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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays in corporate finance. The essays study
the applications of information friction to various contexts in corporate finance.
In the first essay, I study a board’s decision to fire or retain a CEO when board
members care about their reputation in the labor market for directors. These concerns
give the board an incentive to overweight public information and penalize (reward) the
CEO for bad (good) luck, leading to an increase in turnover-performance sensitivity.
I test the empirical predictions of the model using promotions of existing directors as
a proxy for an increase in their reputational concerns. I find turnover-performance
sensitivity is greater when a director is promoted. Further, I find CEO retention
after a director takes on a new role culminates in lower future firm performance.
Overall, the results suggest directors’ incentives due to reputational concerns result
in inefficient firing decisions.
In the second essay, I study the effect of a decrease in the analyst coverage on the
covenants of a firm’s debt contracts. The decrease in analyst coverage is caused by
dismissal of redundant analysts after mergers of brokerage houses during 1984-2005.
I find that the likelihood of inclusion of covenants and the number of covenants in
debt contracts are greater for firms which had lower analyst coverage. These findings
suggest that the creditors take measures to counteract the increase in the agency costs
by increasing the restrictiveness of the contracts.
In the third essay, that is joint work with Sugato Bhattacharyya, I model a firm
run by a manager who invests in a technology with uncertain returns. The man-
ager has incentives to learn about fundamentals from the stock price, as well as to
viii
acquire her own private information to make better investment decisions. However,
such learning increases information asymmetry between the informed trader and the
liquidity traders because the informed trader’s private information now allows him to
predict the manager’s actions. The greater information asymmetry results in greater
price impact and greater price volatility but does not affect the trading volume or
price informativeness. Importantly, the greater information asymmetry that arises
due to the manager acquiring private information (but not the asymmetry due to
her learning from the stock price) results in greater expected profits to the informed
trader. The model suggests that manager’s learning increases the incentives of the
informed trader to gather precise information.
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CHAPTER I
Bad Luck, You’re Fired! Firm Performance and
CEO Dismissal
1.1 Introduction
The board of directors plays a complex and important role in governing a firm.
One of the most important tasks of the board is to appoint and, if needed, replace
a CEO. Directors are elected to the board to represent the interest of the firm’s
shareholders. In an ideal world, the board should maximize shareholder value using
all available information. However, in the real world, the board of directors may
not adhere to maximizing the interests of the shareholders of the firm. The board
of directors has incentives to care about their reputation in the labor market for
directors because favorable reputation is rewarded through additional board seats,
prestige, and compensation of the directors (see, e.g., Levit and Malenko (2016)).
Reputational concerns have been shown to play a role in various settings in the
fields of labor economics and financial economics. e.g. see Scharfstein and Stein
(1990), Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011), Dasgupta and Prat (2008), Chevalier and El-
lison (1999), Hong et al. (2000), and Boyson (2010). Due to these reputational con-
cerns, the board may ignore some private information available while making the
firing and retaining decision. An example where directors’ ignore their private infor-
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mation is the fake accounts scandal of Wells Fargo. In September 2016, regulators
fined Wells Fargo for creating millions of fake bank accounts. Press reports reveal
that board of directors received “regular” reports1 about suspicious activity related
to sales and employee misconduct. It appears that board members chose to ignore
that information and retain the CEO since the firm was performing well.
Do reputational concerns of the board of directors affect CEO dismissal? Existing
research has studied various factors that affect CEO turnover and the sensitivity
of CEO turnover to firm performance. For example, Huson et al. (2004) study the
role of independent directors and institutional shareholders on CEO dismissal. Mobbs
(2013) examines the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity for companies with access
to replacement CEO candidates. He finds that boards with viable internal CEO
replacement alternatives monitor the CEO better. Guo and Masulis (2015) study
the role of board independence on CEO turnover. Jenter and Kanaan (2015) study
whether CEO turnover is affected by factors outside of CEO’s control. Despite so
many important frictions being studied in the literature, still, not many papers2 have
studied the role of directors’ reputational concerns on CEO turnover-performance
sensitivity. My paper aims to fill this gap. I argue that reputational concerns about
how its decision will be perceived in the labor market for directors give the board an
incentive to ignore some of its own information when deciding whether to retain or
fire a CEO. As a result, luck plays a prominent role in the board’s decision to fire or
retain a CEO.
I develop a model in which directors care about both firm value and labor market
perception of their decision. In addition to observing firm performance, the board
receives a private signal about the CEO type. However, the market only observes firm
performance and the board’s decision. Because the market’s information about the
CEO is inferior to that of the board, it perceives the board’s decision to fire (retain) in
1http://fortune.com/2017/04/14/wells-fargo-fake-accounts-2/
2see Masulis and Mobbs (2014) and Fos et al. (2017)
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response to poor (good) firm performance as favorable. When reputational concerns
are high, the board has a greater incentive to fire a CEO after poor performance,
even if it has a good private signal, because that decision is perceived as favorable.
Similarly, after good firm performance, even if it receives a poor private signal, the
board has an incentive to retain a CEO. In other words, the board penalizes (rewards)
the CEO for bad (good) luck.
The model generates three main results. First, the board makes inefficient use of
its own information due to reputational concerns. Because the directors care about the
labor market’s beliefs about their decision, they rely excessively on firm performance
to make firing decisions. CEOs are fired more (less) often than they should after poor
(good) firm performance. Second, when the publicly available information about the
CEO is less precise, the agency friction is more severe, because the board’s additional
information advantage is greater. In this case, the effect of reputational concerns
on turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger. Third, the inefficient decision of
the board results in retaining a bad manager more often. Thus, the future firm
performance of the retained managers declines if the decision to retain is driven by
greater reputational concerns.
The main empirical prediction from the model is that turnover-performance sen-
sitivity increases with directors’ reputational concerns. I test this prediction using
the number of years a director has been in a role (years-in-role) on the board as an
inverse proxy for reputational concerns. I compute this measure at the firm-year level
by taking the average of a director’s years-in-role across all directors on the board. I
find turnover-performance sensitivity is greater in the early years of a director’s role
when directors have greater incentives to care about reputational payoff. In terms of
economic significance, a one-year decrease in a director’s number of years in the role
is associated with a 27% increase in turnover-performance sensitivity.
A clean identification of the relation between directors’ years in their role and
3
turnover-performance sensitivity faces several challenges. One might be concerned
that increases in CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is driven by a less entrenched
board. For instance, serving for a longer time in a role on the board might be
correlated with weaker governance (if the board is entrenched or has stronger ties
with the CEO). Moreover, directors who have served longer in their role may be
better informed about the CEO type. In both scenarios, the longer the time in the
role, the lower the turnover-performance sensitivity. Further, that association reflects
the effect of weaker corporate governance or better information about the CEO type,
instead of reputational concerns.
To address these concerns, I analyze the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity
around the promotions of existing directors. For instance, in a particular year, a
director may be promoted from an Independent Director to a Chairman. I argue that
a director in a new role of greater visibility and responsibility, such as a Chairman
or a Lead Independent Director, will be more careful in making decisions to establish
himself as a smart director. Thus, I only consider the promotions in which a director
takes on a new role of a Chairman or a Lead Independent Director. I label the
firm year in which at least one of the directors on the board undergoes a promotion
as treatment firm-year. For each year in the sample period, I use nearest-neighbor
propensity score matching to obtain a set of control firms that are similar to the
pre-role-change treated firms. Using the matched set of treated and control firms, I
examine the effect of a promotion of a director on the turnover-performance sensitivity
for treated firms over a four-year period before and after the promotion, relative to
control firms at which no such promotion occurs. I find the promotion in the treated
firms is associated with a 28% increase in the turnover-performance sensitivity over
a four-year period.
The identifying assumption is that any confounding factor, such as board’s pri-
vate information or board entrenchment that affects the CEO turnover-performance
4
sensitivity, affects the treatment and control group in the same manner. Another
advantage of using the promotion of existing directors to capture the effect of repu-
tational concerns is as follows. Because the tenure of the existing directors increases
after the promotion, on average, the board’s entrenchment, if anything, should in-
crease after the promotion. Thus, in the years after the promotion, the board’s greater
entrenchment should decrease turnover-performance sensitivity. On the contrary, I
find turnover-performance sensitivity increases after the promotion.
The test of the second prediction of the model allows me to shed some light on
the drivers of the main result. The model predicts that the effect of reputational
concerns on turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger for firms at which the public
information about the CEO is worse. I capture the precision of public information
about the CEO using three proxies: the number of analysts following the firm, size
(measured by market capitalization) of the firm, and institutional ownership of the
firm. For all three proxies, a lower measure signifies worse public information about
the CEO. I divide the sample into three groups sorted by each proxy. I estimate the
effect of director promotions on turnover-performance sensitivity using the matched
set of treatment and control firms for the bottom and top tercile. I find the effect of
a promotion on turnover-performance sensitivity is mainly driven by firms that are
followed by fewer analysts, are smaller in size, and have lower institutional ownership.
The result on greater CEO turnover-performance sensitivity after director pro-
motions suggests that an increase in reputational concerns affects CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity. However, there can be alternative explanations for the same
result. Perhaps, only boards with weaker governance have promotions as a mechanism
to strengthen corporate governance. For instance, the director promotion happens
in response to CEO or Chairman entrenchment, so entrenchment will be correlated
with promotion. Perhaps shareholder activists drive promotions on the board as well
as turnover-performance sensitivity. The test of the third empirical prediction of the
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model allows me to alleviate some of those concerns. Importantly, this test helps me
to distinguish my story from alternative stories that may associate the increase in
turnover-performance sensitivity after promotions with improved governance.
The third prediction is that the directors’ reputational concerns lead to retaining
the bad-type manager too often. To test this prediction, I compare the future firm
performance of the retained managers of treated firms before and after the promotion
relative to those of control firms. If boards with weaker governance, for instance,
board with entrenched Chairman, are self-selected into the treatment group and the
promotion improves internal governance, then the pool of retained managers should
consist of prominently good-type managers, leading to better future firm performance.
On the contrary, I find the future firm performance of retained managers declines for
treated firms after the promotion. In terms of economic significance, the future firm
performance (measured by the average firm profitability over three years) decreases
by 1.3% for treated firms after a promotion. This result suggest the directors’ repu-
tational concerns may result in inefficient retention of bad-type managers.
I conduct several robustness tests on the main results. I use the equity compensa-
tion of directors as a proxy of alignment of their interest with the shareholders. I find
turnover-performance sensitivity is lower when the proportion of equity compensa-
tion to total compensation of directors is high. I use board tenure as another inverse
proxy for reputational concerns. I find turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for
directors with longer tenure. I also use director deaths as an exogenous shock to a
board’s years-in-role and board tenure (arrival of new replacement directors). I find
turnover-performance sensitivity is greater in the five-year period after the director
death compared to five years before the director death.
In the empirical analyses, I control for CEO age, CEO tenure, firm size, board
size, book leverage, board’s busyness, proportion of non-executive directors on the
board, and directors’ past experience. I also include year, industry, industry-times-
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year and firm fixed effects to control for any time-specific macro shock, time-invariant
or time-varying (observable or unobservable) industry specific variables, or time in-
variant (observable or unobservable) firm-specific variables. The main results remain
unchanged.
My paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, my study is related to
the literature on CEO turnover.3 Two papers closest to my paper are Dow (2013) and
Fisman et al. (2013). Dow (2013) analyzes a model in which the board retains the
CEO more because firing sends a bad signal about firm prospects and increases the
cost of capital. In that model, firing is a value-maximizing decision. Instead, in my
paper, an agency friction exists between the board and the shareholders. Directors
retain the CEO after good firm performance despite poor private information because
they care about the labor market’s beliefs about their decision. Fisman et al. (2013)
show board entrenchment improves the firing decision. By contrast, in my paper, the
agency friction between the board and the shareholders represented by the directors’
reputational concerns lead them to make inefficient firing decisions.
Second, several papers have analyzed the role of board of directors in corporate
governance.4 My study is related to the papers that study the impact of labor market
for directors on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Fos et al. (2017) examine elec-
toral incentives of the directors and show that when directors are closer to election,
turnover-performance sensitivity is greater. Masulis and Mobbs (2014) examine rep-
utation incentives of directors and show turnover-performance sensitivity is greater
for firms that directors consider more prestigious. In these papers, higher turnover-
performance sensitivity is interpreted as an improvement in board monitoring. My
3see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Adams and Ferreira (2007), Kaplan and Minton (2012),
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner et al. (1988), Huson et al. (2004), Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013),
Huson et al. (2001), Taylor (2010), Cornelli et al. (2013), Huang et al. (2015), Denis and Denis (1995).
4See Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Adams et al. (2010) for a survey. Various papers
have studied the role of busy boards (Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Falato et al. (2014)), co-
opted boards (Coles et al. (2014)), female directors (Adams and Ferreira (2009)), outside directors
(Weisbach (1988), Duchin et al. (2010), Guo and Masulis (2015)), and directors’ financial expertise
(Gu¨ner et al. (2008)) in corporate governance.
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paper contributes to this literature in the following ways. First, it provides a novel
measure to proxy for reputational concerns of the board. Second, I provide a novel
perspective on turnover-performance sensitivity. The findings suggest the increase in
turnover-performance sensitivity reflects the higher agency friction between the board
and shareholders. As a result, the future firm performance is lower when managers
are retained due to reputational concerns.
Third, my paper is related to the broad idea in which myopic concerns may lead the
agents to make inefficient decisions (Stein (1989)). Brandenburger and Polak (1996)
show that stock price concerns may lead managers to partly ignore their superior
information. Gao et al. (2017) suggest that investor myopia may lead to greater
turnover-performance sensitivity in public firms relative to private firms. Similarly,
in my paper, the board that cares more about the market perception, is more likely
to dismiss the CEO in response to poor firm performance, even if it receives a good
private signal. Finally, my paper also complements the papers that study the role of
luck in CEO compensation (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Gopalan et al. (2010),
Garvey and Milbourn (2006)) and CEO dismissal (Jenter and Kanaan (2015), Jenter
and Lewellen (2017), Fee et al. (2017), Cheng and Indjejikian (2009)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe
the model, obtain the comparative statics, and build empirical predictions of the
model. In Section 3, I describe the research design, data, and variables and test the
hypotheses using regression models. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 Model
The model uses three dates: 0, 1, and 2. At date 0, a manager works on a project.
The project produces an output y1 at date t = 1 and y2 at date t = 2. The manager
can be of two types, good (g) and bad (b). The good-type manager is drawn with a
probability of 1
2
. The distribution of yt depends on the type of the manager working
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on the project from t − 1 to t. The output y can be either high (yh) or low (yl). I
assume a good-type manager generates output yh with probability ψ and output yl
with probability 1 − ψ. A bad-type manager generates output yh with probability
1−ψ and output yl with probability ψ where ψ > 0.5. For simplicity, I assume yh = 1
and yl = 0.
At date 1, output y1 is realized. The board observes a signal s about the manager
type after output has been realized. A good-type manager generates a signal sg with
probability α and signal sb with probability 1− α. A bad-type manager generates a
signal sg with probability 1−α and sb with probability α. Once the board has received
the signal s, it decides to fire or retain the manager. If retained, the manager continues
to work for the second period and produces output y2 at t = 2. If the manager is
fired, the board has to hire a new manager. The new manager works for the second
period and produces output y2 depending on his type.
The market does not observe the signal received by the board, but it observes
the board’s firing decision and updates its beliefs about the manager type using the
firm output and the board’s decision. Denote the market’s posterior beliefs about the
manager type by µ.
The board cares about long-term firm value and the labor market’s beliefs about
the board’s decision. The directors on the board have incentives to care about labor
market beliefs because favorable beliefs are rewarded through additional board seats,
prestige, and compensation of the directors (see, e.g., Levit and Malenko (2016)). In
the paper, I do not explicitly model board with different types. See Dow (2013) for
a model in which the board’s ability to select CEOs can vary. However, implicitly
rewarding the directors based on favorable beliefs about their decision provides the
labor market a way to screen the good directors from the bad ones who, perhaps,
choose to fire randomly. That is, the directors’ decision to fire the manager has to be
correlated with the directors’ ability. Directors with worse ability will make wrong
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decisions. In other words, if the market believes that the board has fired (retained) the
bad (good) type manager, then it must be that the directors are good. For simplicity,
I assume the board receives a reward 1 if the labor market believes the fired manager
is a bad type or a retained manager is a good type, and 0 if the market believes the
fired manager is a good type or a retained manager is a bad type. The results of the
model will remain the same if I assume the reward to be 1 and −1 instead of 1 and 0.
I define the labor market beliefs about the board’s decision to fire (retain) as more
favorable to the board if the posterior probability that the manager is a bad (good)
type given that he is fired (retained) is higher. I define the board’s payoff by firing
as (1−β)v+βµ(b|f), where v denotes the expected cash flows of the firm from t = 1
to t = 2 and µ(b|f) denotes the market’s belief that the fired manager is a bad type.
Because the reputational payoff is 1 (0) if the market believes the fired manager is a
bad (good) type, µ(b|f) is also equal to the expected reputational payoff the board
receives. Similarly, the board’s payoff by retaining is defined as (1 − β)v + βµ(g|r),
where µ(g|r) denotes the market’s belief that the retained manager is a good type.
β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the extent of reputational concerns of the board of directors.
From the market’s perspective, two states of the world exist: high-output state
H and a low-output state L. I analyze perfect Bayesian equilibria in both states of
the world. In any equilibrium of the game, the board receives signal sg or signal sb.
The board has to decide to fire or retain the manager upon receiving both signals.
Denote Ag as the board with signal sg, and Ab as the board with signal sb. To simplify
exposition, if the board with signal sg (sb) retains or fires the manager, I say board
Ag (Ab) retains or fires the manager, respectively.
First, I examine the equilibria when α < ψ; that is, the precision of the board’s
private information is worse than the precision of information in output. In the lemma
below, I show that in those equilibria, the agency friction β does not play a role in
the firing decision.
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In state H, board Ag beliefs about a good-type manager are strengthened by the
realization of output H. Because α < ψ, information in output dominates the board’s
information. Board Ab beliefs that the manager is a good type is more than the prior
0.5. Thus, retaining the manager maximizes firm value for both Ag and Ab.
Suppose an equilibrium exists in which both Ag and Ab choose to retain the
manager. In this equilibrium, the board’s decision to retain the manager does not
give any information about the board’s signal to the market. Thus, the equilibrium
expected reputational payoff by retaining is ψ (because the state is H). Firing is
off-equilibrium.
This equilibrium is sustained by an off-equilibrium belief that the board has signal
sb given that the manager is fired. Thus, the labor market beliefs that the fired
manager is a bad type is smaller than the prior 0.5 (because α < ψ). It implies the
reputational payoff by firing is smaller than the equilibrium reputational payoff by
retaining (ψ). Thus, retaining the manager maximizes the reputational payoff too.
Therefore, it is strictly dominant for boards Ag and Ab to retain the manager for all
β ∈ [0, 1].
Similarly, in state L, because α < ψ, the board’s payoff from the project is smaller
than the payoff from firing and hiring a new manager. Thus, firing the manager max-
imizes firm value. This equilibrium is sustained by an off-equilibrium belief that the
board has signal sg given that the manager is retained. The equilibrium reputational
payoff by firing (ψ) is also greater than the reputational payoff by retaining (smaller
than 0.5). Therefore, it is strictly dominant for boards Ag and Ab to fire the manager
for all β ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma I.1. If α < ψ and
(a) state is H, a pooling equilibrium exists in which the board with signal sg and the
board with signal sb retain the manager for all β ∈ [0, 1].
(b) state is L, a pooling equilibrium exists in which the board with signal sg and the
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board with signal sb fire the manager for all β ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See Appendix. 
This lemma shows that the agency friction does not play a role in the board’s
decision when α < ψ. Because board’s information is less precise than the information
in output, both the market’s and the board’s beliefs are more responsive to the latter.
In state H (L), the board’s expected cash flows by retaining (firing) is greater than
the expected cash flows by firing (retaining). Further, the board’s decision to retain
(fire) is perceived as more favorable than the board’s decision to fire (retain) in state
H (L). Thus, the board’s optimal strategy is to retain the manager in state H and
fire the manager in state L.
Next, I analyze the more interesting set of equilibria when α > ψ. That is, the
board’s private information about the manager type is better than the information
in output. In that set of equilibria, the agency friction β plays a significant role in
the board’s strategy.
1.2.1 State H
First, consider the case in which the state is H. Suppose an equilibrium exists in
which Ag retains. In this equilibrium, Ab faces a trade-off between firing and retaining
the manager. Because Ab has signal sb, it is pessimistic about the future cash flows
of the project from the retained manager. If Ab retains the manager, it receives lower
expected cash flows from the project than by firing and hiring a new manager. Thus,
firm shareholders would want Ab to fire the manager. On the other hand, by retaining
the manager, Ab pools with Ag, leading to a greater reputational payoff. The reason
is that, in state H, the board’s decision to retain is perceived as more favorable than
the board’s decision to fire. Thus, the reputational payoff provides incentives to Ab
to ignore its signal and retain the manager.
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By firing the manager, Ab receives a greater payoff from the project, but reveals
its signal to the market, thereby lowering the reputational payoff, because the market
perceives the decision to fire in state H as less favorable. Therefore, if β is small
enough, the payoff from the project dominates the reputational payoff and the board
Ab chooses to follow its own signal and fire the manager.
Define βs(α, ψ):
βs(α, ψ) =
1
1 + 2α(1−α)
(α−ψ)(ψα+(1−ψ)(1−α))
.
If Ag retains the manager, it receives a greater payoff from the project because
signal sg strengthens the board’s beliefs about the manager being a good type in state
H. Further, it receives a greater reputational payoff because the market’s beliefs about
the board’s decision to retain are more favorable in state H. Therefore, it is optimal
for Ag to retain the manager for all β.
If β < βs(α, ψ) , the board prefers to maximize firm value; therefore, board Ab
relies on its signal sb and chooses to fire the manager. If β > βs(α, ψ), the higher
reputational payoff by retaining the manager in state H gives incentives to board Ab
to ignore its signal and retain the manager.
If β is very high, the higher reputational payoff by retaining the manager outweighs
the low expected cash flows due to pessimistic beliefs of board Ab. In that case, Ab
has incentives to pool with Ag and retain the manager. This equilibrium is sustained
by an off-equilibrium belief that the manager is being fired by board Ab. If either
board Ag or Ab deviates to firing, it receives the same payoff (a combination of project
payoffs from a new manager and reputational payoff by firing). In this equilibrium,
the reputational payoff by retaining is equal to ψ. The payoff from the project is
greater for Ag than for Ab because signal sg makes the board more optimistic about
future cash flows from the project. Thus, overall, Ag receives a higher equilibrium
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payoff than Ab. Therefore, if any board deviates to firing, the market must believe it
is Ab.
Define
βp(α, ψ) =
1
1 + 2ψ
2(1−α)−(1−ψ)2α
(α−ψ)(2ψ−1)
.
If β > βp(α, ψ), board Ab chooses to ignore its private information and retain the
manager. The expected project payoff from the retained manager is lower, but the
reputational payoff overcomes the decrease in the expected project payoff. Thus, it
is an optimal strategy for the board Ab to retain the manager.
If β is in the range [βs,min(βp, 1)], a hybrid equilibrium exists in which Ag retains
the manager and Ab is indifferent between firing and retaining the manager.
Suppose the market believes the board Ab fires with probability one. In that case,
if the market observes retention, it must believe the manager is retained by board
Ag. If Ag retains the manager in state H, its reputational payoff is high because the
board’s decision to retain is perceived as more favorable than the board’s decision to
fire. This gives incentives to board Ab to retain the manager. If β > βs, the board
puts enough weight on the reputational payoff such that the separating equilibrium
fails to hold and Ab does not fire with probability one.
Now, suppose the market believes board Ab retains with probability one. In this
case, the reputational payoff from retaining is equal to ψ: this reputational payoff
from retaining the manager is lower than that in the separating equilibrium when Ab
fires the manager. Thus, the incentives for board Ab to retain the manager are lower.
If β < min(βp, 1), the pooling equilibrium fails to hold.
In the hybrid equilibrium, Ab is indifferent between firing and retaining the man-
ager. It fires the manager with probability δh. I summarize the results of this section
in the following proposition.
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Proposition I.2. If α > ψ and
(a) β < βs(α, ψ), a separating equilibrium exists in which the board with signal sg
retains the manager and the board with signal sb fires the manager.
(b) β ∈ [βs(α, ψ),min(βp(α, ψ), 1)], a hybrid equilibrium exists in which the board
with signal sg retains the manager and the board with signal sb mixes between firing
and retaining the manager.
(c) β > βp(α, ψ), a pooling equilibrium exists in which both the board with signal sg
and the board with signal sb retain the manager.
Proof. See Appendix. 
1.2.2 State L
Next, consider the case in which the state is L. In contrast to the previous section,
in this state, it is optimal for board Ab to fire the manager for all β ∈ [0, 1], whereas
board Ag faces a trade-off between retaining and firing the manager. Due to the
symmetric structure of the game, the intuition for the existence of various equilibria
follows the same logic. Further, the parameter range of β necessary for the existence
of the set of equilibria also remains the same. In this section, I briefly describe the
intuition for the existence of a set of equilibria in state L.
Suppose an equilibrium exists in which Ab fires. In this equilibrium, Ag is opti-
mistic about the future cash flows of the project from the retained manager. If Ag
retains the manager, it receives greater expected cash flows from the project. Thus,
shareholders would prefer Ag to retain the manager. On the other hand, by firing the
manager, Ag pools with Ab, leading to a greater reputational payoff. The reason is
that, in state L, the board’s decision to fire is perceived as more favorable than the
board’s decision to retain. Therefore, the reputational payoff provides incentives to
Ag to ignore its signal and fire the manager.
Therefore, if β is small enough, the payoff from the project dominates the rep-
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utational payoff and the board Ag chooses to follow its own signal and retain the
manager. Specifically, if β < βs(α, ψ), a separating equilibrium exists in which the
board relies on its own signal to make the firing decision: Ag retains the manager and
Ab fires the manager.
If Ab fires the manager, it receives a greater project payoff from the new manager
because, in state L, signal sb strengthens the board’s beliefs about the manager being
a bad type. Further, it receives a greater reputational payoff because market’s beliefs
about the board’s decision to fire are more favorable in state L. Therefore, it is
optimal for Ab to fire the manager for all β.
If β < βs(α, ψ), the board prefers to maximize firm value; thus, board Ag relies
on its signal sg and chooses to retain the manager. If β > βs(α, ψ), the higher
reputational payoff by firing the manager in state L gives incentives to board Ag to
ignore its signal and fire the manager.
If β is very high, the higher reputational payoff by firing the manager outweighs
the decrease in cash flows for board Ag. In that case, Ag has incentives to pool with
Ab and fire the manager. This equilibrium is sustained by an off-equilibrium belief
that board Ag is retaining the manager. In contrast to the pooling equilibrium in
state H, in this state, the equilibrium payoff from firing the manager is the same for
board Ag and Ab. Upon deviating to retaining, board Ag receives a higher payoff
because it has signal sg that makes it optimistic about the expected cash flows from
the project. Therefore, if any board deviates to retaining, the market must believe it
is Ag.
Thus, this pooling equilibrium in which Ag and Ab fire the manager exists if
β > βp(α, ψ). In this equilibrium, board Ag chooses to ignore its private information
and fire the manager, because firing in state L provides a higher reputational payoff.
If β is in range [βs,min(βp, 1)], a hybrid equilibrium exists in which Ab fires the
manager and Ag is indifferent between firing and retaining the manager. I denote the
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probability of firing the manager in state L by δl.
Suppose the market believes the board Ag retains with probability one. In that
case, the reputational payoff provides incentives to Ag to ignore its signal and fire
the manager. If β > βs, the reputational payoff breaks the separating equilibrium,
and Ag does not retain with probability one. Now, suppose the market believes the
board Ag fires with probability one. In this case, the reputational payoff from firing
is equal to ψ: this reputational payoff from firing is lower than that in the separating
equilibrium when Ag retains the manager. Thus, the reputational payoff breaks the
pooling equilibrium if β < min(βp, 1).
I summarize the results of this section in the following proposition.
Proposition I.3. If α > ψ and
(a) β < βs(α, ψ), a separating equilibrium exists in which the board with signal sg
retains the manager and the board with signal sb fires the manager.
(b) β ∈ [βs(α, ψ),min(βp(α, ψ), 1)], a hybrid equilibrium exists in which the board with
signal sg mixes between firing and retaining the manager and the board with signal sb
fires the manager.
(c) β > βp(α, ψ), a pooling equilibrium exists in which both the board with signal sg
and the board with signal sb fire the manager.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The thresholds βs and βp are the same as in proposition I.2 (state H). The main
difference, however, is that in state H, the reputational payoff provides incentives to
board Ab to retain the manager because the market believes retaining is the correct
decision. In state L, however, the reputational payoff provides incentives to board Ag
to fire the manager, because the market believes firing is the correct decision. So, if
β is high, board Ag chooses to ignore its own signal sg and fire the manager.
The figure above shows the parameter space of α and β for the existence of the
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Figure 1.1:
This figure shows the equilibrium cut-offs in the model. The parameter
values used are ψ = 0.6.
set of equilibria in state H and state L in a numerical example. The parameter ψ is
set equal to 0.6. The solid line shows the values of β that separates the separating
and hybrid equilibria in both states. If β < βs, board Ab (Ag) uses its own private
signal and fires (retains) the manager in state H (L). This firing decision is efficient
because the board uses its own private signal. If β > βs, the reputational payoff
provides incentives to the board to ignore its own signal and choose a decision the
market believes to be correct. Therefore, Ab (Ag) has incentives to retain (fire) the
manager in state H (L). The dashed line shows the values of β that separate the
hybrid and pooling equilibria in both states. If β > βp, board Ab (Ag) ignores its
information completely and retains (fires) the manager in state H (L). Thus, board
makes inefficient firing decisions (when β > βs and α > ψ) by partially or completely
ignoring its private information.
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1.2.3 Comparative Statics
In this section, I obtain the comparative statics with respect to the main parameter
of the model (β). First, I analyze how the sensitivity of CEO dismissal to firm
performance is affected by β. Second, I examine how the strength of this relationship
changes when the board’s information is relatively more or less precise than the public
information. Finally, I examine the consequence of the board’s inefficient decision due
to the incentives from reputational concerns. In particular, I analyze how the board’s
reputational concerns affect the future performance of the firm.
1.2.3.1 CEO Turnover
In this section, I analyze how the board’s reputational concerns affect the sen-
sitivity of the probability of firing to firm performance. First, I obtain the partial
derivative of δh with respect to β:
δh = f
−1
(
(1− β)(α− ψ)(2ψ − 1)
2β(ψ(1− α) + α(1− ψ)) +
(1− ψ)α
(1− ψ)α + (1− α)ψ
)
where
f(x) =
ψ(α + (1− α)(1− x))
ψ(α + (1− α)(1− x)) + (1− ψ)(α(1− x) + (1− α)) .
.
Because f(x) is an increasing function, the equilibrium firing probability (δh) of
board Ab in state H is decreasing in β. If the board fires the manager more when
its signal is poor, retention becomes a more credible signal about the board’s good
information.
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Next, I obtain the partial derivative of δl with respect to β:
δl = g
−1
(
(1− β)(α− ψ)(2ψ − 1)
2β(ψ(1− α) + α(1− ψ)) +
(1− ψ)α
(1− ψ)α + (1− α)ψ
)
where
g(x) =
ψ(α + (1− α)x)
ψ(α + (1− α)x) + (1− ψ)(αx+ (1− α)) .
Notice that g(x) is decreasing in x. Therefore, the equilibrium firing probability
(δl) of board Ag in state L is increasing in β.
Next, I compare the unconditional ex-ante probability of firing the manager in
state H and state L as β goes from 0 to 1. First, I obtain the probability of firing
the manager in state H. If α > ψ and β < βs, the board fires the manager after
signal sb in both states. The probability that the board receives sb in state H is equal
to ψ(1 − α) + (1 − ψ)α. If β ∈ (βs,min(βp, 1)), the board fires the manager upon
receiving sb with probability δh. The probability of firing the manager in that range
is equal to (ψ(1 − α) + (1 − ψ)α)δh. If β > βp, the board retains the manager after
both signals.
In state L, if α > ψ and β < βs, the board fires the manager after sb. The
probability that the board receives sb in state L is equal to (1 − ψ)(1 − α) + ψα.
If β ∈ (βs, βp), the board fires the manager after sb and with probability δl after
receiving sg. The probability of firing the manager in that range is equal to (1 −
ψ)(1 − α) + ψα + (ψ(1 − α) + (1 − ψ)α)δl. If β > βp, the board fires the manager
after both signals.
Because δh is decreasing with β and δl is increasing with β, overall, the turnover-
performance sensitivity increases with β. I summarize this result in the following
proposition.
Proposition I.4. If α > ψ and β ∈ [βs,min(βp, 1)], the probability of firing the
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manager in state H (L) is decreasing (increasing) with β.
Next, I analyze how the parameter ψ affects the above relation between the proba-
bility of firing and β in state H and state L. The result of the above proposition holds
only if α > ψ. It implies turnover-performance sensitivity increases with β, only for
firms where the board’s private information is relatively more precise than the public
information. Lemma I.1 shows if α < ψ, turnover-performance sensitivity does not
vary with β. It suggests that for firms where the board’s private information is rel-
atively less precise than public information, turnover-performance sensitivity should
remain the same for high β and low β firms.
1.2.3.2 Ex-Post Performance
In this section, I analyze how the board’s decision affects the performance of the
firm in the second period. If the board retains the manager due to reputational
concerns, it is making an inefficient decision. In particular, if the board retains the
manager despite its poor signal, that manager is more likely to have a bad type,
leading to poor performance in the second period.
In state H, Ag retains the manager for all β ∈ [0, 1]. Board Ab relies on its own
signal and fires the manager if β < βs. If β ∈ [βs,min(βp, 1)], a hybrid equilibrium
exists in which Ab fires the manager with probability δh and retains otherwise. In this
equilibrium, conditional on retention, the probability that the manager in the second
period has a good type is
ψ(α + (1− α)(1− δh))
ψ(α + (1− α)(1− δh)) + (1− ψ)(α(1− δh) + (1− α)) .
In state H, the board fires the manager less often if β is high (see Proposition I.4).
This greater retention of the CEO decreases the value of retention as a signal of a
good manager. Thus, given that the manager is retained, the posterior beliefs that
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he is a good type is lower if β is high. Similarly, in state L, Ab fires the manager for
all β ∈ [0, 1]. Board Ag relies on its own signal and retains the manager if β < βs. If
β ∈ [βs,min(βp, 1)], a hybrid equilibrium exists in which Ag fires the manager with
probability δl and retains otherwise. In this equilibrium, retention reveals the board’s
signal. Therefore, conditional on retention, the probability that the manager in the
second period is a good type does not vary with β.
Therefore, across states H and L, it is easy to see that given the manager is
retained, the probability that he is a good type decreases with β. In that case, the
expected cash flows in the second period are also decreasing with β because they are
determined using the distribution of the retained-manager type.
Corollary I.5. If α > ψ and β ∈ [βs,min(βp, 1)], then given that the manager is
retained, the expected cash flows in the second period are decreasing with β.
Instead, if the board chooses to fire the manager, he is replaced with a new
manager. In the model, I have implicitly assumed the career of the fired manager
ends after firing. Therefore, the model does not generate any comparative statics of
the future performance of the manager who is fired.
1.2.4 Empirical Predictions
In this section, I develop empirical predictions on the relation between reputa-
tional concerns and turnover-performance sensitivity using the comparative statics
of the model. The first prediction builds on the comparative statics with respect to
parameter β in the model. The model predicts that, all else equal, if α < ψ, the sen-
sitivity of CEO turnover with respect to performance does not vary with β. However,
if α > ψ, the sensitivity of CEO turnover with respect to performance increases with
β.
In the model, parameter α represents the precision of board’s information. This
parameter α might vary across firms. Thus, turnover-performance sensitivity in-
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creases with β for firms that have higher values of this parameter, and does not
change with β for firms that have lower values of this parameter. However, on av-
erage, one would expect CEO turnover-performance sensitivity to increase with the
board’s reputational concerns (β). This results in the below hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. CEO dismissal is more sensitive to firm performance when the board’s
reputational concerns are higher.
To test this hypothesis, I need to construct a proxy for reputational concerns of
directors on the board. I exploit the promotions of a director to capture the director’s
reputational concerns. The motivation for using this approach is based on the idea
that in the early years of their role on the board, directors have greater reputational
concerns (Holmstro¨m (1999)). In the literature, researchers have used several proxies
related to an agent’s tenure to capture reputational/career concerns. Hong et al.
(2000) study the career outcomes of security analysts and show inexperienced analysts
face a greater threat of termination for inaccurate forecasts than experienced analysts.
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) study mutual fund managers and show younger managers
face a greater threat of termination for poor performance than older managers. Lim
et al. (2016) show younger hedge funds receive greater future flows upon good current
performance.
Recall that in this model, director’s reputational concerns affect their firing deci-
sions only if they have better information about the CEO type. So although director’s
age and experience on other boards may affect their long-term reputation, to have
better information about the CEO, the director must have a seat on that firm’s board.
Therefore, a director’s years-in-role is a reasonable way to capture his reputational
concerns, because it allows the directors to obtain a signal about that firm’s CEO.
I describe other advantages of using this approach in the Research Design section
below.
The second prediction builds on how the comparative statics in proposition I.4
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change with respect to parameter ψ in the model. Parameter ψ represents the preci-
sion of information about the CEO type that can be extracted from firm performance.
The model predicts that if ψ is high relative to α, turnover-performance sensitivity
does not change with reputational concerns. When ψ is low relative to α, turnover-
performance sensitivity increases with the board’s reputational concerns.
The model results remain the same if the parameter ψ is interpreted as the mar-
ket’s beliefs about the CEO type given all publicly available information, not just firm
performance. Arguably, when a firm has a higher number of analysts following, the
publicly available information is more precise relative to the board’s private informa-
tion. The role of analysts is to provide a comprehensive analysis of cash flows of the
firm and to provide forecasts to the investor community. This role requires them to
obtain information about the drivers of future prospects of the firm including, but not
limited to, CEO characteristics. Therefore, a greater number of analysts following a
firm increases the precision of public information about the CEO characteristics.
In addition, firms with a larger market capitalization and greater institutional
ownership have stronger external governance mechanisms that increase the precision
of publicly available information. For instance, proxy fights by activists attract media
and investor attention, thus providing an additional signal about the firm/CEO type
to the market and improving the precision of public information. This results in the
below hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. The effect of reputational concerns on turnover-performance sensitivity
is stronger for firms that are followed by fewer analysts, are smaller, and have lower
institutional ownership.
The third prediction analyzes the consequences of a board’s inefficient decision
due to reputational concerns. The model predicts the board, due to reputational
concerns, may ignore its private information and retain the manager despite its poor
signal. In that case, the retained manager would be associated with lower future
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performance of the firm.
Hypothesis 3. The ex-post firm performance of the retained manager is lower when
board of directors’ reputational concerns are high.
The reputational concerns are measured using the same approach as in Hypothesis
1. For future firm performance, I compute the average firm performance (using ROA
as a measure of firm profitability) for three years after the firing decision from year
t+ 1 to t+ 3.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I describe the research design, data and variables, test the hy-
potheses using regression models, and present the results.
1.3.1 Research Design
The main empirical prediction from the model is that turnover-performance sen-
sitivity increases with the reputational concerns of the board of directors. I use the
number of years a director has been in a role on the board as an inverse proxy for
reputational concerns. A director who is new in a role has greater reputational con-
cerns, because that director may want to create a favorable reputation of making the
right decision regarding CEO dismissal.
A clean identification of the relation between directors’ years-in-role and turnover-
performance sensitivity faces several challenges. One might be concerned that a
director’s longer time on the board may be correlated with weaker governance (board
entrenchment, stronger ties with the CEO). Moreover, a director with longer tenure in
a role on the board may be better informed about the CEO type because the director
has spent more time with the CEO. Both scenarios predict that a director’s longer
tenure in a role on the board is associated with lower turnover-performance sensitivity.
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Therefore, by using a director’s years-in-role, I may be spuriously capturing the effect
of weaker corporate governance or better information.
To address these concerns, I use the following approach. I track the changes
in the role of a director within the board. For instance, in a particular year, a
director’s may be promoted from an Independent Director to a Lead Independent
Director or from an Independent Director to a Chairman. I create an indicator
variable PromotionDirectoridt that takes the value of one in the year t in which
the director d of firm i is promoted, and zero otherwise. Then, I create a variable
Promotionit that takes the value of one for firm i in year t, if at least one director is
promoted in that year and zero otherwise.
This approach addresses two main concerns that may drive the relationship be-
tween a director’s years-in-role and turnover-performance sensitivity in the following
way. I only consider the new role of existing directors who were on the board and
experienced a promotion. I do not count the directors who have been assigned a
new role and are new to the board too. This approach alleviates the concern that
a director in a new role is also new to the board and therefore is relatively less en-
trenched, leading to greater turnover-performance sensitivity. Because the tenure of
the existing directors who undergo a promotion increases after the promotion, board
entrenchment should, if anything, increase. Second, this approach addresses the con-
cern that a director in a new role may be uninformed about the CEO type and that
lack of information, instead of reputational concerns, drives the sensitivity of CEO
turnover to firm performance. Again, because the tenure of the existing directors
who experience a promotion increases after the promotion, the board’s information
should, if anything, increase.
To cleanly identify the change in turnover-performance sensitivity due to a pro-
motion, I need to observe the turnover-performance sensitivity for the same firm with
and without a promotion. Because this ideal counterfactual cannot be observed, I ob-
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tain the change in turnover-performance sensitivity for similar firms where the board
of directors did not undergo a promotion. To obtain similar firms, I match the pre-
role-change (treatment) firm-year observations using propensity score matching to a
set of potential control firms. Specifically, for each year t, I use the nearest-neighbor
matching to match the firms in which the variable Promotion takes the value of one
in year t + 1 to a set of firms in the same year t for which the variable Promotion
takes the value of zero in year t+1. The set of firms that are closest in the propensity
score of the treatment firm-years are labelled as the control firm-years. I use the
following firm, board, and CEO characteristics for matching: two-digit SIC industry,
size (measured by log Sales and log Assets), firm profitability (measured by ROA),
average number of years in the role on the board, average board tenure, CEO age,
CEO tenure, board size, book leverage, board’s busyness, fraction of non-executive
directors, and board experience.
The identifying assumption is that any confounding factor, such as board’s pri-
vate information or board entrenchment that affects the CEO turnover-performance
sensitivity, affects the treatment and control group in the same manner. The match-
ing of treatment and control groups on observable characteristics suggests that the
assumption holds. However, the assumption might be violated if there are some un-
observable characteristics that affect the treatment and control group in a different
manner. For example, the boards that have promotions might have had weaker gov-
ernance before the promotion, and the promotion is a mechanism to strengthen the
corporate governance. To alleviate this concern, I conduct another test, in which I
compare the ex-post performance of the retained managers before and after the pro-
motion relative to control firms in which no such promotion occurs (Hypothesis 3).
If the boards with weaker governance are self-selected into the treatment group that
undergo a promotion, then, relative to control firms, I expect to observe an increase
in performance. On the contrary, I show below that, relative to control firms, the
27
future performance declines for treated firms after the promotion.
1.3.2 Data and Variables
The data on CEO characteristics are from ExecuComp. All CEO changes in
ExecuComp are classified as forced or voluntary. Following Parrino (1997), any CEO
change recorded in ExecuComp is classified as forced, using press reports and an
age criterion. Peters and Wagner (2014) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) describe the
methodology in detail.5 The data on board characteristics are from BoardEx. The
data on firm characteristics are from Compustat and CRSP. The final matched data
sample consists of 2,880 firms in the period 2000-2014.
The main variable of interest in the empirical analysis is the proxy for the rep-
utational concerns of directors. I use the number of years a director has been in a
role on the board as an inverse proxy for reputational concerns. For a director d at
firm i in year t, I obtain the number of years the director has been in that role on
the board of that firm up to and including year t. I aggregate this measure at the
firm-year level (TRit) by taking the average of directors’ years-in-role on the board
across all directors on the board of firm i in year t.
As a robustness test, I construct two more proxies for the reputational concerns
of directors. First, I obtain the equity compensation of directors as a measure of
alignment of their interests with the shareholders of the firm. If their interests are well
aligned with the shareholders, the directors care less about their payoff in the labor
market. For a director d at firm i in year t, the equity compensation (Eidt) is obtained
as a proportion of total compensation based on the closing stock price of the annual
report date in that year. I aggregate the equity compensation of directors at the
firm-year level (Eit) by taking the average of the proportion of equity compensation
to total compensation across all directors on the board of firm i in year t.
5I am grateful to Dirk Jenter, Florian Peters, and Alexander Wagner for graciously sharing the
data with me.
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Second, I obtain the directors’ tenure on the board as a proxy for the reputational
concerns. In the early years of their tenure, the directors’ actions have a greater affect
on their future payoff through additional board seats, larger network, and prestige.
Therefore, directors would care about reputational payoff more in the early years of
their tenure than in the later years. For a director d at firm i in year t, I obtain the
number of years the director has been on the board of that firm up to and including
year t. I aggregate this measure at the firm-year level (Tit) by taking the average of
directors’ tenure on the board across all directors on the board of firm i in year t.
Table 1.2 presents the summary statistics of the proxy for reputational concerns
and other firm and board characteristics. Equity compensation as a fraction of to-
tal compensation at the firm-year level has a sample mean of 60% with a standard
deviation of 26%, which suggests substantial variation across boards in the equity
compensation of directors. Directors’ tenure at the firm-year level has a sample mean
of 8.22 with a standard deviation of 3.89. The years-in-role variable at the firm-year
level has a mean of 6.57 and a standard deviation of 3.14.
During the sample period 2000-2014, 826 forced CEO turnover events occur. The
CEO of a median firm is about fifty-six years old and stays in the firm for a tenure
of five years. A board is considered to be busy if more than half the directors sit on
three or more boards. In the sample, about 5% of boards are busy. A median board
has nine directors, and about 86% of them are non-executive directors.
In the sample, I only consider the role changes that involve an increase in the
director’s responsibility. Therefore, I include the role changes that involve moving to
a new role of either a Lead Director or a Chairman. I argue that those promotions
are associated with an increase in the director’s reputational concerns due to the
following reason. Moving to a new role of a Chairman or a Lead Independent Director
increases the visibility of the director. The director in the role of a Chairman will
be more careful in making decisions to establish himself as a smart director in that
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role. I find 5, 063 promotions that occur at the director-year level. Upon aggregating
at the firm level, I obtain 2, 958 firm-year observations for which at least one of the
directors had a role change. Table 1.3 presents the top promotions captured in the
sample using this method. A promotion from an Independent Director to a Lead
Independent Director occurs in over 46% of the promotions. The promotion from an
Independent Director to a Chairman occurs in about 25% of the promotions in the
sample.
1.3.3 Directors’ Years-in-Role on the Board and CEO Turnover-Performance
Sensitivity
In this section, I study the relation between the number of years a director has
been in a role on the board as an inverse proxy for β and turnover-performance
sensitivity using the following linear probability regression model:6
CEO Turnoverit =ηt + ηi + η1ROAit + η2TRit
+ η3TRit ×ROAit + η4Xit + it , (1.1)
where TRit represents the directors’ years-in-role on the board, calculated using the
average of the number of years a director has been on the board across all directors
on the board. The motivation for using this proxy is that in the early years of their
role, directors have greater reputational concerns than in the later years.
Table 1.4 presents the results of this regression. In column (1), the coefficient
on the interaction term is positive and significant at the 1% level. It suggests that
in the later years of the director’s role, turnover-performance sensitivity becomes
weaker. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation change in the
6In all the empirical analyses in this paper, I use the linear probability regression model to obtain
unbiased coefficients on the interaction between firm performance and the proxy for reputational
concerns (see Ai and Norton (2003) for a discussion on how logit and probit models may incorrectly
estimate the interaction effect.).
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director’s years-in-role is associated with an 83% change in the turnover-performance
sensitivity. Moreover, firms with older CEOs, busier boards, and inexperienced boards
are less likely to experience CEO turnover. The results in columns (2), (3), and (4)
show the main results are robust to including industry, industry-times-year, and firm
fixed effects, respectively. They imply time-invariant industry-level variables or time-
varying industry-specific variables or firm-specific variables do not drive the results.
1.3.4 Director Promotions and CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity
The results from the estimation of regression equation 1.1 shows a strong asso-
ciation between a director’s years-in-role and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity.
However, the results may be biased due to omitted variable concerns. To alleviate
some of those concerns, I consider only promotions within a board. I label the ob-
servation for firm i in year t as treatment if at least one promotion occurs in that
firm in that year. Figure 2 shows the variation of the number of treatment firms
across all years in the sample period. Then, for each year, I use the nearest-neighbor
matching to obtain a set of control firms that are similar to the pre-role-change treat-
ment firm-year observations. Table 1.5 presents the difference in the means of the set
of firm, CEO, and board characteristics for the treatment and control-group firms.
Panel A (Panel B) presents the difference between the treatment and control-group
firms before (after) matching. The t-stat column in Panel B suggests the observable
characteristics of the treatment and control-group firms are very similar.
Using the matched set of treatment and control firms, I examine the effect of a
promotion of a director on the turnover-performance sensitivity using the following
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linear probability regression model:
CEO Turnoverit =ηt + ηi + η1ROAit + η2Postit + η3ROAit × Postit
+ η4Treatit + η5Treatit ×ROAit + η6Treatit × Postit
+ η7Treatit × Postit ×ROAit + η8Xit + it , (1.2)
where the dependent variable CEO Turnover is an indicator variable that takes
the value of one if the CEO is fired from firm i immediately after year t, and zero
otherwise. ηi represents firm fixed effects, ηt represents year fixed effects, ηj represents
industry fixed effects, and ηjt represents industry-times-year fixed effects. ROAit is
the return on assets (ROA) of firm i in year t. Treatit is an indicator variable that
takes the value of one for firm i from year t − 4 to year t + 3, where the promotion
happened in year t, and takes the value of zero for the matching control firm during
the years t− 4 to t+ 3. Postit is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for
both control and treatment firms from year t to year t + 3, where t is the year of a
promotion. Xit represents a vector of controls including CEO age, CEO tenure, board
size, firm size (measured by logarithm of Sales), book leverage, busyness of board,
fraction of non-executive directors on the board, and directors’ past experience. All
variables are defined in Table 1.1 in the appendix. The main coefficient of interest is
η7, which estimates the difference in turnover-performance sensitivity for the treated
firms from four years before the promotion to four years after, relative to the same
difference in control firms where no such promotion occurs.
Table 1.6 presents the results of this regression. In column (1), the coefficient η3
is statistically insignificant. It suggests that for control firms in which no promotion
occurs, the turnover-performance sensitivity does not change. The coefficient on the
triple-interaction term (η7) is negative and significant at the 1% level. It suggests
the effect of performance on CEO dismissal increases after the promotion for the
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treatment firms relative to the matching control firms. In terms of economic signifi-
cance, promotion in the treatment firms, relative to control firms, is associated with
an 84% increase in the turnover-performance sensitivity in the four-year period after
the promotion. The results in columns (2), (3), and (4) show the coefficient on the
triple-interaction term remains negative and statistically significant after including
industry, industry-times-year, and firm fixed effects, respectively.
1.3.5 Sub-Sample Tests
In this section, I report the results of three sub-sample tests to test Hypothesis
2 using regression specification (1.2). First, I divide the sample into three groups
sorted by the number of analysts following the firm. Hypothesis 2 predicts the effect
of reputational concerns on turnover-performance sensitivity is greater for firms that
are followed by fewer analysts. Table 1.7 presents the results of regression equation
(1.2) for firms in the bottom tercile in column (1) and for firms in the top tercile in
column (2). The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant only for
firms in the bottom tercile. The results suggest the increase in turnover-performance
sensitivity after a director’s promotion is mostly driven by firms with a fewer number
of analysts following.
Second, I divide the firm-years into three groups sorted by the market capital-
ization of the firm. Hypothesis 2 predicts the effect of reputational concerns on
turnover-performance sensitivity is greater for smaller firms. Table 1.7 presents the
results of regression equation (1.2) for firms in the bottom tercile in column (3) and
for firms in the top tercile in column (4). The coefficient on the interaction term
is negative and significant only for firms in the bottom tercile. The results suggest
the increase in turnover-performance sensitivity after a director’s promotion is mostly
driven by smaller firms.
Finally, I divide the sample into three groups sorted by institutional ownership.
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Hypothesis 2 predicts the effect of reputational concerns on turnover-performance
sensitivity is greater for firms with low institutional ownership. Table 1.7 presents
the results of regression equation (1.2) for firms in the bottom tercile in column (5)
and for firms in the top tercile in column (6). The coefficient on the interaction term
is negative and significant only for firms in the bottom tercile. The results suggest
the increase in turnover-performance sensitivity after a director’s promotion is mostly
driven by firms with low institutional ownership.
Overall, the results from the sub-sample tests suggest that when publicly available
information about the CEO is less precise relative to the board’s private information,
the effect of reputational concerns on turnover-performance sensitivity is greater.
1.3.6 Director Promotions and Future Firm Performance
In this section, I estimate the regression model to test Hypothesis 3 and report
the results. To test Hypothesis 3, I need to compare the difference in future firm
performance of the treated firms before and after the promotion, relative to the same
difference in the future firm performance of the control firms, given that the manager
is retained. For future firm performance, I calculate the average ROA across years
t+ 1 to year t+ 3 for every firm i and year t.
I examine the effect of a promotion of a director on ex-post performance using the
following linear regression model:
ROAit+1,t+3 =ηt + ηi + η1CEO Retainedit + η2Postit + η3CEO Retainedit × Postit
+ η4Treatit + η5Treatit × CEO Retainedit + η6Treatit × Postit
+ η7Treatit × Postit × CEO Retainedit + η8Xit + it , (1.3)
where the dependent variable ROAit+1,t+3 is the average ROA from years t+1 to t+3.
ηi represents firm fixed effects, ηt represents year fixed effects, ηj represents industry
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fixed effects, and ηjt represents industry-times-year fixed effects. CEO Retainedit is
an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the CEO of firm i is retained in
year t. Treatit is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firm i from
year t − 4 to year t + 3, where the promotion happened in year t, and takes the
value of zero for the matching control firm during the years t − 4 to t + 3. Postit
is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for both control and treatment
firms from year t to year t + 3, where t is the year of a promotion. Xit represents a
vector of controls including CEO age, CEO tenure, board size, firm size (measured
by logarithm of Sales), book leverage, board’s busyness, fraction of non-executive
directors on the board, and directors’ past experience. All variables are defined in
Table 1.1 in the appendix. The main coefficient of interest is η7 which estimates the
difference in average future profitability of the retained manager for the treated firms
over a four-year period before and after the promotion, relative to the same difference
for the control firms where no such promotion occurs.
Table 1.8 presents the results of this regression. In column (1), the coefficient
η1 is positive and significant at the 1% level. It shows that relative to the years in
which the CEO is fired, firm profitability is higher in the years when the CEO is
retained. In column (2), I present the results of regression equation 1.3 by comparing
the average future performance of the treated and control firms. The coefficient
η5 on Treatit × CEO Retainedit is insignificant. It suggests that if the CEO is
retained, the future performance of the treated firms in which a promotion occurs
is not statistically different from the future performance of the control firms. In
column (3), I present the results of the overall regression model. The coefficient η3 is
statistically insignificant. It suggests the future performance of the retained manager
for control firms does not change after the year of the promotion in treated firms.
The coefficient on the triple-interaction term (η7) is negative and significant at the
5% level. It suggests that if the manager is retained, the future firm performance
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declines after the promotion for the treated firms relative to the matching control
firms. In terms of economic significance, a promotion in the treatment firms, relative
to control firms, is associated with a 0.89% decline in the average future profitability
over a four-year period.
The results in column (1), (2), and (3) include firm fixed effects, so the effect of
promotions on future firm performance is relative to the average firm performance
across the sample period. However, the average firm performance across the sample
period includes the performance by the retained CEO as well as the performance of
other CEOs who worked with that firm. Therefore, in column (4), instead of firm
fixed effects, I control for CEO fixed effects, which enables me to capture the effect of
promotions on future firm performance relative to the average firm performance by
the same CEO. The results remain the same.
1.3.7 Other Results
In this section, I study the effect of reputational concerns on turnover-performance
sensitivity using alternative ways to capture the reputational concerns of the board
of directors. First, I use the equity compensation of the directors as a proxy for
how much they care about shareholder value. The motivation for using this measure
is based on the agency view: shareholders provide incentives in the form of equity
compensation to align the interests of the board with those of the shareholders. Fol-
lowing the assumption about the board’s payoff in the model, one minus the fraction
of the directors’ equity compensation captures the director’s reputational concerns
(parameter β in the model). The equity compensation of the directors for a firm i
in year t is calculated using the average of the proportion of equity compensation to
total compensation across all directors on the board.
I study the relation between the equity compensation of the directors and turnover-
performance sensitivity by estimating the linear probability regression model specified
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in equation 1.1. Table 1.9 presents the results of this regression. The results suggests
the effect of performance on CEO dismissal is weaker when the board’s equity com-
pensation is high. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation change
in equity compensation is associated with a 65% change in turnover-performance sen-
sitivity. The results are robust to including year, industry, industry-times-year, and
firm fixed effects.
Second, I use the tenure on the board as an inverse proxy for a director’s repu-
tational concerns. The motivation for using this proxy is that in the early years of
their tenure on the board, directors have greater reputational concerns than in the
later years. The reason is that the board’s decisions in the early years of their tenure
have a greater impact on their future payoffs through additional board seats and pos-
sibly more compensation on those board seats. Board tenure is calculated using the
average tenure across all directors on the board.
I use the linear probability regression model in equation 1.1 to study the relation
between board tenure and turnover-performance sensitivity. Table 1.10 presents the
results of this regression. The results suggests that in the later years of the direc-
tor’s tenure, turnover-performance sensitivity becomes weaker. In terms of economic
significance, a one standard deviation change in the director’s tenure is associated
with an 83% change in turnover-performance sensitivity. The results are robust to
including year, industry, industry-times-year, and firm fixed effects.
Directors who are new to the board or new to the role might be selected into the
board because the current directors have stronger ties with the CEO and have become
entrenched. Hence, the arrival of new directors decreases the average board entrench-
ment. In that case, in the early years of a director’s tenure, turnover-performance
sensitivity is stronger because the board’s entrenchment is low. I correct for this
bias using director deaths as an exogenous shock to directors’ tenure on the board.
After a director’s death, the average tenure of directors decreases. The identifying
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assumption is that the decrease in average board tenure is caused by a director death
and not by the selection of new directors to an entrenched board.
I analyze how turnover-performance sensitivity changes from five years before a
director’s death to five years after a director’s death.7 Suppose at least one director
death occurs in firm i in year t. I construct an indicator variable Post Death that
equals one for firm i from year t+ 1 to year t+ 5 and equals 0 from year t− 4 to year
t. Using this variable, I estimate the following linear probability regression model:
CEO Turnoverit =ηt + ηi + η1ROAit + η2Post Deathit
+ η3Post Deathit ×ROAit + η4Xit + it , (1.4)
Table 1.11 presents the results of this regression. In column (1), the coefficient on
the interaction term is negative and significant at the 5% level. The results suggest
turnover-performance sensitivity increases after a director’s death. The results are
robust to including year, industry, and industry-times-year fixed effects.
1.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I study how reputational concerns affects a board’s incentives and
therefore, the internal governance of the firm. I develop a model in which the board
of directors cares about shareholder value and the labor market’s perception of its
decision. Because the market’s information about the CEO is inferior to that of the
board, it perceives the board’s decision to fire (retain) in response to poor (good) firm
performance as favorable. Therefore, the board may rely more on firm performance
for the firing decision, to signal better decision-making to the market. As a result,
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity increases when the board of directors cares
more about its reputational payoff. Importantly, this effect of reputational concerns
7The results are similar if I use the sample during the four-year period before and after a director’s
death.
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on turnover-performance sensitivity holds only if the board’s private information is
more precise than the public information about the CEO. Further, this inefficient
decision by the board culminates in a decline in future firm performance.
I test the predictions of the model using the number of years a director has served
in a role on the board (years-in-role) as an inverse proxy for their reputational con-
cerns. Specifically, I use a director’s promotions as a shift in the board’s reputational
concerns. This approach rules out some of the other factors that are correlated with
years-in-role and affect turnover-performance sensitivity. Relative to matched control
firms, I find a promotion increases the turnover-performance sensitivity by 28% over
a four-year period. Moreover, I find the effect of promotions on turnover-performance
sensitivity is stronger when public information about the CEO is less precise, that
is, for firms that are smaller, are followed by fewer analysts, and have lower institu-
tional ownership. Finally, I find the future firm performance declines if the manager
is retained when the board has greater reputational concerns.
The study has implications for the design of directors’ incentive schemes. The
findings of this paper suggest a director’s career concerns may not necessarily act
as a substitute to explicit incentives. Instead, the labor market for directors may
have unintended consequences for a board’s behavior. In addition, the study has
implications for the labor market for CEOs. That good CEOs are sometimes fired
may deter the entry of good CEOs and encourage the entry of bad CEOs. As a
result, the average CEO quality may go down. Furthermore, this paper contributes
to the debate on director tenure or board “refreshment”. It highlights an advantage
of increasing tenure of the board. A board with a longer tenure may have lower
reputational concerns, and their interests may be better aligned with those of the
shareholders. The greater alignment of incentives may improve the quality of the
board’s decisions. More broadly, this paper provides a novel perspective for analyzing
CEO dismissal in response to bad luck or adverse shocks. The main findings suggest
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the increase in turnover-performance sensitivity perhaps reflects a board’s catering to
the market’s demand. Therefore, researchers and shareholders need to be cautious in
interpreting CEO dismissal in response to firm performance.
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1.5 Variable Construction
Table 1.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Director Characteristics
Tenure The number of years director has been on the board.
Years-in-role The number of years director has been in a role on the board.
Busy Directors Indicator that equals one if the director sits on three or more boards.
Director Experience The number of boards of publicly listed firms that the director has been
on in the past.
Director Compensation Equity compensation as a proportion of total compensation based on
the closing stock price of the annual report date in that year.
Director Promotion Indicator that equals one if the director’s role changes to a Lead Inde-
pendent Director or a Chairman and zero otherwise.
Board and Firm Characteristics
Busy Board Indicator that equals one if more than half the directors on the board
sit on three or more boards and zero otherwise.
% NED Directors Fraction of non-executive directors on the board.
Board Size The number of directors on a board.
Board Experience The average of director experience across all directors on the board.
Board Compensation The average of director compensation across all directors on the board.
Years-in-role The average years-in-role across all directors on the board.
Tenure The average director tenure across all directors on the board.
Promotion Indicator that equals one if at least one promotion occurs in the fiscal
year and zero otherwise.
ROA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided
by total assets.
Stock Return Stock returns in the last fiscal year.
Sales Annual sales, in millions of dollars.
Assets End of fiscal year assets, in millions of dollars.
Book Leverage Book value of debt divided by the book value of debt and the book
value of equity.
Market Capitalization Market value of equity computed as close price at the end of fiscal year
times the number of shares outstanding.
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1.6 Supplementary Figures and Tables
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
The table below reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the regression
models. All variables are defined in Table 1.1 in the appendix.
N Mean SD p50
All Turnover 28748 0.11 0.31 0.00
Forced Turnover 28748 0.03 0.17 0.00
CEO Age 28703 55.78 7.53 56.00
CEO Tenure 28748 7.00 7.12 5.00
Assets ($ mil) 28693 8852.55 19428.18 1891.51
Sales ($ mil) 28677 4401.26 8009.69 1253.59
ROA 27583 0.13 0.11 0.12
Stock Return 24632 0.13 0.42 0.10
Directors Equity Compensation 8639 0.60 0.26 0.64
Tobin Q 28177 1.88 1.40 1.45
Board Size 25287 9.37 2.58 9.00
Board Tenure 25280 8.22 3.89 7.88
Years-in-role 25280 6.57 3.14 6.28
log Sales 28673 7.20 1.60 7.13
Book Leverage 28582 0.23 0.20 0.20
Busy Board 25287 0.05 0.22 0.00
% NED Directors 25287 0.83 0.09 0.86
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Table 1.3: Promotions
The table below reports the top promotions in the sample.
Top 10 Promotions Perc Cum Perc
Independent Director – Lead Independent Director 46.53 46.53
Independent Director – Independent Chairman 25.98 72.51
Independent Director – Presiding Independent Director 10.35 82.86
Lead Independent Director – Independent Chairman 4.14 87.00
Director - SD – Chairman 1.87 88.87
Lead Independent Director – Lead Independent Chairman 1.46 90.33
Director - SD – Lead Independent Director 1.36 91.69
Presiding Independent Director – Lead Independent Director 1.00 92.69
Director - SD – Independent Chairman 0.94 93.63
Independent Director – Lead Independent Chairman 0.93 94.56
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Figure 1.2:
This figure shows the percentage of firms with at least one promotion in
a year across the sample period 2000-2014.
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Table 1.4: Do Years-in-Role Affect CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity?
The table below reports results from a linear probability model that analyzes the
relation between directors’ years-in-role and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity.
All variables are defined in Table 1.1 in the appendix. The standard errors reported
are robust and clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: CEO Turnover (1) (2) (3) (4)
Years-in-role -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0061∗∗∗ -0.0052∗∗
(-5.78) (-5.67) (-5.76) (-2.47)
ROA -0.014∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(-10.29) (-10.21) (-10.14) (-9.21)
ROA × Years-in-role 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗
(4.58) (4.43) (4.29) (2.97)
CEO Age -0.0033∗∗∗ -0.0030∗∗ -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(-2.87) (-2.56) (-2.66) (-4.25)
CEO Tenure -0.0018∗ -0.0016 -0.0015 0.022∗∗∗
(-1.69) (-1.52) (-1.38) (7.10)
Board Size -0.0065∗∗∗ -0.0049∗∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗ -0.0048∗
(-4.78) (-3.48) (-3.49) (-1.76)
log Sales 0.0034∗∗ 0.0027 0.0027 0.015∗∗
(2.13) (1.60) (1.61) (2.41)
Book Leverage 0.0024∗ 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗
(1.85) (2.84) (2.68) (2.37)
Busy Board -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.0052
(-2.69) (-2.43) (-2.49) (-0.87)
% NED Directors 0.0030∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗
(2.49) (2.91) (2.84) (2.16)
Board Experience 0.0032∗∗ 0.0028∗ 0.0028∗ 0.0065
(2.23) (1.91) (1.89) (1.63)
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.032
Observations 24206 24206 24206 24206
Firm FE No No No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Industry X Year FE No No Yes No
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Table 1.5: Matching of Treatment and Control Groups
The table below reports the differences between the sample average of firm, CEO,
and board characteristics for the treatment and control group of firms. All variables
are defined in Table 1.1 in the appendix. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Before Matching
Control Treatment Diff t-stat
ROA 0.13 0.13 0.0014 (0.68)
Years-in-role 6.57 6.71 0.14∗∗ (2.37)
Board Tenure 8.26 8.36 0.10 (1.37)
log Sales 7.19 7.61 0.42∗∗∗ (12.6)
log Assets 7.63 8.03 0.40∗∗∗ (10.9)
CEO Age 55.8 56.3 0.44∗∗∗ (3.12)
CEO Tenure 7.02 6.67 -0.35∗∗∗ (-2.68)
Board Size 9.34 9.82 0.48∗∗∗ (9.79)
Book Leverage 0.24 0.23 -0.0071∗ (-1.85)
Busy Board 0.050 0.058 0.0079∗ (1.88)
% NED Directors 0.84 0.85 0.013∗∗∗ (8.29)
Board Experience 3.08 3.23 0.15∗∗∗ (5.83)
log Market Cap 7.43 7.83 0.40∗∗∗ (11.6)
Panel B: After Matching
Control Treatment Diff t-stat
ROA 0.13 0.13 -0.00063 (-0.26)
Years-in-role 6.62 6.68 0.062 (0.88)
Board Tenure 8.26 8.34 0.076 (0.87)
log Sales 7.61 7.62 0.015 (0.40)
log Assets 7.97 7.99 0.016 (0.38)
CEO Age 56.2 56.2 0.013 (0.078)
CEO Tenure 6.66 6.66 -0.0012 (-0.0077)
Board Size 9.83 9.83 -0.0041 (-0.070)
Book Leverage 0.22 0.22 0.00054 (0.13)
Busy Board 0.057 0.060 0.0035 (0.65)
% NED Directors 0.85 0.85 0.00082 (0.46)
Board Experience 3.22 3.24 0.017 (0.56)
log Market Cap 7.79 7.80 0.0041 (0.11)
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Figure 1.3:
This figure shows the average years-in-role of the board before and after
the promotion in the treatment group and control group firms.
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Table 1.6: Do Director Promotions Affect CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity?
The table below reports results from a linear probability regression model that an-
alyzes how a director’s promotion affects the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity
for treatment firms relative to control firms. All variables are defined in Table 1.1
in the appendix. The standard errors reported are robust and clustered at the firm
level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Dep Var: CEO Turnover (1) (2) (3) (4)
ROA -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(-7.08) (-7.53) (-7.32) (-8.22)
Post Promotion 0.00099 0.00088 0.0010 -0.0017
(0.70) (0.63) (0.72) (-1.21)
ROA × Post Promotion -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0015
(-0.78) (-0.81) (-1.45) (-1.02)
Treat 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 -0.0017
(1.09) (1.12) (1.09) (-1.02)
ROA × Treat 0.000094 0.00017 0.00024 -0.000061
(0.05) (0.09) (0.13) (-0.03)
Post Promotion × Treat 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0098∗∗∗
(2.71) (2.72) (2.74) (3.42)
ROA × Post Promotion × Treat -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.0074∗∗
(-3.10) (-3.06) (-2.98) (-2.16)
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.017 0.023 0.11
Observations 77202 77202 77202 77202
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Industry X Year FE No No Yes No
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Figure 1.4:
This figure shows the average years-in-role of the board before and after
a director’s death.
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Table 1.8: Firm Profitability from (t+1) to (t+3) Years after the Firing Decision
The table below reports results from a regression model that analyzes how a director’s
promotion affects the ex-post firm performance of the retained manager for treatment
firms relative to control firms. All variables are defined in Table 1.1 in the appendix.
The standard errors reported are robust and clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗ correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: ROAit+1,t+3 (1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO Retained 0.011∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.0041
(4.20) (4.33) (4.63) (1.18)
Post Promotion 0.0012 -0.0022
(0.54) (-1.18)
CEO Retained × Post Promotion -0.0015 0.0020
(-0.64) (0.99)
Treat 0.0034 -0.0018 -0.0046
(1.07) (-0.49) (-1.33)
CEO Retained × Treat -0.0045 0.000091 0.0033
(-1.43) (0.03) (0.92)
Post Promotion × Treat 0.010∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(2.34) (3.39)
CEO Retained × Post Promotion ×
Treat
-0.0089∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(-2.02) (-3.12)
Adjusted R2 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.86
Observations 67664 67664 67664 67664
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO FE No No No Yes
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Table 1.9:
Does Equity Compensation of Directors Affect CEO Turnover-
Performance Sensitivity?
The table below reports results from a linear probability model that analyzes the rela-
tion between equity-based compensation of directors and CEO turnover-performance
sensitivity. All variables are defined in Table 1.1 in the appendix. The standard
errors reported are robust and clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: CEO Turnover (1) (2) (3) (4)
% equity -0.0078∗∗∗ -0.0084∗∗∗ -0.0083∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(-4.29) (-4.60) (-4.54) (-3.84)
ROA -0.012∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(-6.01) (-6.22) (-6.07) (-4.88)
ROA × % equity 0.0051∗∗ 0.0051∗∗ 0.0051∗∗ 0.0086∗∗
(2.45) (2.42) (2.44) (2.55)
Adjusted R2 0.0098 0.012 0.012 0.022
Observations 8319 8319 8319 8319
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Industry X Year FE No No Yes No
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Table 1.10: Does a New Board Affect CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity?
The table below reports results from a linear probability model that analyzes the re-
lation between board tenure and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. All variables
are defined in Table 1.1 in the appendix. The standard errors reported are robust
and clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: CEO Turnover (1) (2) (3) (4)
Board Tenure -0.0048∗∗∗ -0.0049∗∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗ -0.0032
(-4.32) (-4.39) (-4.47) (-1.28)
ROA -0.014∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(-10.19) (-10.15) (-10.08) (-9.19)
ROA × Board Tenure 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗
(3.78) (3.63) (3.50) (2.48)
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.032
Observations 24206 24206 24206 24206
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Industry X Year FE No No Yes No
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Table 1.11: Do Director Deaths Affect CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity?
The table below reports results from a linear probability model that analyzes how the
death of a director affects the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. All variables
are defined in Table 1.1 in the appendix. The standard errors reported are robust
and clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: CEO Turnover (1) (2) (3) (4)
ROA -0.0075 -0.0096 -0.012 -0.016
(-0.77) (-0.97) (-1.11) (-1.48)
Post Death -0.0021 -0.0024 -0.0017 0.00017
(-0.44) (-0.50) (-0.35) (0.03)
ROA × Post Death -0.012∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.0086
(-2.40) (-2.40) (-2.33) (-1.23)
Lagged ROA -0.0018 -0.0037 -0.0027 -0.011
(-0.17) (-0.36) (-0.25) (-0.89)
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.015 0.016 0.039
Observations 5808 5808 5808 5808
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Industry X Year FE No No Yes No
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Table 1.12: Sub-sample Tests - Does the Number of Analysts Following Matter?
The table below shows the effect of a director’s promotion on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity
across firms that are sorted into terciles by the number of analysts. All variables are defined in Table
1.1 in the appendix. The standard errors reported are robust and clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: CEO Turnover (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Firms in the bottom tercile of the number of analysts following
ROA -0.020∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(-5.38) (-5.55) (-5.49) (-4.62)
Post Promotion 0.0022 0.0022 0.0027 -0.0034
(0.86) (0.87) (1.09) (-1.36)
ROA × Post Promotion -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0024 -0.00064
(-0.47) (-0.30) (-0.70) (-0.21)
Treat 0.0040 0.0045 0.0042 -0.0014
(1.12) (1.27) (1.19) (-0.46)
ROA × Treat 0.0033 0.0031 0.0035 0.0051
(0.87) (0.82) (0.93) (1.32)
Post Promotion × Treat 0.011∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.010∗
(1.95) (2.01) (1.95) (1.90)
ROA × Post Promotion × Treat -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(-2.91) (-2.86) (-2.75) (-2.81)
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.032 0.051 0.16
Observations 23819 23819 23819 23819
B. Firms in the top tercile of the number of analysts following
ROA -0.0065∗∗ -0.0070∗∗ -0.0074∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(-2.33) (-2.43) (-2.48) (-4.66)
Post Promotion 0.000032 -0.00035 -0.00079 -0.0016
(0.01) (-0.13) (-0.31) (-0.68)
ROA × Post Promotion -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.00098
(-0.49) (-0.57) (-0.87) (-0.42)
Treat 0.0032 0.0030 0.0024 -0.00037
(0.97) (0.92) (0.75) (-0.13)
ROA × Treat -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0022 -0.0023
(-0.83) (-0.88) (-0.73) (-0.93)
Post Promotion × Treat 0.0021 0.0023 0.0027 0.0052
(0.44) (0.49) (0.59) (1.09)
ROA × Post Promotion × Treat -0.0028 -0.0024 -0.0020 0.00024
(-0.67) (-0.56) (-0.48) (0.05)
Adjusted R2 0.0094 0.013 0.028 0.14
Observations 26975 26975 26975 26975
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Industry X Year FE No No Yes No
54
Table 1.13: Sub-sample Tests - Does Firm Size Matter?
The table below shows the effect of a director’s promotion on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity
across firms that are sorted into terciles by the firm size. All variables are defined in Table 1.1 in
the appendix. The standard errors reported are robust and clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗ correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: CEO Turnover (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Firms in the bottom tercile of Market Capitalization
ROA -0.019∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(-5.00) (-5.34) (-5.27) (-4.77)
Post Promotion 0.0025 0.0022 0.0019 -0.0050∗
(0.85) (0.73) (0.62) (-1.74)
ROA × Post Promotion -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0028 -0.0018
(-0.34) (-0.37) (-0.86) (-0.60)
Treat 0.0078∗ 0.0081∗∗ 0.0088∗∗ 0.0010
(1.96) (2.10) (2.30) (0.30)
ROA × Treat 0.0039 0.0043 0.0044 0.0030
(0.92) (1.02) (1.08) (0.72)
Post Promotion × Treat 0.0068 0.0073 0.0061 0.012∗∗
(1.15) (1.24) (1.04) (2.10)
ROA × Post Promotion × Treat -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗
(-3.12) (-3.05) (-2.86) (-2.32)
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.033 0.049 0.19
Observations 24790 24790 24790 24790
B. Firms in the top tercile of Market Capitalization
ROA -0.0070∗∗ -0.0075∗∗∗ -0.0075∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(-2.50) (-2.76) (-2.72) (-4.19)
Post Promotion 0.00039 0.00038 0.00044 0.00020
(0.17) (0.16) (0.20) (0.09)
ROA × Post Promotion -0.00035 -0.0010 -0.00081 -0.0029
(-0.16) (-0.47) (-0.37) (-1.27)
Treat 0.0015 0.0014 0.0013 -0.0018
(0.45) (0.44) (0.41) (-0.61)
ROA × Treat -0.00048 -0.00091 -0.00072 -0.00021
(-0.16) (-0.31) (-0.25) (-0.07)
Post Promotion × Treat 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059 0.0074∗
(1.40) (1.40) (1.43) (1.66)
ROA × Post Promotion × Treat -0.0051 -0.0044 -0.0047 -0.0036
(-1.38) (-1.20) (-1.33) (-0.87)
Adjusted R2 0.0099 0.015 0.026 0.11
Observations 26220 26220 26220 26220
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Industry X Year FE No No Yes No
55
Table 1.14: Sub-sample Tests - Does Institutional Ownership Matter?
The table below shows the effect of a director’s promotion on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity
across firms that are sorted into terciles by the institutional ownership. All variables are defined in
Table 1.1 in the appendix. The standard errors reported are robust and clustered at the firm level.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: CEO Turnover (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Firms in the bottom tercile of Institutional Ownership
ROA -0.014∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(-4.59) (-5.01) (-5.10) (-4.11)
Post Promotion 0.0034 0.0035 0.0047∗ 0.0011
(1.20) (1.24) (1.71) (0.42)
ROA × Post Promotion -0.00076 -0.0011 -0.00057 -0.0027
(-0.23) (-0.34) (-0.17) (-0.98)
Treat 0.0041 0.0045 0.0044 0.0013
(1.37) (1.48) (1.47) (0.45)
ROA × Treat -0.00096 -0.00097 0.000068 0.0010
(-0.29) (-0.30) (0.02) (0.34)
Post Promotion × Treat 0.0018 0.0013 0.0012 0.0062
(0.35) (0.26) (0.24) (1.24)
ROA × Post Promotion × Treat -0.015∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.0079
(-2.15) (-2.08) (-2.27) (-1.26)
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.030 0.052 0.21
Observations 21507 21507 21507 21507
B. Firms in the top tercile of Institutional Ownership
ROA -0.0084∗∗∗ -0.0097∗∗∗ -0.0099∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(-2.63) (-3.10) (-3.11) (-3.62)
Post Promotion 0.00076 0.000056 -0.00021 -0.0022
(0.31) (0.02) (-0.09) (-0.99)
ROA × Post Promotion -0.0039 -0.0041∗ -0.0042∗ -0.0040∗
(-1.62) (-1.67) (-1.79) (-1.80)
Treat 0.00024 0.00032 0.00041 -0.0039
(0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (-1.46)
ROA × Treat 0.00050 0.00067 0.00093 -0.0030
(0.14) (0.20) (0.28) (-1.00)
Post Promotion × Treat 0.0090∗ 0.0090∗ 0.0089∗ 0.011∗∗
(1.86) (1.87) (1.88) (2.29)
ROA × Post Promotion × Treat 0.00061 0.00042 0.00060 0.0022
(0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.35)
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.019 0.029 0.19
Observations 22607 22607 22607 22607
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Industry X Year FE No No Yes No
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1.7 Proofs
Proof of Lemma I.1. This proof shows the existence of a pooling equilibrium in which
the board retains the manager upon receiving signal sg or signal sb in state H. In
this equilibrium, firing is an off-equilibrium decision. In state H, the equilibrium
labor market’s beliefs are µ(g|r) = ψ. Suppose the off-equilibrium beliefs are such
that given that the manager is fired, the board must be Ab (have signal sb). The
off-equilibrium belief in state H is µ(b|f) = (1−ψ)α
ψ(1−α)+(1−ψ)α . This off-equilibrium belief
is less than 0.5 because α < ψ. Board Ag and Ab’s equilibrium payoffs by retaining
after signal sg and sb are:
(1− β)(µ(g|sg)ψ + (1− µ(g|sg))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) ,
(1− β)(µ(g|sb)ψ + (1− µ(g|sb))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) .
The board’s payoff from deviation to firing is (1 − β)(0.5) + βµ(b|f). Notice that
µ(g|sg) > µ(g|sb), so the payoff from project by retaining after signal sg is greater
than the payoff by retaining after signal sb. Further, µ(g|r) = ψ > 0.5 > µ(b|f).
Therefore, the pooling equilibrium is sustained with the off-equilibrium beliefs that
the board has signal sb given that the manager is fired.
Similarly, in state L, a pooling equilibrium exists in which the board fires the
manager upon receiving signal sg or signal sb. In this equilibrium, retaining is an off-
equilibrium decision. This pooling equilibrium is sustained with the off-equilibrium
beliefs that the board has signal sg given that the manager is retained. The board
does not have an incentive to deviate to retaining, because both the payoff from the
project and the reputational payoff are greater by firing the manager. 
Proof of Proposition I.2. First, I show the existence of a separating equilibrium. In
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this equilibrium, the labor market beliefs µ(g|r) and µ(b|f) are:
µ(g|r) = ψα
ψα + (1− ψ)(1− α) ,
µ(b|f) = (1− ψ)α
ψ(1− α) + (1− ψ)α .
To sustain this equilibrium, board Ag and Ab’s payoffs need to satisfy the following
conditions:
(1− β)(µ(g|sg)ψ + (1− µ(g|sg))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) > (1− β)(0.5) + βµ(b|f) ,
(1− β)(0.5) + βµ(b|f) > (1− β)(µ(g|sb)ψ + (1− µ(g|sb))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) .
It is optimal for board Ag to retain the manager, because µ(g|sg) > 0.5 and µ(g|r) >
µ(b|f). The no-deviation condition for the board with signal sb can be simplified to:
(1− β)(α− ψ)(2ψ − 1) > 2βα(1− α) ψ
2 − (1− ψ)2
ψα+ (1− ψ)(1− α) .
Denote the solution to the above equation as βs. Therefore, the separating equilib-
rium is sustained if β < βs(α, ψ).
Next, I show a hybrid equilibrium exists in which Ag retains the manager and Ab
fires the manager with probability δh and retains the manager with probability 1−δh.
In this equilibrium, market beliefs are
µ(g|r) = ψ(α + (1− α)(1− δh))
ψ(α + (1− α)(1− δh)) + (1− ψ)(α(1− δh) + (1− α)) ,
µ(b|f) = (1− ψ)α
ψ(1− α) + (1− ψ)α .
Notice that µ(g|r) in this equilibrium is lower than µ(g|r) in the separating equi-
librium, because board Ab sometimes retains the manager in this equilibrium. To
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sustain this equilibrium, the board’s payoff must satisfy the following conditions:
(1− β)(µ(g|sg)ψ + (1− µ(g|sg))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) > (1− β)(0.5) + βµ(b|f) ,
(1− β)(0.5) + βµ(b|f) = (1− β)(µ(g|sb)ψ + (1− µ(g|sb))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) .
Suppose the second condition holds; that is, board Ab is indifferent between firing
and retaining the manager. Then, it follows that board Ag’s payoff from retaining
the manager is strictly greater than its payoff from firing the manager. Because the
payoff from firing for both boards are the same, by firing, board Ag will receive as
much as Ab’s payoff: that payoff is smaller than board Ag’s payoff from retaining.
The indifference condition for board Ab can be simplified to:
(1− β)(α− ψ)(2ψ − 1) = 2β(ψ(1− α) + (1− ψ)α)(µ(g|r)− µ(b|f)) .
Observe that µ(g|r) is increasing in δh. If the board is more likely to fire the manager
when its signal is poor, the value of retention as a signal of good information increases.
Because µ(g|r) is increasing in δh, the equilibrium firing probability is decreasing in
β. Let the threshold of β at which δh = 0 be βp. βp is solved using the following
equation:
(1− β)(α− ψ)(2ψ − 1) = 2β(ψ(1− α) + (1− ψ)α)(ψ − (1− ψ)α
ψ(1− α) + (1− ψ)α) .
This threshold for β between hybrid and pooling equilibria exists when α ∈ [ψ, ψ2
ψ2+(1−ψ)2 ].
When α = ψ
2
ψ2+(1−ψ)2 , δh = 0 at β = 1. Therefore, the hybrid equilibrium exists if
β ∈ [βs(α, ψ), βp(α, ψ)] and α ∈ [ψ, ψ2ψ2+(1−ψ)2 ]. When α > ψ
2
ψ2+(1−ψ)2 , the hybrid
equilibrium exists when β ∈ [βs(α, ψ), 1].
Next, I show the existence of a pooling equilibrium in which board retains the
manager upon receiving signal sg or signal sb. In that equilibrium, firing is an off-
equilibrium decision. The equilibrium belief µ(g|r) = ψ. Suppose the off-equilibrium
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beliefs are such that when the market observes firing, the board must have signal sb.
Hence, µ(b|f) = (1−ψ)α
ψ(1−α)+(1−ψ)α . The board’s equilibrium payoff from retaining after
signal sg and sb is
(1− β)(µ(g|sg)ψ + (1− µ(g|sg))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) ,
(1− β)(µ(g|sb)ψ + (1− µ(g|sb))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) .
The board receives (1−β)(0.5)+βµ(b|f) if it deviates to firing. Notice that µ(g|sg) >
µ(g|sb), so the board’s payoff from retaining after signal sg is greater than the payoff
from retaining after signal sb. Thus, for the pooling equilibrium to sustain, the board
should not deviate to firing upon receiving signal sb. The no-deviation condition for
board Ab can be simplified to
(1− β) ψ − α
2(ψ(1− α) + α(1− ψ))(2ψ − 1) + β
(
ψ − (1− ψ)α
ψ(1− α) + (1− ψ)α
)
> 0 .
If α < ψ, both the firm payoff and reputational payoff are strictly greater from
retaining the manager after sb. In other words, if the board’s information is worse
than the information in output, the board follows the output and retains the manager
after state H. If α ∈ [ψ, ψ2
ψ2+(1−ψ)2 ], firing the manager is value maximizing. However,
the reputational payoff is greater from retaining the manager. The board retains
the manager if β is large enough such that the reputational payoff dominates the
loss in value from retaining the manager. Specifically, if β > βp, the board retains
the manager upon receiving sb. This completes the proof of existence of pooling
equilibrium.

Proof of Proposition I.3. First, I show the existence of a separating equilibrium in
state L. In this equilibrium, the board retains after signal sg and fires after signal sb.
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The equilibrium beliefs µ(g|r) and µ(b|f) are:
µ(g|r) = (1− ψ)α
(1− ψ)α + ψ(1− α) ,
µ(b|f) = ψα
ψα + (1− ψ)(1− α) .
To sustain this equilibrium, the board’s payoff needs to satisfy the following condi-
tions:
(1− β)(µ(g|sg)ψ + (1− µ(g|sg))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) > (1− β)(0.5) + βµ(b|f) ,
(1− β)(0.5) + βµ(b|f) > (1− β)(µ(g|sb)ψ + (1− µ(g|sb))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) .
Board Ab’s payoff from firing is strictly greater than its payoff from retaining, because
µ(g|sb) < 0.5 and µ(b|f) > µ(g|r). The no-deviation condition for board Ag can be
simplified to
(1− β)(α− ψ)(2ψ − 1) > 2βα(1− α) ψ
2 − (1− ψ)2
ψα+ (1− ψ)(1− α) .
Observe that the solution to this equation is given by βs. The threshold β beyond
which board Ag chooses to fire the manager with a non-zero probability is equal to
the threshold in state H beyond which the board Ab chooses to fire the manager with
a non-zero probability. Therefore, the separating equilibrium exists if β < βs(α, ψ).
Next, I show the existence of a hybrid equilibrium in which board Ag fires the
manager with probability δl and retains the manager with probability 1− δl. Ab fires
the manager with probability one. In this equilibrium , market beliefs are
µ(g|r) = (1− ψ)α
ψ(1− α) + (1− ψ)α ,
µ(b|f) = ψ(α + (1− α)δl)
ψ(α + (1− α)δl) + (1− ψ)(αδl + (1− α)) .
Because board Ag sometimes fires the manager, µ(b|f) in this equilibrium is lower
than µ(b|f) in the separating equilibrium. To sustain this equilibrium, the board’s
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payoff must satisfy the following conditions:
(1− β)(µ(g|sg)ψ + (1− µ(g|sg))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) = (1− β)(0.5) + βµ(b|f) ,
(1− β)(0.5) + βµ(b|f) > (1− β)(µ(g|sb)ψ + (1− µ(g|sb))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) .
Suppose the first condition holds. Then, it follows that board Ab’s payoff from fir-
ing the manager is as much as board Ag’s payoff from retaining. Because µ(g|sg) >
µ(g|sb), board Ag’s payoff from retaining is greater than board Ab’s payoff from re-
taining. Therefore, it is optimal for board Ab to fire the manager. The indifference
condition for board Ag can be simplified to
(1− β)(α− ψ)(2ψ − 1) = 2β(ψ(1− α) + (1− ψ)α)(µ(b|f)− µ(g|r)) .
Notice that µ(b|f) is decreasing with δl. Therefore, the equilibrium firing probability
is increasing with β. The threshold of β at which δl = 1 (defined by βp) is solved
using the following equation:
(1− β)(α− ψ)(2ψ − 1) = 2β(ψ(1− α) + (1− ψ)α)(ψ − (1− ψ)α
ψ(1− α) + (1− ψ)α) .
This threshold is the same as βp solved in the hybrid equilibrium in state H. This
threshold for β between the hybrid and pooling equilibria exists when α ∈ [ψ, ψ2
ψ2+(1−ψ)2 ].
When α = ψ
2
ψ2+(1−ψ)2 , δl = 1 at β = 1. Therefore, the hybrid equilibrium exists if
β ∈ [βs(α, ψ), βp(α, ψ)] and α ∈ [ψ, ψ2ψ2+(1−ψ)2 ]. When α > ψ
2
ψ2+(1−ψ)2 , the hybrid
equilibrium exists when β ∈ [βs(α, ψ), 1].
Next, I show the existence of a pooling equilibrium in which the board fires upon
receiving both signals sg and sb. In this case, retaining is off-equilibrium. The equi-
librium belief µ(b|f) = ψ. Suppose the off-equilibrium beliefs are such that when the
market sees retention, the board’s information must be good (it received sg). There-
fore, µ(g|r) = (1−ψ)α
ψ(1−α)+(1−ψ)α . The board’s payoff from firing after signal sg and sb is
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(1− β)(0.5) + βµ(b|f). Board Ag and Ab’s off-equilibrium payoffs from retaining are
(1− β)(µ(g|sg)ψ + (1− µ(g|sg))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) ,
(1− β)(µ(g|sb)ψ + (1− µ(g|sb))(1− ψ)) + βµ(g|r) .
Notice that µ(g|sg) > µ(g|sb), so board Ag’s payoff from retaining is greater than
board Ab’s payoff from retaining. Thus, for the pooling equilibrium to sustain, board
Ag should not deviate to retaining. The no-deviation condition for board Ag can be
simplified to
(1− β) ψ − α
2(ψ(1− α) + α(1− ψ))(2ψ − 1) + β
(
ψ − (1− ψ)α
ψ(1− α) + (1− ψ)α
)
> 0 .
If α < ψ, both the firm value and reputational payoff are strictly greater from firing
the manager. If the board’s information is worse than the information in output,
the board relies on the output and fires in state L. If α ∈ [ψ, ψ2
ψ2+(1−ψ)2 ], it is value
maximizing for Ag to retain the manager. However, the reputational payoff is greater
from firing the manager. If β > βp, board Ag fires the manager. This completes the
proof of the existence of pooling equilibrium.

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CHAPTER II
Do Equity Analysts Matter for Debt Contracts?
2.1 Introduction
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that security analysts employed by institutional
investors and brokers play a large role in monitoring activities. The security analysts
employed by these intermediaries have access to private information, and specialised
skills and ability to interpret and process that information. They interact with the
managers of a firm directly and question them in the earnings release conference calls.
They can reveal any managerial misbehavior, and unravel any accounting shenanigans
ex-post, thus posing a threat to the manager and preventing the manager from taking
actions which are detrimental to the shareholders ex-ante. Dyck et al. (2010) find
that analysts play an important role in the external governance mechanisms and are
often the first to detect managerial misbehavior.
The security analysts by putting a check on the actions of the manager increase the
value of the firm not only by reducing the agency costs of equity, but also by reducing
the agency costs of debt. If the manager engages in private benefit or takes inefficient
actions, the value of the claims to the creditors as well as the shareholders is affected.
The two effects on the value of the debt and equity are not mutually exclusive and
difficult to disentangle. Leland (1994) shows that the value of debt depends on the
leverage and the asset risk. Thus, if the riskiness of the assets decreases due to the
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monitoring by security analysts, it will also affect the value of debt. Similarly, the
actions of the manager detrimental to the creditors can reduce the value of the firm
by reducing the value of debt as well as the value of equity. Chava and Roberts (2008)
show that debt covenant violations lead to a decrease in capital investment, which
would decrease the value of the firm.
The goal of this paper is to study the effect of a decrease in analyst coverage on
the agency costs of debt. A decrease in analyst coverage causes a decrease in the
monitoring of the firms which is expected to lead to an increase in the agency cost of
debt. All else equal, this decrease in analyst coverage may lead to an increase in the
probability of default and thus increase the cost of debt and reduce the value of the
firm. However, I also expect that the creditors of the firms will take relatively more
precautionary measures to reduce the increasing riskiness of debt by making the debt
contracts more restrictive. The contracts are expected to be more likely to include
covenants and a larger number of them. All else equal, the increased restrictiveness
of the contracts is expected to reduce the costs of debt. However, it remains an
empirical question whether the decrease in the costs of debt due to an increase in the
number of covenants is more than enough to compensate for the increase in the costs
of debt due to an increase in the agency costs.
Covenants can be thought of as mechanisms, which by imposing a credible threat
to the managers, reduce the agency costs of debt (see Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Smith and Warner (1979)). The breach of a covenant in the debt contract is taken
to be a signal of poor performance. Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994) show that the debt contracts in which control rights are transferred to
the creditors after poor performance are the optimal financial contracts in mitigating
inefficient management decisions and reducing managerial moral hazard problem.
Empirically, it has been observed that cost of debt is lower for bonds which include
covenants. Chava et al. (2009), Reisel (2014) and Goyal (2005) find that covenants
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reduce the cost of issuing public debt. Bradley and Roberts (2015) find the same for
private debt.
It is challenging to cleanly identify the effect of analyst monitoring on the debt
covenants due to confounding factors that may drive debtholders’ behavior. An in-
crease in the number of covenants could be driven by an increase in the opaqueness
of the firm or a change in manager’s investment behavior. For example, the manager
may choose to invest in risky projects and that may result in an increase in restric-
tiveness of debt contracts. Due to these concerns, estimating the effect of a reduction
in the number of analysts following the firm on the debt contracts using a simple OLS
could be biased.
In order to cleanly identify the effect of a decrease in monitoring by the security
analysts on the debt contracts, I use the merger of 14 brokerage houses between 1984
and 2005 (Hong and Kacperczyk (2010)), as a quasi-natural experiment which led
to a decrease in the amount of coverage because some redundant analysts had to
leave post-merger. The reduced coverage has been shown to increase the agency costs
of equity and decrease the value of the firm (see Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012)). As
discussed above, it should also adversely affect the value of the firm by increasing the
agency costs of debt and decreasing the value of debt. It is plausibly an exogenous
source of decrease in the analyst coverage, because it seems unlikely that an increase in
the agency costs of debt would cause an ex-ante reduction in analyst coverage. Also,
since the merger is staggered during a long period of about 20 years, it is unlikely
that other events occurring at the same time as the brokerage houses merger will be
affecting the agency costs of debt.
I use difference-in-difference technique to establish a causal effect of decrease in
analyst coverage on the inclusion of debt covenants and the cost of debt. The firms
which were covered by both brokerage houses before the merger and only by the
merged broker after the merger form the treatment group. The remaining firms
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which were unaffected by the brokerage houses merger form the control group. The
identifying assumption is that any confounding factor that drives the characteristics
of the debt contracts affects the treatment and the control group in the same manner.
For instance, it is possible that the brokerage houses prefer to cover firms that are
larger and therefore the treatment firms, that are followed by fewer analysts after the
merger, are smaller. However, matching the treatment firms to set of control firms
that are similar in size and other characteristics (that may drive the ownership of the
firm’s debt or equity by the brokerage firm) suggests that the assumption holds.
Moreover, as argued above, the reduced coverage due to the brokerage houses
merger should increase the agency costs of debt only for treatment group firms. Thus,
firms which were covered by both brokerage houses pre-merger should have higher
agency costs of debt as compared to firms which were unaffected by the merger.
Therefore, the creditors should be more likely to include covenants and increase the
number of covenants for debt issued after the merger for the firms in the treatment
group. Also, the role of covenants in reducing the agency costs of debt should be of
greater importance for the firms in the treatment group in post-merger period.
First, I study the effect of covenants in reducing the agency costs of debt. Smith
and Warner (1979) argue that covenants reduce the agency costs of debt by restricting
the actions of the manager. I find that, on average, the cost of debt is 14bps lower if
there is at least one covenant in the bond. The covenants which restrict the investment
actions and the event-driven covenants play an important role in reducing the costs
of debt. However, the financing and the payout covenants impose restrictions which
may negatively affect the probability of payment to the creditors. Thus, they infact
diminish the effect of investment and event-driven covenants and increase the costs
of debt.
Further, using the merger of brokerage houses as an exogenous decrease in the
analyst coverage, I find that the likelihood of including the covenants in bonds in-
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creases, the number of covenants included in the bonds increases and the cost of debt
decreases, upon a decrease in the analyst coverage. I find that the odds of including
the covenants are about 1.6-2.3 times larger for the treatment firms after the merger.
Also, on average, the number of covenants increases by about 1.03-1.22 for the treat-
ment firms after the merger. I find that all four categories of covenants increase upon
a decrease in the analyst coverage. I also find weak evidence of an increase in the
effectiveness of the covenants in reducing the costs of debt.
2.2 Literature Review
Smith and Warner (1979) argue that covenants reduce the agency costs of debt by
restricting the actions of the manager and giving him incentives to maximize the value
of the firm, instead of shareholder’s wealth. Billett et al. (2007) find that covenant
protection diminishes the negative relationship between growth opportunities and
leverage for high growth firms, by reducing the agency costs of debt. Gamba and
Triantis (2014) find that debt covenants mitigate losses due to agency costs and
makes investment and financing policies closer to first-best. Leland (1994) finds that
positive net-worth covenants makes both debt and equity a concave function of the
firm value, and reduces the incentive of shareholders to take excessive risk. He also
finds that “increasing risk lowers equity value as well as debt value”. Chava et al.
(2009), Reisel (2014) and Goyal (2005) while studying the role of covenants in public
debt issues find that including covenants reduce the cost of debt. Bradley and Roberts
(2015) examine private debt and supports the role of covenants in reducing the cost
of debt.
Besides covenants, researchers have studied other mechanisms which reduce the
agency costs of debt. Diamond (1989) and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) show that
the problem of agency costs of debt is attenuated if managers, out of reputational
concerns, favor relatively safe projects. Green (1984) finds that issuing convertible
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bonds and warrants reduce the agency costs of debt by reversing the convex shape of
levered equity over the upper range of the firm’s earnings. In this paper, I examine the
effect of decrease in analyst coverage on the agency costs of debt and the effectiveness
of the covenants in overcoming the increase in agency costs.
Researchers have also studied various incentive schemes to overcome the agency
problem. Equity ownership structure reduces the manager-shareholder conflict by
aligning the interests of the manager with that of the shareholders (Morck et al.
(1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990)). The effect of ownership on agency costs of
debt is mixed. Brander and Poitevin (1992) and Anderson et al. (2003) find that
ownership structure is associated with reducing the agency costs of debt besides
the usual manager-shareholder agency conflict. On the other hand, Bagnani et al.
(1994) find that increase in managerial ownership structure increases the agency costs
of debt, when ownership is low. The increase in managerial ownership aligns the
manager’s incentives with that of shareholders, which increases the agency costs of
debt. However, they find a non-positive relationship when the ownership is large
(over 25 percent).
Another strand of literature focuses on the reasons and effects of covenant viola-
tions. Dichev and Skinner (2002) find that covenant violations are quite high because
the constraints on the covenants are quite tight relative to the financial condition of
the firm at the time they are written. Roberts and Sufi (2009) find that net debt
issuing activity reduces after covenant violations. Chava and Roberts (2008) show
that debt covenant violations lead to a decrease in capital investment. Nini et al.
(2009) find that covenant violations lead to a decrease in acquisitions and capital
expenditures, increase in CEO turnover and a decrease in leverage and shareholder
payouts. Thus, covenants play an important role in reducing the agency problem and
thus protecting the interests of the creditors and the value of the firm.
There are several papers which have used the brokerage house mergers as an
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exogenous shock to information asymmetry and studied its effect on reporting bias
(Hong and Kacperczyk (2010)) credit ratings (Fong et al. (2014)) and innovation (He
and Tian (2013)). Purnanandam and Rajan (2018) show that an increase in the
information asymmetry increases the intensity of the signal inherent in the growth
option conversion. Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) find an increase in the cost of equity
and a decrease in the value of the firm. However, they find that the channel that links
information asymmetry to prices is liquidity. Irani and Oesch (2013) and Balakrishnan
et al. (2014) investigate the effect of analyst monitoring on corporate disclosure.
Derrien and Kecske´s (2013) find that firms decrease investment and financing due
to an increase in the information asymmetry. They show that a decrease in analyst
coverage increases the information asymmetry which increases cost of capital.
In a related contemporaneous study, Derrien et al. (2016) show that with an
increase in information asymmetry the cost of debt and the rate of credit events
(such as defaults) increases. They suspect information asymmetry affects debt-holders
through two channels. The direct channel is by the transfer of information from the
stock market to the bond market. The indirect channel is through the price of equity,
since it is an important determinant in the price of debt (Merton (1974)). Unlike
Derrien et al. (2016), I find that the cost of debt decreases as the amount of analyst
coverage reduces. The channel is due to an increase in the likelihood of inclusion of
covenants and an increase in the number of covenants in the bonds issued after the
decrease in the analyst coverage.
2.3 Hypothesis and Empirical Design
Covenants protect the interests of the creditors by imposing constraints on the
actions of the manager which may be detrimental to the creditors. The managers
may make large dividend payments, raise additional financing and thereby, dilute
the claim of the creditors. They may engage in risk shifting, which increases the
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probability of default on the bond. The managers may forgo investment in some
positive net present value projects (Myers (1977)) and may participate in mergers
and acquisitions which might adversely affect the claim of the creditors (Warga and
Welch (1993)). However, covenants limit the discretion of the manager and help to
reduce the risk of default by increasing the probability of repayment of the debt.
Therefore, the cost of debt is lower for bonds which include covenants.
I measure the inclusion of covenants in two ways: i) I create dummy variable
CovFlag which measures the presence or absence of covenants, ii) I count the number
of covenants included in each bond, and estimate the effect of a marginal increase in
the number of covenants on the cost of debt.
Security analysts, apart from making a buy-sell recommendation on the equity
of the firm, provide details about the firm and the competition in the industry in
their reports. They provide sales and margin analysis, which are also relevant for the
creditors and the institutional investors. The projections about the sales, gross margin
and operating margin provide information about the ability of the firm to pay its debt
obligations. Since the managers are ex-ante aware that creditors and institutional
investors consume the reports published by the security analysts, it deters them from
making decisions which might deteriorate the value of debt. Thus ex-post monitoring
by the security analysts reduces the agency costs of equity as well as agency costs of
debt by disciplining the manager ex-ante.
Therefore, if there is an exogenous shock which decreases the coverage by security
analysts then it will adversely affect the agency costs of debt. Thus, the bonds will
be more likely to include covenants to protect the interest of the creditors. Also, the
creditors should include more number of covenants to deter the manager from taking
actions detrimental to the creditors.
Hypothesis 1: With a decrease in analyst coverage, the likelihood of including
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covenants in a bond increases, and the number of covenants included in a bond in-
creases.
I test the above hypothesis against the null hypothesis that the analyst coverage
has no effect on the likelihood of including the covenants in bonds and the number
of covenants in the bonds. I use 14 mergers of brokerage houses during 1984-2005
as an exogenous shock which adversely affected the analyst coverage. I assign firms
into the treatment group if they were followed by both brokerage houses before the
merger and only by the merged entity after the merger. I use matching by industry
and size as well as propensity score matching (using all firm specific control variables)
to match the control firms with the treatment firms.
Since the number of covenants increases for the bonds of the treatment firms, the
cost of debt should be marginally lower for those bonds. As the first hypothesis states
that covenants are an effective mechanism which reduce managerial misbehavior and
thus lower the cost of debt, more covenants should decrease the cost of debt. How-
ever, with a decrease in monitoring by the security analysts and with an increase in
information asymmetry, the cost of debt goes up. It remains an empirical question
to test whether the effect of covenants in reducing the cost of debt dominates the
adverse effect of a decrease in analyst coverage on the cost of debt.
Hypothesis 2: The cost of debt is lower after a decrease in monitoring by the
analysts.
I test the above hypothesis against the null hypothesis that the analyst coverage
has no effect on the cost of debt. I use the same dataset as described in Hypothesis
1. I use both industry-size as well as propensity score matching to match the control
firms with the treatment firms.
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2.4 Data
2.4.1 Covenants and Cost of Debt
Chava et al. (2009), Reisel (2014), Goyal (2005), and Billett et al. (2007) in their
studies use the sample of debt issues from Fixed Investment Securities Database
(FISD), which has detailed information on over 130,000 public debt issues spread
across different countries and includes, among others, Corporate bonds, US govern-
ment bonds, and foreign bonds. FISD dataset includes only those debt issues which
mature after 1989, thus there are few debt issues prior to 1981, which marks the
start of my sample. I do not include any of the government bonds, foreign bonds,
bonds denominated in foreign currency in the sample. I exclude bond issues for which
“subsequent data” flag in FISD dataset is “N”. This flag is “Y” if the issue has pro-
ceeded beyond the initial input phase and whether FISD records subsequent data
from a prospectus, pricing supplement or other more detailed document or source.
This leaves us with a sample of about 23,672 public debt issues spanning from 1981-
2012, out of which 64% of the issues includes covenants, about 89% of the issues are
corporate debentures, and about 7% are corporate convertibles.
Further I match the bond issuers with the Compustat dataset and obtain infor-
mation about other firm specific variables, such as the Issuer Ratings, Leverage, Size,
Tangibility and Profitability of the firm. However, I am able to match only 11,464
bond issues for 2516 issuers with the information about the financial statement vari-
ables from the Compustat database. Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics of these
debt issues and also the information on firm specific variables of the firm-bond obser-
vations. The median debt has a maturity of 10 years and offering yield of 6.63%. Each
bond issue in the sample has the information of about 50 possible covenants for cred-
itor protection and restriction on the issuer’s actions. Following, Billett et al. (2007),
I group the covenants into 15 broad categories. I further cluster these categories into
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4 major groups.
The covenants in the first group are the Payout Restriction Covenants which limit
the issuer from paying the shareholders. The two covenants in this group limit the
dividend payments and other forms of payment to the shareholders and others. About
8% of the issues have dividend payment restrictions and about 6% of the issues have
restrictions on other forms of payment to shareholders. The next seven categories
limits the financing activities of the issuer. FunDebtR restricts the issuer from issuing
additional funded debt. Funded debt is any debt with a maturity of 1 year or longer.
The following three covenants restrict the issuer from raising additional subordinate,
senior and secured debt. About 44% of the bond issues include the secured debt
covenant. LevTest includes a group of covenants placing restrictions on the leverage.
SalesLB covenant limits the issuer from selling and then leasing back the assets.
StockIss covenant limits the issuance of additional common or preferred stock.
The next set of covenants are the Event-driven covenants. These covenants auto-
matically trigger certain provisions of the bond after an event specified in the covenant
occurs. For instance, if the issuer’s rating or net worth declines below a certain thresh-
old, then certain provisions of the bond are triggered (such as put provision of the
bond in case of rating decline). In the event of default under any debt of the firm, the
CrossDef provision will trigger the event of the default in the issue that includes the
CrossDef covenant. CrossDef covenant also includes the Cross Acceleration provision
which triggers the acceleration of the debt, incase any other debt has been accelerated
due to an event of default. It is included in 45% of the bond issues in the sample.
PosionPut covenant allows the creditors to have the option of selling the bond back
to the issuer upon a change in control.
The last set of covenants restrict the investment activities of the issuer. AssetSale
clause requires the issuer to use the proceeds from the asset sales to redeem the bonds
at par or at a premium. It does not limit the right to sell assets. Inv restricts the
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issuer’s investment policy to prevent risky investments. MergerR restricts a consoli-
dated merger of the issuer with another entity. There is only 1% of the bond issues
which include the Inv covenant, while 62% of the bond issues have an asset sale
covenant. Also, the correlation between asset sale covenant and merger covenant is
99%, therefore if a bond issue has an asset sale covenant, it is almost certain to have
a merger restriction covenant as well.
I create a dummy variable CovF lag which indicates the presence/absence of
covenants. In the FISD/Compustat matched sample, 74% of the bond issues have
covenants, higher than the unmatched FISD sample in which about 64% of the issues
included covenants. Therefore , it seems that some of the bond issuers are private,
and public debt raised by them is less likely to include covenants. It could be because
the financial information is less verifiable for private firms, thus it is hard to write
covenants on the financial variables of the firm. Also, the accounting variables are
more subject to manipulation by the manager, therefore even if the bond includes
the covenants, their enforcement will be ineffective.
I create 15 dummy variables for each covenant and consolidate those 15 variables
into 4 variables for each group of covenant. CovIndex is calculated as the sum of all
15 covenant dummy variables. Table 2.2 also presents the summary statistics of other
firm specific variables obtained from Compustat. Instead of using issue rating, I use
issuer rating since FISD has rating information about the issue only since April 1995.
However, the issuer rating is a huge determinant in assigning an issuer rating. The
correlation between issue rating and the issuer rating is about 94% during the time
period when both are present. The variables are defined in the Appendix.
2.4.2 Analyst Coverage
I follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and use the merger of brokerage firms as
an exogenous shock to the analyst coverage. I use the IBES database and get the
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detailed history about the earnings estimates by the security analysts. Each analyst
has a unique identifier through which I can follow the analyst across time. I can
identify the firms which are followed by the analyst as well as the brokerage firms
with which the analyst was employed during different periods of time. I use 14 mergers
between brokerage firms spanned during 1984-2005.1
A firm is considered to be treated if it was covered by both brokerage houses
before merger and with the merged brokerage house after the merger. If not, then
that firm will be a control firm. I choose 4 time windows before and after the merger
to observe the early and late effects of the merger on the use of debt covenants. The
first three time windows are denoted by 1yr, 2yr and 3yr, while the fourth time
window is anytime before or after the merger in the sample, and is denoted by Nyr.
For instance, consider the merger on May 31, 1997. If any firm is covered by both
brokerage firms, which were involved in the merger, during the period May 31,1996
to May 31,1997 and only by the merged entity during the period May 31,1997 to May
31,1998 then this firm will be included in the 1yr time-window sample. Similarly, I
do it for 2yr, 3yr and Nyr time window samples.
Now, during the period of 1981-2012, a firm may be affected by more than one
merger. If there is a overlap between the time-windows of the two mergers, there will
be a dilemma in the post merger status of the firm. To illustrate, suppose there is
a firm which is affected by two mergers, one in 1997 and second in 1999. Now, the
year 1998 will be treated as post merger observation for merger 1 while a pre-merger
observation for merger 2. To avoid this dilemma, in this paper, I consider only the
most recent merger which affected the firm and ignore all the earlier mergers. Using
this process, I obtain 1,167 treated firms and 18,590 control firms which were not
affected by the merger. Similarly, for 2yr, 3yr, Nyr window, I find 1,322 firms, 1,407
firms and 1,595 firms to be affected by the mergers. Upon, considering different time
1Detailed information about the mergers can be obtained from the appendix in Hong and Kacper-
czyk (2010).
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windows, on average, there are about 12-16 control firms for each treatment group.
On average, every year 13.3 analysts follow the group of firms covered by 1yr window.
The 2yr, 3yr and Nyr window has about 12-13 analysts covering a firm every year.
The treated firms in these windows are covered by around 15-16 analysts while the
control firms are covered by 8-9 analysts.
2.5 Effect of Covenants on Cost of Debt
In this section, I analyse whether the inclusion of covenants in a bond reduces
the costs of raising debt. I control for all possible factors which may affect the cost
of raising debt. I use year fixed effects to control for any changes in the market
environment, which affects all firms in a particular year. I control for firm specific
variables which affect the cost of debt. If the leverage of a firm is high, then the risk of
default is also high, thus raising the cost of debt for highly levered firms. I also control
for the growth opportunities of the firm. Firms with more growth opportunities have
been known to issue equity to raise financing, and are negatively related to leverage.
Thus, cost of debt is lower for firms with higher growth opportunities. I use the
market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the growth opportunities.
First, I analyse the effect of the presence of covenants on the cost of raising debt.
I run the following regression:
CostofDebtitb =α + γi + δt + β1CovF lagitb + β2Termitb
+ β3Firm Controlsit + itb ,
(2.1)
where CostofDebtitb is the yield offered by firm i on bond b issued in year t. γ
and δ control for firm and year fixed effects. CovF lag is a dummy variable which
equals 1 if the bond issue includes at least one covenant. Term denotes the maturity
of the bond. Firm Controls denote the time-varying firm specific control variables
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(defined in the Appendix). I run 4 regressions with different subsets of the above
control variables. The results are reported in detail in Table 2.3. The full regression
(Model 4 in the table) shows that the cost of debt for bonds which includes covenants
is 14 bps lower than the bonds which do not include covenants. If the rating decreases
by one notch, the cost of debt increases by 23 bps. Also, the cost of debt increases
with an increase in leverage, and decreases with an increase in market-to-book ratio.
Upon comparing the results for regression models (3) and (4), I find that many of the
other firm level controls become insignificant after controlling for firm fixed effects.
It implies there is not enough variation within firms for R&D expenses, advertising
expenses, capital expenditure and cash. Also, there are only about 4.5 firm-bond
observations for each firm during the period 1981-2012.
Next, I analyse the contribution of a marginal increase in the number of covenants
in decreasing the cost of debt. I run the following regression:
CostofDebtitb =α + γi + δt +
∑
j
β1jCovIndexDummmy(= j)itb + β2Termitb
+ β3Firm Controlsit + itb ,
(2.2)
where CovIndexDummy(= j) is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the number
of covenants in a bond issue is equal to j. I again run 4 regressions as before. The
results are reported in Table 2.4. As the number of covenants increases the cost of
debt decreases. The cost of debt is the least for bonds with 4 covenants. However,
as the number of covenants begin to increase beyond 7 the cost of debt begins to
increase. This implies that the marginal benefit of an increase in the number of
covenants diminishes as the number of covenants increases. Once the number of
covenants is greater than 7, further increase in the number of covenants increases the
cost of debt.
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Now, I divide the covenants into different categories and analyse the source of the
decrease in the cost of debt. I run a regression similar to the the previous one but with
a different set of dummy variables indicating the different categories of covenants.
CostofDebtitb = α + γi + δt +
∑
j
β1jPayoutRestriction(= j)itb
+
∑
j
β2jFinancingRestriction(= j)itb +
∑
j
β3jInvestmentRestriction(= j)itb
+
∑
j
β4jEventDriven(= j)itb + β5Termitb + β6Firm Controlsit + itb ,
(2.3)
where the dummy variable, PayoutRestriction(= j) equals 1 if there are j payout
covenant restrictions for a bond. The other 3 dummy variables are similarly related
to the other 3 categories of covenants.
Table 2.5 presents the results of this regression. The covenants which restrict the
investment policy of the firm and the event-driven covenants are the ones which reduce
the cost of debt. While the payout restriction covenants and the financing restriction
covenants increase the cost of debt. Upon comparing these results with those of Table
2.4, I infer that the event driven covenants and the investment restriction covenants
are the first ones to be included in a bond issue. This is so because these covenants
have a negative effect on the cost of debt; and a smaller number of covenants is
also associated with lower cost of debt (Table 2.4). Whereas the payout restriction
covenants and the financing restriction covenants must be the ones which are included
in the debt after the investment and the event driven covenants are already included,
since the payout restriction covenants and the financing restriction covenants are
positively related to the cost of debt (Table 2.5), which increases if the number of
covenants increases beyond 7 (Table 2.4).
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It seems surprising that the addition of payout and financing restriction covenants
should be associated with higher cost of debt. One plausible explanation of this result
is that firms issuing bonds with large number of covenants and payout and financing
covenants are the ones with low creditworthiness, and thus they have a higher cost of
debt compared to the others.
As seen above the investment and event-driven covenants seem to be the ones
which are included first in the bonds and they play an important role in reducing
the cost of debt. This may be so because these types of covenants are more effec-
tive in reducing the agency costs of debt than the financing or payout covenants.
The investment restriction group of covenants include the asset sale, investment and
merger covenants. In the absence of the asset sale covenant, the manager may sell the
asset and not use the proceeds to redeem the bonds, which jeopardizes the principal
amount of debt for the creditors. If any of the thresholds in the event driven covenant
is breached, then it automatically triggers certain provisions of the bond. CrossDef
covenant will trigger the event of default/acceleration of the debt in case any other
bond faced an event of default/acceleration.
Payout and financing restriction covenants do not pose such strong restrictions as
event driven covenants. For instance, for a financing covenant, in case the borrower
issued additional debt and breached a covenant. This breach increases the probability
of bankruptcy since leverage has increased. However, if the additional financing
is invested in positive net present value projects with low risk, the probability of
repayment should increase and the probability of default should decrease instead.
Second, the payout covenants restrict the manager from paying dividends to the
shareholders. However, the dividends can be paid only from the net income after
paying the interest payments to the creditors. Therefore, the payout and the financing
restriction covenants do not jeopardize the principal outstanding for the debt issue
as the investment restriction covenants. They also do not impose automatic trigger
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of default/acceleration or put provision of the debt as the event-driven covenants.
2.6 Effect of Brokerage Firms Merger on Debt Contracts
In this section, I use the merger of brokerage firms to establish a causal relationship
between the analyst coverage and the debt contracts. Before that, I replicate (using
only the IBES brokerage house dataset) the results of Hong and Kacperczyk (2010)
who find that when brokerage firms merge, a redundant analyst is fired. This provides
a quasi-natural experiment to measure a decrease in the analyst monitoring of the
firm. I match the treatment firms with control firms which were followed by exactly
the same number of analysts as the treatment firm before the merger. For each
treatment firm I match upto 5 control firms. I do the same exercise for all 4 time
windows 1yr, 2yr, 3yr and Nyr. I run the following regression:
NumAnalystit = β1Treat+ β2Post+ β3TreatXPost+ it , (2.4)
where NumAnalyst represent the number of analysts following firm i in year
t. The results are shown in Table 5. The coefficient of interest is β3 which is the
difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of brokerage house merger on the analyst
coverage. I run the above regression with treatment firms estimated in three different
ways. As described in the data section, the regression for 1yr under column 1 and
2 correspond to the treatment variable estimated using 1 year time window before
and after the merger. Similarly, the 2yr and 3yr columns correspond to two year and
three year time windows before and after the merger. The coefficient β3 is negative
and significant at 1% level for all three regression specifications.
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2.6.1 Effect of Decrease in Analyst Coverage on Bond Covenants
I use the IBES analyst dataset as described in the data section and merge it with
the Compustat/FISD dataset. Out of the 11,464 bond issues in the FISD/Compustat
dataset, I could find 9,629 bond issues whose issuers were followed by security analysts
at some point of time in the sample. I include the remaining firms which were not
covered by security analysts (remaining 1,835 out of 11,464) but have bond issues, into
the group of control firms as well. Thus, the final FISD/Compustat/IBES merged
dataset consists of 11,464 bonds issued by 2516 issuers during the period 1981-2012.
I partition these bond issues into treatment and control group where the groups are
assigned based on 4 different time windows. I assign firms into the treatment group if
they were followed by both brokerage houses before the merger and only by the merged
entity after the merger. For each treated firm, I find control firms through matching
by industry and size; and through propensity scores. The results are qualitatively
similar in both cases and I report only those obtained though matching based on the
propensity score. There are 4367 treatment firm-bond observations using a 1 year
time window, while 4737, 4935, 5289 firm-bond treatment observations using a 2yr,
3yr, Nyr time window. The summary statistics of the covenant and the financial
statement variables for the treatment and control firm-bond observations using a 3yr
window are in Table 2.7.
I estimate the effect of merger of brokerage firms on the debt covenants. I run the
following logistic regression model:
CovF lagitb =α + γj + δt + β1Treat+ β2NewDebtPostMerger
β3Treat X NewDebtPostMerger + β4Firm Controls+ itb ,
(2.5)
where CovF lagitb is a dummy variable which indicates the presence of covenants
in bond b for firm i in year t. I run the above regression for 4 different time-window
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specification, as described in the data section. Treat equals 1 for a firm if it was
followed by both brokerage houses before the merger, while only by the merged entity
after the merger for that particular time-window. In the regression specifications for
1yr, 2yr, 3yr and Nyr time-windows NewDebtPostMerger equals 1 for firm-bond
observations 1 year, 2 year, and 3 year and all remaining years in the sample after
the merger. NewDebtPostMerger equals 0 for all firm-bond observations before the
merger. There is not enough within-firm variation amongst the bonds in the data to
analyse the data at the within-firm level. On average there are only 4.5 bond issues
by a firm during the sample period of 31 years. I use industry fixed effects γj to
control for any factors particular to an industry which may effect the probability of
including covenants in bonds.
I also control for financial statement variables of the issuer which may affect the
presence of covenants in the bond issues. Malitz (1986) and Begley (1994) identify
that firm size and capital structure play a role in the use of covenants in the bond.
Nash et al. (2003) and Billett et al. (2007) find that growth options play a role in
influencing the use of bond covenants. Following the literature, I use market-to-book
ratio as a proxy for growth options.
The results of the above regression are in Table 2.8. The coefficient of interest
is β3 which represents the difference in difference estimate of the probability of issu-
ing a bond with covenants for treatment firms after the merger. It is positive and
significant at 1% level for all time-windows. It implies that the bonds issued by the
treatment firms after the merger are more likely to include covenants. Thus, I reject
the hypothesis that monitoring by the equity analysts have no effect on the bond
contracts. I find that the creditors are more likely to include bond covenants after an
exogenous decrease in the monitoring by analysts.
Now, I test whether the brokerage house merger has any effect on the number
of covenants in the bonds which are issued after the merger. I run the following
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regression model:
CovIndexitb =α + γj + δt + β1Treat+ β2NewDebtPostMerger
β3Treat X NewDebtPostMerger + β4FirmControls+ itb ,
(2.6)
where CovIndex measures the total number of covenants included in the bond.
The coefficient of interest is β3 which represents the difference in difference estimate
of the number of bond covenants for treatment firms after the merger. The coefficient
is positive and significant at 1% level for all regression specifications, implying that
the bonds issued post merger include more number of covenants for the treated firms.
The results are reported in Table 2.9. On average, the number of covenants in the
new bond issued post merger by the treated firms is higher by 1.03-1.22.
I further investigate the source of increase in the bond covenants. I find that all
categories of covenants increase after the merger. The results are reported in Table
2.10. The results hold for all time windows and are statistically significant at 1%
level. These results are in contrast with Chava et al. (2009) who find that likelihood
of including investment related and merger related covenants increases while that
of payout and financing related covenants decreases once managerial entrenchment
increases.
I also analyse the relative proportion of increase in different categories of covenants.
I run the following regression on proportion of all 4 covenants:
Proportionitb =α + γj + δt + β1Treat+ β2NewDebtPostMerger
β3Treat X NewDebtPostMerger + β4FirmControls+ itb ,
(2.7)
where Proportion is the relative proportion of covenants. I use all four categories
of covenants as the dependent variable in 4 separate regressions. The results are
presented in Table 2.11. This analysis is limited to those bonds which include at
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least one covenant, so that proportion of different categories of covenants can be
estimated. This explains the decrease in the number of observations in the regressions
in this particular table. I find that the proportion of payout covenants and event-
driven covenants increases, while the proportion of investment restriction covenants
decreases for the bonds issued after the merger by the treated firms. The results are
statistically significant at 1% level.
2.7 Effect of Decrease in Analyst Coverage on Cost of Debt
Now, I estimate the effect of a decrease in the analyst coverage on the cost of
raising new debt. Specifically I run the following regression:
CostofDebtitb =α + γj + δt + β1Treat+ β2NewDebtPostMerger
β3Treat X NewDebtPostMerger + β4FirmControls+ itb ,
(2.8)
where CostofDebt is the yield offered on a bond. The results are reported in
Table 2.12. The difference in difference estimate of the effect of a decrease in analyst
coverage on the cost of debt is captured by β3. As can be seen from the table, β3 is
negative and statistically significant at 1% level for the 1year, 2yr and 3yr windows.
The coefficient for the N year window is statistically significant at 5% level with a
t-stat of -2.54. It implies that the cost of debt is lower for the new bonds issued by
the firms which were affected by the merger.
Therefore as the number of analysts following a firm reduce, the number of
covenants in the new debt increases as well as the cost of debt reduces. This provides
an evidence of the role of covenants in reducing the cost of debt for the new debt
issued.
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2.8 Discussion
It is puzzling to note that the cost of debt goes down when there are fewer analysts
following a firm. However, this result can be justified in a world in which the decrease
in analyst coverage results in worse shareholder monitoring. Because of the worse
monitoring, manager chooses to remain passive and do nothing. Thus, the manager
chooses low risk projects and therefore the cost of debt is lower.
Alternatively, assume a world in which the manager’s behavior is disciplined only
by security analysts and debt covenants. The security analysts produce information
about the manager’s actions and the covenants put restrictions on the manager’s
behavior. Further, the cost of debt is only a function of debt covenants. Before the
merger of brokerage houses, the number of covenants on the debt contracts and the
security analysts covering the firm are optimal. After the merger of brokerage houses,
the firm faces an exogenous shock to its analyst coverage. In order to to substitute
for the loss of information produced by the analysts, the debt holders increase the
number of covenants. The increase in the restrictions put forth by the covenants
results in a change in manager’s behavior. The manager chooses low risk projects
and that results in a lower cost of debt.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyse the overlap between the agency costs of equity and agency
costs of debt. I study and connect the effects of covenants and security analysts
in reducing these agency costs. On one hand, covenants play an important role in
protecting the interests of the creditors. They impose constraints on the actions of
the manager and the shareholders ex-post, and thus reduce the agency cost of debt
ex-ante. On the other hand, information intermediaries act as agents of the share-
holders and prevent the manager from taking inefficient actions detrimental to the
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shareholders. However, since any sub-optimal action of the manager will effect the
value of the equity as well as the value of debt, information intermediaries, in the pro-
cess of reducing the agency costs of equity, indirectly reduce the agency costs of debt
as well, and protect the interests of the creditors. If there is an exogenous decrease in
monitoring by the information intermediaries, it should increase the agency costs of
equity as well as the agency costs of debt. Creditors, by increasing the likelihood of
inclusion of covenants and the number of covenants, are expected to take measures
to reduce the increase in the agency costs of debt.
I find that the inclusion of covenants in the bond contracts reduce the cost of debt.
The covenants which restrict the investment actions and the event-driven covenants
are strong and play an important role in reducing the cost of debt. However, the
financing and the payout covenants impose restrictions which may negatively affect
the probability of payment to the creditors. Thus they infact diminish the effect
of investment and event-driven covenants and increase the costs of debt. Further,
I use the merger of brokerage houses during the period 1984-2005 as an exogenous
decrease in the analyst coverage and study its effect on the debt contracts. I find that
the likelihood of including the covenants increases, the number of covenants included
in the bonds increases and the cost of debt decreases, upon a decrease in the analyst
coverage. I find that all four categories of covenants increase upon a decrease in the
analyst coverage.
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2.10 Variable Construction
Table 2.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Tangibility Plant, Property and Equipment / Total Assets, both at time t
Profitability EBITDA between t− 1 and t / Total Assets at t -1
Capx Assets Capital Expenditure between t− 1 and t / Total Assets at t− 1
RD PPE R&D Expenditure between t − 1 and t / PPE at t. Set missing observations to
0 to maintain sample size.
Adv PPE Advertising Expenditure between t−1 and t / PPE at t. Set missing observations
to 0 to maintain sample size.
M/B Ratio (Total Assets - Book value of equity + Market value of equity) / Total Assets,
all at time t.
Cash Assets Cash and Short Term Investments / Total Assets at t
Leverage (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities)/(Total Assets - Book value of
equity + Market value of equity)
ROA Income Before Extraordinary items / Total Assets at t− 1 * 100
Issuer Rating Number coding from 1 to 22 for S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit Rating
1=AAA, 22=D
DivPmtR Equals 1 if there is covenant limiting the dividend payments of the issuer or a
subsidiary of the issuer.
ShareRepR Equals 1 if there is a covenant limiting the issuer to make payments (other than
dividend payments) to shareholders and others.
FundDebtR Equals 1 if there is covenant preventing the issuer and/or the subsidiary from
issuing additional debt with a maturity of 1 year or longer.
SubDebtR Equals 1 if there is a covenant preventing the issuer from issuing additional sub-
ordinate debt.
SenDebtR Equals 1 if there is a covenant preventing the issuer from issuing additional senior
debt.
SecDebtR Equals 1 if there is a covenant preventing the issuer from issuing additional se-
cured debt.
LevTest Equals 1 if i) there is a covenant restricting leverage of the issuer of the issuer
and/or subsidiary and/or ii) there is covenant specifying issuer to maintain min-
imum net worth and/or iii) there is a covenant specifying issuer to maintain
minimum ratio of earnings to fixed charges.
SalesLB Equals 1 if there is covenant restricting the issuer and/or subsidiary from selling
and then leasing back assets that provide security to the debtholder.
StockIss Equals 1 if there is a covenant restricting the issuer and/or subsidiary from issuing
additional common or preferred stock.
RatingNWT Equals 1 if there is covenant under which certain provisions are triggered if either
the credit rating or the net worth of the issuer falls below a specified level.
CrossDef Equals 1 if there is a covenant under which default or acceleration is triggered in
the issue when default or acceleration occurs in any other debt issue.
PoisonPut Equals 1 if there is a covenant under which bondholders have the option of selling
the issue back to the issuer (poison put) upon a change in control of the issuer.
AssetSale Equals 1 if there is a covenant requiring the issuer and/or subsidiary to use the
net proceeds from the sale of certain assets to redeem the bonds at par or at a
premium.
Inv Equals 1 if there is a covenant restricting the issuer and/or subsidiary from in-
vesting in risky assets.
MergerR Equals 1 if there is a covenant restricting the issuer from a consolidated merger
with another entity.
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2.11 Supplementary Tables
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
The table below presents the summary statistics of the debt issues by 2516 firms using 11,464
firm-bond observations during 1981-2012. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
N Mean p50 SD Min Max
Yield 11464 6.65 6.63 2.33 0.12 20.35
Term 11464 12.83 10.00 9.94 0.00 100.00
Payout Restriction Covenants
DivPmtR 11464 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00
ShareRepR 11464 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00
Financing Restriction Covenants
FundDebtR 11464 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00
SubDebtR 11464 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00
SenDebtR 11464 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00
SecDebtR 11464 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
LevTest 11464 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
SalesLB 11464 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
StockIss 11464 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00
Event-Driven Covenants
RatingNWT 11464 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00
CrossDef 11464 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
PoisonPut 11464 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
Investment Restriction Covenants
AssetSale 11464 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Inv 11464 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.00
MergerR 11464 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Aggregate Variables
CovFlag 11464 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
CovIndex 11464 3.04 3.00 2.53 0.00 12.00
Payout Restrictions 11464 0.14 0.00 0.46 0.00 2.00
Financing Restrictions 11464 0.98 1.00 1.09 0.00 5.00
Event Driven 11464 0.67 1.00 0.76 0.00 3.00
Investment Restrictions 11464 1.24 2.00 0.98 0.00 3.00
Firm Level Controls
logAssets 11464 9.06 9.06 1.70 4.20 14.82
logSales 11450 8.26 8.39 1.67 -2.30 13.01
Tangibility 10952 0.40 0.37 0.30 0.00 0.97
Profitability 10868 0.13 0.12 0.12 -1.89 2.39
RD PPE 10875 0.13 0.00 1.02 0.00 54.67
Adv PPE 10875 0.05 0.00 0.27 0.00 14.66
Capx Assets 10812 0.08 0.05 0.13 -0.03 3.34
ROA 11274 3.46 3.51 10.00 -306.44 90.11
Cash Assets 11457 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.95
Leverage 9154 0.25 0.22 0.16 0.00 0.95
MBRatio 9185 1.54 1.30 0.90 0.53 27.09
IssuerRating 10726 8.31 8.00 3.27 1.00 21.33
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Table 2.3: Effect of Presence of Covenants on Cost of Debt
The table below reports the effect the presence of covenants on the cost of debt using 11,464 firm-
bond observations during 1981-2012. The number of observations in Models (3) and (4) are less
due to some missing values for firm control variables in the merged FISD/Compustat dataset. The
dependent variable is the offering yield on the bond. CovF lag is a dummy variable which equals 1
if there is at least one covenant in the bond. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: Cost of Debt (1) (2) (3) (4)
CovFlag -0.84∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(-20.51) (-5.59) (-9.15) (-2.60)
Term 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(4.83) (19.47) (12.39) (18.01)
IssuerRating 0.22∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(25.52) (13.94)
logAssets -0.30∗∗ -0.71∗∗
(-2.56) (-2.26)
logAssets Sq 0.0094 0.023
(1.59) (1.42)
logSales 0.051 0.69∗∗
(0.49) (2.43)
logSales Sq -0.00094 -0.028∗
(-0.16) (-1.72)
Tangibility -0.031 -0.087
(-0.37) (-0.29)
Profitability -0.11 0.033
(-0.50) (0.13)
RD PPE -0.58∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗
(-9.51) (-2.32)
Adv PPE -0.092 0.26∗∗
(-1.36) (2.17)
Capx Assets 0.29∗ -0.18
(1.75) (-0.69)
ROA -0.0030 -0.014∗∗∗
(-1.24) (-3.81)
Cash Assets -0.89∗∗∗ 0.31
(-4.31) (0.85)
Leverage 1.82∗∗∗ 2.29∗∗∗
(12.69) (7.93)
MBRatio -0.14∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗
(-4.62) (-2.32)
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.74 0.57 0.73
Observations 11464 11464 7513 7513
Firm FE No No No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Industry X Year FE No No Yes No
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Table 2.4: Effect of Marginal Increase in Covenants on Cost of Debt
The table below reports the effect of marginal increase in the number of covenants on the cost
of debt using 11,464 firm-bond observations during 1981-2012. The number of observations in
Models (3) and (4) are less due to some missing values for firm control variables in the merged
FISD/Compustat dataset. The dependent variable is the offering yield on the bond. Covenants(#j)
is a dummy variable which equals 1 if there are j covenants in the bond, otherwise 0. All other
variables are defined in the Appendix. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: Cost of Debt (1) (2) (3) (4)
Covenants(#1) -0.35∗∗∗ -0.10 -0.10 0.020
(-4.79) (-1.53) (-1.20) (0.21)
Covenants(#2) -0.90∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗
(-14.59) (-4.24) (-7.10) (-4.07)
Covenants(#3) -1.20∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗
(-21.72) (-6.73) (-13.11) (-4.00)
Covenants(#4) -1.17∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗
(-24.08) (-11.05) (-14.26) (-7.74)
Covenants(#5) -0.85∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(-15.85) (-6.65) (-10.29) (-3.82)
Covenants(#6) -0.86∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.14∗
(-11.79) (-4.52) (-8.49) (-1.69)
Covenants(#7) -0.59∗∗∗ -0.13 -0.51∗∗∗ 0.0078
(-5.92) (-1.35) (-5.23) (0.07)
Covenants(#8) 1.53∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗
(10.85) (7.05) (4.55) (6.08)
Covenants(#9) 2.20∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(18.46) (9.30) (9.01) (7.51)
Covenants(#10) 2.31∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
(17.27) (6.94) (7.44) (5.00)
Covenants(#11) 2.24∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗
(8.46) (3.39) (3.32) (2.17)
Covenants(#12) 2.38∗∗ 2.15∗
(2.03) (1.72)
Term 0.015∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(9.21) (20.40) (13.89) (18.67)
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.75 0.60 0.74
Observations 11464 11464 7513 7513
Firm FE No No No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Industry X Year FE No No Yes No
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Table 2.5: Effect of Different Categories of Covenants on Cost of Debt
The table below reports the effect of different categories of covenants on the cost of debt using
11,464 firm-bond observations during 1981-2012. The dependent variable is the offering yield on
the bond. PayoutRestrictions(#j), FinancingRestrictions(#k), InvestmentRestrictions(#l),
EventDriven(#m) are dummy variables which equal 1 if there are j, k, l, m payout covenants,
financing covenants, investment covenants, and event driven covenants in the bond, otherwise 0. All
other variables are defined in the Appendix. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: Cost of Debt (1) (2) (3) (4)
Payout Restrictions(#1) 0.58∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(7.31) (5.84) (6.18) (6.00)
Payout Restrictions(#2) 3.13∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗
(30.70) (14.57) (17.60) (11.44)
Financing Restrictions(#1) -0.055 0.16∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(-1.10) (3.19) (7.79) (7.79)
Financing Restrictions(#2) 0.17∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗
(3.43) (7.59) (12.35) (11.55)
Financing Restrictions(#3) 0.11 0.40∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗
(1.43) (5.04) (8.29) (8.28)
Financing Restrictions(#4) 0.63∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
(4.51) (5.06) (5.94) (5.76)
Financing Restrictions(#5) 0.13 1.04∗∗ 0.44 1.36∗∗
(0.28) (2.06) (0.99) (2.44)
Investment Restrictions(#1) -0.79∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗ -0.96∗∗∗ -0.96∗∗∗
(-3.17) (-2.57) (-3.50) (-3.94)
Investment Restrictions(#2) -0.66∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗
(-14.99) (-5.69) (-12.03) (-7.17)
Investment Restrictions(#3) -0.69∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗ -0.55∗∗
(-3.63) (-3.57) (-2.13) (-2.01)
Event Driven(#1) -0.32∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗
(-7.98) (-8.35) (-8.52) (-6.41)
Event Driven(#2) -0.55∗∗∗ -0.82∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗
(-8.94) (-12.88) (-15.40) (-11.87)
Event Driven(#3) 0.35∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗
(2.11) (-2.77) (-2.48) (-4.04)
Term 0.013∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(8.12) (20.65) (14.05) (19.44)
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.75 0.61 0.75
Observations 11464 11464 7513 7513
Controls No No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes
Industry X Year FE No No Yes No
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Table 2.6: Effect of Brokerage Firms Merger on Coverage by Analysts
The table below reports the effect of the merger of brokerage firms on the number of analysts
following a firm using IBES database during the period 1981-2012. The dependent variable is the
number of analysts following a firm in a given firm-year. There are three sets of regressions for three
different time windows before and after the merger. Treat equals 1 for a firm if it was followed by
both brokerage houses before the merger, while only by the merged entity after the merger for that
particular time-window. In the regression specifications for 1yr, 2yr, and 3yr time-windows Post
equals 1 for observations 1 year, 2 year, and 3 year after the merger. Post equals 0 for observations
1 year, 2 year, and 3 year before the merger.
Dep Var: # of Analysts (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat 7.59∗∗∗ 7.77∗∗∗ 7.93∗∗∗
(25.59) (29.50) (31.18)
Post -1.73∗∗∗ -2.89∗∗∗ -0.68∗∗∗ -2.29∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗ -2.05∗∗∗
(-5.91) (-7.17) (-3.20) (-8.34) (-4.89) (-11.02)
Treat × Post -0.84∗∗∗ -0.91∗∗∗ -1.52∗∗∗ -1.56∗∗∗ -1.88∗∗∗ -1.83∗∗∗
(-3.63) (-3.47) (-6.64) (-6.62) (-8.25) (-8.25)
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.81 0.20 0.76 0.20 0.75
Observations 7527 7527 13116 13116 17759 17759
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.7: Summary Statistics
The table below presents the summary statistics of the 11,464 firm-bond observations obtained from
the FISD/Compustat/IBES merged dataset during 1981-2012. The firm-bond observations are in
the treatment group if that firm was followed by both brokerage houses before the merger, while only
by the merged entity after the merger. All remaining firms are in the control group. The statistics
presented in the table are for the treatment group which was obtained using a 3 year time-window
before and after the merger.
N Mean p50 SD Min Max
Treatment Group
Yield 4935 6.43 6.54 2.26 0.12 20.35
Term 4935 13.26 10.00 11.04 1.00 100.00
CovFlag 4935 0.82 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00
CovIndex 4935 3.47 4.00 2.30 0.00 12.00
Payout Restrictions 4935 0.09 0.00 0.38 0.00 2.00
Financing Restrictions 4935 1.24 1.00 1.06 0.00 5.00
Event Driven 4935 0.67 1.00 0.76 0.00 3.00
Investment Restrictions 4935 1.47 2.00 0.89 0.00 3.00
logAssets 4935 9.63 9.52 1.56 4.95 14.60
logSales 4933 9.02 9.08 1.41 3.86 13.01
Tangibility 4797 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.00 0.96
Profitability 4819 0.14 0.14 0.13 -1.89 2.39
RD PPE 4795 0.12 0.00 0.46 0.00 11.16
Adv PPE 4795 0.06 0.00 0.30 0.00 14.66
Capx Assets 4614 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.00 3.34
ROA 4901 4.46 4.26 9.49 -294.46 54.58
Cash Assets 4933 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.87
Leverage 4744 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.00 0.86
MBRatio 4756 1.62 1.35 0.96 0.59 27.09
IssuerRating 4815 7.57 7.00 3.06 1.00 21.33
Control Group
Yield 6529 6.81 6.74 2.37 0.25 19.00
Term 6529 12.50 10.00 9.01 0.00 100.00
CovFlag 6529 0.68 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
CovIndex 6529 2.71 2.00 2.65 0.00 12.00
Payout Restrictions 6529 0.18 0.00 0.50 0.00 2.00
Financing Restrictions 6529 0.78 0.00 1.07 0.00 5.00
Event Driven 6529 0.68 1.00 0.76 0.00 3.00
Investment Restrictions 6529 1.07 2.00 1.01 0.00 3.00
logAssets 6529 8.63 8.60 1.67 4.20 14.82
logSales 6517 7.67 7.75 1.62 -2.30 12.33
Tangibility 6155 0.43 0.45 0.31 0.00 0.97
Profitability 6049 0.12 0.12 0.11 -1.41 1.44
RD PPE 6080 0.13 0.00 1.31 0.00 54.67
Adv PPE 6080 0.05 0.00 0.25 0.00 6.68
Capx Assets 6198 0.09 0.05 0.13 -0.03 3.11
ROA 6373 2.69 3.18 10.30 -306.44 90.11
Cash Assets 6524 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.95
Leverage 4410 0.27 0.25 0.16 0.00 0.95
MBRatio 4429 1.46 1.25 0.81 0.53 19.72
IssuerRating 5911 8.91 9.00 3.31 1.00 20.80
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Table 2.8:
Effect of Brokerage Firms Merger on New Debt Issue Covenants (Probability of Presence
of Covenants)
The table below reports the effect of a decrease in analyst coverage on the probability of presence of
covenants using 11,464 firm-bond observations obtained from the FISD/Compustat/IBES merged
dataset during 1981-2012. The dependent variable CovF lag is a dummy variable which equals 1 if
there is at least one covenant in the bond, otherwise 0. There are four sets of regressions for four
different time windows before and after the merger. Treat equals 1 for a firm if it was followed
by both brokerage houses before the merger, while only by the merged entity after the merger
for that particular time-window. In the regression specifications for 1yr, 2yr, 3yr and Nyr time-
windows NewDebtPostMerger equals 1 for firm-bond observations 1 year, 2 year, and 3 year and
all remaining years in the sample after the merger. NewDebtPostMerger equals 0 for all firm-bond
observations before the merger. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: CovFlag (1) (2) (3) (4)
1Yr 2Yr 3Yr NYr
Treat 0.30 0.11 0.054 0.072
(1.55) (0.59) (0.30) (0.44)
New Debt Post Merger -0.55∗ -0.13 -0.27 -0.31
(-1.75) (-0.45) (-1.09) (-1.38)
Treat × New Debt Post Merger 0.77∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(2.60) (3.39) (3.53) (2.74)
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.29
Observations 2763 3180 3617 7510
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.9: Effect of Brokerage Firms Merger on New Debt Issue Covenants (Covenant Index)
The table below reports the effect of a decrease in analyst coverage on the number of covenants us-
ing 11,464 firm-bond observations obtained from the FISD/Compustat/IBES merged dataset during
1981-2012. The dependent variable CovIndex equals the number of covenants included in a bond.
There are four sets of regressions for four different time windows before and after the merger.
Treat equals 1 for a firm if it was followed by both brokerage houses before the merger, while only
by the merged entity after the merger for that particular time-window. In the regression spec-
ifications for 1yr, 2yr, 3yr and Nyr time-windows NewDebtPostMerger equals 1 for firm-bond
observations 1 year, 2 year, and 3 year and all remaining years in the sample after the merger.
NewDebtPostMerger equals 0 for all firm-bond observations before the merger.∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ cor-
respond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: CovIndex (1) (2) (3) (4)
1Yr 2Yr 3Yr NYr
Treat 0.20∗ 0.18 0.12 -0.43∗∗∗
(1.67) (1.51) (1.01) (-3.61)
New Debt Post Merger -0.89∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.97∗∗∗
(-3.27) (-3.56) (-3.03) (-4.60)
Treat × New Debt Post Merger 1.03∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗
(4.24) (6.17) (6.88) (8.36)
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.19
Observations 2814 3206 3639 7513
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.12: Effect of Decrease in Analyst Coverage on Cost of Debt
The table below reports the effect of a decrease in analyst coverage on the cost of debt using 11,464
firm-bond observations obtained from the FISD/Compustat/IBES merged dataset during 1981-2012.
The dependent variable is the offering yield on the bond. There are four sets of regressions for four
different time windows before and after the merger. Treat equals 1 for a firm if it was followed
by both brokerage houses before the merger, while only by the merged entity after the merger
for that particular time-window. In the regression specifications for 1yr, 2yr, 3yr and Nyr time-
windows NewDebtPostMerger equals 1 for firm-bond observations 1 year, 2 year, and 3 year and
all remaining years in the sample after the merger. NewDebtPostMerger equals 0 for all firm-bond
observations before the merger. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: Cost of Debt (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr N Yr
Treat -0.055 -0.047 -0.055 -0.0019
(-0.88) (-0.74) (-0.82) (-0.03)
New Debt Post Merger 0.24∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.21
(1.65) (2.70) (3.70) (1.59)
Treat × New Debt Post Merger -0.55∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗
(-4.27) (-4.40) (-5.67) (-2.54)
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.59
Observations 2814 3206 3639 7513
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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CHAPTER III
Managerial Learning and Feedback Effects
3.1 Introduction
Trading in the financial markets aggregates the information of various speculators
and arbitrageurs into market prices. Hence, market prices may serve as a useful
source of information about fundamentals that can be utilised by managers in the
resource allocation decisions of a firm. For instance, Luo (2005) provides evidence
of use of information in stock prices in acquisition decisions of the firm. Chen et al.
(2007) document that the information in price affects the investment decisions of the
firm. Considering these findings, it may appear optimal for a manager to extract
useful information from prices in order to enrich her information set and take efficient
decisions. However, a more careful analysis suggests that the manager’s decisions,
in particular, manager’s use of information to take those decisions, may affect the
information that the prices are supposed to reflect in the first place. For instance,
Dow et al. (2017) and Faure-Grimaud (2002) show that manager’s use of information
in price reduces the incentives of the informed trader to collect information about the
state.
In this paper, we model a firm whose value depends on uncertain exogenous fun-
damentals and the actions of its manager. The manager decides how much to invest
in an uncertain technology. The fundamentals can be interpreted as the return to
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the technology. The manager does not know this return, but gathers some private
information about it. In addition, the stock price of the firm reflects the private
information of an informed trader, and serves as another source of information. We
model price formation through trading in the secondary market as in Kyle (1985).
The manager can learn about the fundamentals in two ways: (i) from the stock
price of the firm and (ii) by gathering her own private information. The uncertainty
about her action increases the uncertainty about the firm value. The greater uncer-
tainty affects the payoffs of the informed trader, market maker and liquidity traders
in the financial market, whose strategies, in turn, affect the information reflected in
the stock price. There is a feedback effect: The stock price affects the manager’s
learning, and hence affect the amount of uncertainty generated by her action.
We analyze two compensation contracts. The first contract does not provide
incentives to the manager to learn about fundamentals (from either channel) before
taking action. The alternative incentive contract induces the manager to take a high
action in the good state of the world, and take a low action in the bad state of the
world. We exploit the difference in the two incentive structures to illustrate the effects
of manager’s learning on financial markets.
The main result of the paper is that the manager acquiring private information
and the manager learning from the stock price have different effects on the expected
profits of the informed trader. Both channels of learning increases the informational
advantage to the informed trader. However, the greater informational advantage leads
to greater expected profits to the informed trader only due to the manager acquiring
private information. The feedback from price does not affect the expected profits of
the informed trader.
The reason is that greater information asymmetry exposes the market maker to
greater adverse selection risk. The market maker, anticipating this, increases the
price impact, which results in greater price illiquidity and greater price volatility. By
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setting a higher price impact, the market maker completely unwinds the effects of in-
formation asymmetry created by the feedback from price, resulting in no net benefit
to the informed trader. However, the market maker cannot undo the informational
advantage to the informed trader that results from the manager acquiring private in-
formation, because the informed trader has better knowledge about the fundamentals
than the market maker does. Thus, only the manager acquiring private information
creates a wealth transfer from uninformed liquidity traders to the informed trader.
The second result of the paper is that neither of the learning channels affects the
trading volume or how informative the price is about the fundamentals. One might
expect that a strategic informed trader would increase his trading intensity to utilise
his informational advantage, which would result in an increase in trading volume. The
higher trading intensity would also imply greater price informativeness. However, we
show that the increase in price impact, set by the market maker, forces the informed
trader to lower the quantity he trades, in a manner that completely offsets the former
increase in trading volume. In other words, in equilibrium, the trading volume is
unaffected by the manager’s learning. Consequently, the price informativeness about
the fundamentals is also unaffected by the manager’s learning.
It has been suggested in the literature that if liquidity traders are the original
shareholders of the firm, they would offer a lower price ex-ante to compensate for
their losses (see Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993)). In our model, when the manager
gathers private information with greater precision, ceteris paribus, it decreases her
learning from the stock price, thereby increasing the losses to liquidity traders. The
increase in losses will be compensated by greater underpricing in the IPOs. So, the
model suggests that underpricing will be greater when the manager has better private
information about fundamentals.
Our model generates implications for the incentives of the informed trader to
acquire information. The precision of the informed trader’s information has two
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effects on his expected profits. First, there is a direct effect: Better information of the
informed trader increases his information advantage over uninformed liquidity traders,
which increases his expected profits. Second, better information of the informed
trader increases the equilibrium price informativeness. As a result, in choosing her
action, the manager relies more on the stock price than on her private information.
This effect lowers the equilibrium expected profits to the informed trader. We show
that overall the first effect dominates.
We extend the model to study the effect of competition amongst informed traders
on the manager’s learning. We show that, with competition, the price is more in-
formative. As a result, the manager learns more from the price and less from her
private information. This lowers the expected profits of the informed trader. Thus,
we provide another channel through which the profits of the informed trader decrease
beyond the direct effects of market competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.3 we describe the
model and define equilibrium. In Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 we solve the equilibrium
strategies for a passive and an active manager. In Section 3.6 we solve the model
when there is competition between informed traders. We conclude in Section 3.7.
3.2 Related Literature
The paper contributes to a growing literature on feedback effects of financial
markets (see Bond et al. (2011) for a survey). Several papers studying the feedback
effects of financial markets show that when the manager learns from price to guide
her real decisions, it reduces price informativeness about the fundamentals (see for
example, Bond et al. (2010), Dow et al. (2017), Bond and Goldstein (2015)). However,
they ignore the strategic behavior of the informed trader, which might affect the price
informativeness. In our paper, the informed trader is strategic and takes into account
the effect of his order on price, and consequently on manager’s learning and firm
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value. We show that manager’s learning does not reduce the informativeness of the
price.
The model in our paper is closest to the model in Edmans et al. (2015) who also
study feedback with a strategic informed trader. They show that the feedback effect
results in an asymmetric effect on trading volume, price impact, price informativeness
and expected profits of the informed trader. That is, the informed trader has greater
profits when the fundamentals are high, while lower profits when the fundamentals
are low. Instead, in this paper, we show that, both when the fundamentals are high
or low, the feedback effect increases the price impact, while it does not affect trading
volume, price informativeness and the expected profits of the informed trader.
In both papers, the role of feedback effect is to reduce the difference between the
information sets of market maker and the manager. In their paper, the feedback
effect eliminates the difference between the information sets of the market maker
and the manager. That is, due to feedback, the market maker can exactly predict
the actions of the manager. But the market maker has imperfect knowledge about
the fundamentals due to noise trading by liquidity traders, which results in a net
advantage to the informed trader. In our paper, the feedback effect reduces, but does
not eliminate, the difference between the information set of the market maker and
the manager. Overall, the manager has better information about fundamentals than
the market maker, due to her private information. This results in an informational
advantage to the informed trader, since his information about fundamentals is useful
in predicting manager’s actions.
The key difference between their paper and ours is the effect of manager’s action
on firm value. In their paper, the optimal action of the manager makes the firm
value a convex function of the fundamentals, which is the main driver of their results.
Due to convexity, market maker faces greater risk when manager takes higher action.
Conversely, when manager takes low action, market maker faces lower risk. This
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results in asymmetric price impact. It also implies that the informed trader receives
greater profits when the fundamentals are high, and lower profits when the funda-
mentals are low. In our paper, the firm value is a linear function of the fundamentals,
which implies that the risk faced by the market maker is symmetric, implying that
the increase in price impact is symmetric. Moreover, the risk faced by the market
maker is greater due to manager’s learning from her private information. This results
in an informational advantage to the informed trader, and hence he receives greater
profits both when fundamentals are high and when they are low.
Put differently, both papers show that manager’s learning increases the profits of
the informed trader because knowing the state benefits the informed trader. But the
mechanism is different. In our paper, the benefit of the informed trader in superior
knowledge of the state is useful in predicting manager’s action, which leads to greater
expected profits. In their paper, the informed trader’s superior knowledge about the
state leads to greater profits when the fundamentals are high because the value is
convex in fundamentals.
Dow and Gorton (1997), Dow et al. (2017) and Faure-Grimaud (2002) show that
feedback effect reduces the incentives of the informed trader to collect information
about the state. The idea is that when the firm learns that the state is bad, it does
not invest, which lowers the profitability and the incentives of the informed trader to
collect information. However, in our paper, the manager learns from price and from
her private information, resulting in a net informational advantage to the informed
trader as his information is useful in predicting manager’s action. This results in
greater incentives to gather precise information.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on underpricing of the IPOs. The
asymmetric information based models of underpricing in IPOs (see Rock (1986), Rit-
ter (1984) and Beatty and Ritter (1986)) suggest that the underpricing is greater for
firms with greater ex-ante uncertainty in value. In this paper, we show that con-
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t = 0
The firm is publicly traded in
the secondary market.
Informed trader places order us-
ing the rule X(st). Liquidity
traders place an order y.
Market maker sets the price
P (q) as a function of total or-
der q = x+ y received.
t = 1
The manager receives
her independent in-
formation sa and
takes action a ac-
cording to the rule
A(sa, P ).
t = 2
Value of the
firm is realized
and cash flows
are distributed.
Figure 3.1: This figure shows the timing of the model
ditional on ex-ante uncertainty, manager’s incentives to learn about fundamentals
increases the uncertainty about the firm value which increases the losses to unin-
formed traders and aggravates underpricing. It implies that firms with lower ex-ante
uncertainty but with better informed managers may underprice their stock listing the
same as firms with higher ex-ante uncertainty and uninformed managers.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Timing
There are three dates in the model t = 0, 1, 2. There is one firm run by a manager
whose actions affect the value of the firm. At t = 0, the firm is traded in the secondary
market consisting of an informed trader, liquidity traders and a market maker. The
price formation takes place in the first period in two stages. In the first stage, the
informed trader and the liquidity traders place their orders to the market maker.
In the second stage, the market maker upon receiving the total order flow from the
informed trader and the liquidity traders sets the price P . At t = 1, the manager of
the firm uses the price P and her own private information to take an action which
affects the value of the firm. Once the action is taken, the value of the firm is realized
and the cash flows are distributed.
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3.3.2 Firm
The value of the firm depends on uncertain exogenous fundamental θ and the
action a chosen by the manager. θ can be interpreted as the returns to technology
or the set of investment opportunities or future industry profitability. At t = 0,
agents in the economy do not know θ. They have a prior that θ follows a normal
distribution with mean θ0 and variance σ
2
θ . We assume the value of the firm to be
linear and additively separable1 in θ and a. We assume a linear form to disentangle
the effect due to feedback on the financial markets from the effect due to a non-linear
value function (for example, Edmans et al. (2015) model a firm such that manager’s
optimal action makes the firm value a convex function of fundamentals).
V = θ + a
The manager of the firm incurs a cost C(a) upon taking action a (We assume C ′(.) > 0
and C ′′(.) > 0). The action a can be interpreted as the amount of investment in the
technology and C(a) can be interpreted as the cost of financing the investment. The
owners of the firm cannot observe the action taken by the manager. They set up a
contract with the manager which pays w(V ). We assume that w(V ) is exogenously
given (satisfying w′ > 0 and w′′ ≥ 0) and instead focus on the manager’s use of
information to maximize her payoff.2 The payoff received by the manager at t = 2
is w(V ) − C(a). The manager chooses action a at t = 1 to maximize her payoff as
1An alternative way to model the firm can be when the owners are choosing the action a (resources
added to the firm) instead of the manager. In an Empire-Building example, where the manager is
entrenched and derives status in running a larger firm, Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) show that
the owners would prefer to learn about the fundamentals and add more resources to the firm when
the fundamentals are high. That formulation will be consistent with the value function postulated
in this paper.
2Note that, we have not analyzed the owner’s payoff and whether ex-ante it is optimal to give the
compensation contract w(V ) to the manager. The results of the paper are conditional on a given w.
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follows:
max
a
E[w(V )− C(a)|I] . (3.1)
We assume (w′′ < C ′′) so that there exists an interior solution to the optimization
problem. The manager’s information set I consists of her own private information
sa and price P . The private information sa is noisy signal about θ (sa = θ + εa
where εa ∼ N(0, σ2a)) and the price of the firm P is determined through trading in
the secondary market at t = 0.
3.3.3 Secondary Market
We follow Kyle (1985) and model the secondary market with an informed trader,
liquidity traders and a market maker. The informed trader is a monopolistic trader
who has private information st = θ + εt where εt ∼ N(0, σ2t ). In our setting, his
private information is useful to make inference about the actions of the manager, in
addition to the fundamentals θ. The informed trader chooses his order x to solve:
max
x
E[(V − P )x|st, x] .
Besides the informed trader, the liquidity traders put an order y ∼ N(0, σ2y) for
exogenous reasons. The market maker receives the total order flow (q) coming from
the informed trader (x) and the liquidity traders (y). Since the market maker is in a
competitive industry, he sets the price of the firm equal to expected value of the firm
conditional on the order flow, thereby making 0 expected profits. The price set by
the market maker is:
P (q) = E[V |q = x+ y] .
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Note, the market maker sets the price before the manager takes action a but knows the
decision rule of the manager. When he sets the price, he also incorporates the effect
of price on the value of the firm through its effect on manager’s actions. In section
3.6 below, we extend the model with N informed traders competing in quantities.
3.3.4 Equilibrium
We now define the equilibrium.
Definition III.1. An equilibrium consists of a trading strategy of the informed trader
X(st) : R → R, market maker’s pricing rule P (q) : R → R, and manager’s decision
rule A(I) : R2 → R such that
i. for informed trader, x = arg maxE[(V − P )x|st, x],
ii. market maker’s sets the price P (q) = E[V |q = x+ y]; and
iii. manager’s action is a = arg maxE[w(V )− C(a)|I].
We use the following strategy to solve the model. At t = 1 the manager chooses
to take action a using the rule A(I). At t = 0, the informed trader places an order
x(st) = γ0 + γ1st to maximize his expected profits given the manager’s decision rule
and the market maker’s pricing rule. The market maker sets the price P using the
pricing rule P (q) = α0 + α1q given the manager’s decision rule and the informed
trader’s order strategy. We then solve the manager’s optimal decision given the order
x(st) from the informed trader and the market price P set by the market maker. We
also refer to the tuple (γ0, γ1) as γ and (α0, α1) as α in the paper.
3.3.5 Manager’s Incentives
In this section, we solve the manager’s problem. In our paper, the compensation
contract w(V ) is a way to provide incentives to the manager to induce her to learn
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about fundamentals. The payoff received by the manager at t = 2 is w(V )−C(a). The
manager is choosing action a to maximize her expected payoff at t = 1 conditional
on her information set I = {sa, P}. The optimal action a∗ solves the following first
order condition:
E[w′(θ + a∗)|I]− C ′(a∗) = 0 .
We assume w′(.) as a linear function of its parameters, which enables us to characterize
the optimal action only as a function of conditional expectation of θ. Let µ denote
the conditional expectation E[θ|I]. We denote the optimal solution as a∗(µ). It can
be easily shown that the optimal action a∗ is increasing with µ and
∂a∗
∂µ
=
w′′
C ′′ − w′′ = k1 ≥ 0 . (3.2)
The magnitude of k1 depends on the convexity of the compensation contract w
′′. It
implies that manager’s actions vary with µ more if her contract has greater pay-for-
performance sensitivity. While, if the contract is linear (w′′ = 0), then the manager’s
action will be unaffected by µ. This gives us the following lemma.
Lemma III.2. The manager’s optimal action a∗ is increasing with µ if the compen-
sation contract is strictly convex (w′′ > 0) while it is unaffected by µ if the contract
is linear (w′′ = 0).
We assume the cost function to be quadratic, which immediately gives us the
following equation as the optimal action rule of the manager when w′′ > 0.
a∗(µ) = k0 + k1µ . (3.3)
Thus, a convex compensation contract induces the manager to take higher action
if µ is higher. Next, we show that the manager’s ex-ante expected payoff is higher
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when her information I is of greater precision. We write the expected payoff to the
manager as:
pi(µ, σ2) = E[w(θ + a∗(µ))− C(a∗(µ))|I] .
where σ2 = V [θ|I]. Since the information structure and the fundamental θ is jointly
normal, the expected payoff only depends on the conditional mean and conditional
variance. We show that the manager’s expected payoff is increasing in the precision
of her information set as long as the compensation contract w is strictly convex.
Proposition III.3. The manager’s ex-ante expected payoff E[pi] is increasing with the
precision of her information I if the compensation contract is strictly convex w′′ > 0.
Whereas the manager’s ex-ante expected payoff is unaffected by the precision of her
information if the compensation contract is linear (w′′ = 0).
The proposition suggests that ex-ante the manager would prefer to gather informa-
tion with greater precision in order to take efficient actions. It validates the idea that
the manager would prefer to use additional information about θ from market price,
in addition to her private information, to increase the precision of her information set
which increases her expected payoff.
The proposition also suggests that the benefit of having precise information is
greater if the manager receives high pay-for-performance sensitivity contract. In
summary, the compensation contract creates incentives for the manager such that her
actions are more sensitive to her prediction about θ as well as induces the manager
to gather precise information ex-ante.
3.4 Passive Manager Equilibrium
In this section, we consider a benchmark case when the manager is given a linear
compensation contract. In this case, as shown in Lemma III.2 above, the optimal
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action a taken by the manager does not depend on µ. Moreover, as shown in Propo-
sition III.3 a linear compensation contract does not provide any incentives to learn
about the fundamentals. We label the manager to be “Passive”.
The passive manager’s action do not add any additional uncertainty in the value
of the firm beyond the uncertainty due to fundamentals θ. Thus the price formation
process through trading in the secondary market follows Kyle (1985). The trading
intensity, price impact and price informativeness obtained in the equilibrium with a
passive manager serve as a benchmark to illustrate the effects of manager’s learning
on the financial markets with an active manager in section 3.5 below.
We solve the equilibrium strategies of all agents as follows. Given the manager’s
decision, we first solve for informed trader’s trading intensity. At t = 0 the informed
trader places his order x(st) to maximize his expected profits E[(V −P )x|st] given the
pricing rule of the market maker. The informed trader chooses the trading intensity
as:
γP1 =
1
2αP1
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
t
. (3.4)
The informed trader trades with a greater intensity if his information is precise (σ2t
low) or if the price impact αP1 is low. Since the manager is passive, her actions do
not add any additional uncertainty about the firm value. Thus, the informed trader’s
information about the fundamental θ is useful to predict the overall firm value. Put
differently, in the case of a passive manager, her actions do not affect the trading
intensity of the informed trader.
Given the trading intensity, the market maker chooses the price impact to make
zero expected profits. The market maker upon observing the total order flow q can-
not distinguish between the orders coming from informed trader or liquidity traders.
Thus, in order to minimize the adverse selection risk, he sets the price P = E[V |q]
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such that his expected losses E[(P − V )q] equal 0. The price impact αP1 set by the
market maker is:
αP1 =
γP1 σ
2
θ
(γP1 )
2(σ2t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
y
. (3.5)
The price impact is non-linear in trading intensity γP1 and increasing in informed
trader’s precision 1/σ2t , while it is decreasing in the amount of noise trading σ
2
y . The
price impact also does not depend on the manager’s action, since a passive man-
ager’s action do not add any uncertainty to the firm value (beyond the fundamental
uncertainty about θ).
Next, we solve for the equilibrium trading intensity and the price impact given
the manager is passive. We find the trading intensity and the price impact as
γP1 =
[
σ2y
σ2θ + σ
2
t
]1/2
, (3.6)
αP1 =
σ2θ
2σy(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
1/2
. (3.7)
We plot the informed trader’s trading intensity as a function of price impact and the
market maker’s price impact as a function of trading intensity in figure 3.2. When
the manager is passive, the equilibrium values of (γP1 ,α
P
1 ) are shown at point A. Note,
point A corresponds to the maximum αP1 for all possible values of γ
P
1 , implying that
the market maker chooses the highest possible price impact given trading intensity
γP1 .
Next, we calculate the price informativeness, price volatility and the expected
profits of the informed trader for this benchmark case. In our setting the market
price, not only provides information about the value of the firm, but also serves as a
signal about θ, which the manager may find useful to learn about the fundamental.
Thus, we define price informativeness about fundamental as the amount of reduction
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in uncertainty about θ.
PI =
V [θ]− V [θ|P ]
V [θ]
.
We obtain the equilibrium price informativeness and price volatility as:
PI =
σ2θ
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
, (3.8)
V (P ) =
(σ2θ)
2
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
. (3.9)
Note in this equilibrium, since the manager is passive, her actions do not affect
the price impact, price informativeness and price volatility. The reason is that the
passive manager’s action does not increase uncertainty about the firm value. This
also implies that the price informativeness about the firm value is equal to the price
informativeness about the fundamental. We show later that, in the case of an active
manager, the price informativeness about the firm value is different from the price
informativeness about the fundamental.
We also calculate the equilibrium expected profits of the informed trader. It can
be easily shown that the expected profits of the informed trader are:
E[pi(st)] =
σyσ
2
θ
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
. (3.10)
We summarize the results of this section in the following proposition.
Proposition III.4. There exists a unique linear equilibrium when the manager is
passive. In the equilibrium the market maker sets the price impact αP1 as:
αP1 =
σ2θ
2σy(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
1/2
.
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The informed trader’s trading intensity γP1 is:
γP1 =
[
σ2y
σ2θ + σ
2
t
]1/2
.
The price volatility is:
V (P ) =
(σ2θ)
2
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
.
When the manager is passive, the trading intensity, price impact, price informa-
tiveness and price volatility are the same as in a Kyle setting. In the next section,
we modify the model such that the manager has incentives to use her information
I to take optimal actions which affect the price formation process in the secondary
market.
3.5 Active Manager Equilibrium
In this section, we consider the case when manager is given a strictly convex
compensation contract. Thus, as Proposition III.3 shows, the manager has incentives
to use her information set to take the optimal action. We label the manager to be
“Active”. The optimal action rule of the manager is given by equation (3.3). Using
the assumption of normality on the information structure we obtain the optimal action
rule as a linear function of sa and P as follows:
A(sa, P ) = β0 + β1sa + β2P , (3.11)
where β0, β1, β2 are functions of k0 and k1. β1 is interpreted as the manager’s use
of her private information while β2 is interpreted as the learning from the price. We
also refer (β0, β1, β2) as β in the paper.
The informed trader places his order by taking into account the effect of his order
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on the price and subsequently, the effect of price on manager’s action. The market
maker sets the price by incorporating the effect of price on manager’s action and thus
the value of the firm. Thus, in this case the manager’s use of private information and
market price to take optimal action also affects the price which in turn affects the
optimal learning by the manager.
3.5.1 Trading Intensity and Market Liquidity Given Manager’s Decision
First, we solve for the optimal trading strategy for the informed trader, given the
pricing rule of the market maker and the decision rule of the manager. We obtain
the trading intensity of the informed trader as:
γ1 =
(1 + β1)
(1− β2)
σ2θ
2α1(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
. (3.12)
Given the pricing rule of the market maker, the trading intensity is greater than the
trading intensity in equation (3.4) by a factor of 1+β1
1−β2 . It increases with manager’s
use of her private information β1 and learning from the prices β2. When the manager
is active, her actions increase the uncertainty associated with the value of the firm.
This gives an informational advantage to the informed trader since the informed
trader’s information about θ is useful in predicting the value of the firm by i) directly
predicting θ and ii) predicting the actions of the manager. Thus, the informed trader
trades with a greater intensity when the manager is active.
Next, we solve for the optimal pricing rule of the market maker, given the order
of the informed trader and the decision rule of the manager. We obtain the price
impact α1A as:
α1 =
1 + β1
1− β2
γ1σ
2
θ
γ21(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
y
. (3.13)
The price impact when manager is active is greater than the price impact when the
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manager is passive (equation (3.5)) by a factor of 1+β1
1−β2 . The price impact is increasing
in β1 and β2. To see the reason, first note that the market maker’s objective to get 0
expected profits can be interpreted as minimizing the variance of V − P conditional
on his information set. When the manager is active, there is additional uncertainty
in the firm value due to manager’s actions. Accordingly, the market maker increases
the price impact given trading intensity γ1 and manager’s decision rule β.
It is important to note here that the price impact is greater because of greater
uncertainty in firm value and not because of greater trading intensity. The reason
is that the manager’s learning affects the objectives of the informed trader and the
market maker separately. The market maker, in anticipation of manager’s learning,
increases price impact to recoup his losses given the order flow.
Next, we use equations (3.12) and (3.13) to solve for the equilibrium of the game
between the informed trader and the market maker, given manager’s decision rule.
We calculate γ1 and α1 as:
γ1 =
[
σ2y
σ2θ + σ
2
t
]1/2
, (3.14)
α1 =
1 + β1
1− β2
σ2θ
2σy(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
1/2
. (3.15)
See appendix for γ0 and α0. Note, the trading intensity in (3.14) is independent
of manager’s action and is equal to the trading intensity in the case of a passive
manager. The reason is that when the manager is active, the market maker increases
the price impact due to greater uncertainty in the firm value, which in turn decreases
the trading intensity. In other words, when the manager is active, it increases the
informational advantage to the informed trader which in turn increases the trading
intensity, but it also leads to an increase in price impact by the market maker which
reduces the trading intensity. The outcome of the game between the informed trader
and the market maker given manager’s decision results in a higher price impact with
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Figure 3.2:
This figure shows the trading intensity and market illiquidity in two cases
i) when the manager is passive and ii) when manager is active
no effect on trading intensity. This gives us the following Lemma.
Lemma III.5. When the manager is active, her learning, both from her private
information and from prices, increases the risk faced by the market maker. The
market maker, in anticipation, increases the price impact, which exactly offsets the
effect of manager’s learning on the trading intensity of the informed trader, such that
it is equal to the trading intensity with a passive manager.
We can see the results of this Lemma in figure 3.2. The figure shows the informed
trader’s order strategy as a function of market illiquidity (γ1(α1)) and market illiquid-
ity as a function of informed trader’s strategy (α1(γ1)) given the manager’s decision
rule. We plot γ1(α1) and α1(γ1) for passive and active manager to highlight the role
of manager’s action on trading intensity and price impact.
Point C shows informed trader’s order intensity when the manager uses her infor-
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mation, but the market maker keeps the price impact as if the manager is passive (at
point A). Note the trading intensity increase from A to C. This increase corresponds
to the relation of γ1(β1, β2) in (3.12) above. The intuition is that the use of informa-
tion by the manager increases the informational advantage of the informed trader.
Thus, he increases trading intensity.
In turn, the market maker being exposed to greater uncertainty in the firm value
adjusts the price impact from A to B. Accordingly, the informed trader decreases the
trading intensity from C to B. Note B is directly above A, which implies that the
increase in price impact is just enough so that the trading intensity is independent
of manager’s use of information. The best response trading strategy γ1 and best
response price impact α1 given the active manager’s decision rule are shown at point
B.
By increasing the price impact, market maker decreases the price liquidity and
increases the price volatility. The price informativeness and price volatility given
active manager’s decision rule are:
PI =
σ2θ
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
, (3.16)
V (P ) =
(
1 + β1
1− β2
)2
(σ2θ)
2
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
. (3.17)
Note price informativeness when the manager is active is equal to the price infor-
mativeness when the manager is passive (equations 3.8). The reason is that the price
informativeness is only dependent on trading intensity. Since in the case of active
manager, the market maker increases the price impact such that the trading intensity
is unaffected by the manager’s decision rule (Lemma III.5). Consequently, the price
informativeness is also unaffected by the manager’s decision rule.
However, the price impact and price illiquidity when the manager is active is
greater than when the manager is passive (equation 3.7 and 3.9). The reason is
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because the active manager’s use of information increases the uncertainty in the firm
value, to which the market maker responds by increasing the price impact. This
results in greater illiquidity and higher price volatility.
3.5.2 Expected Profits of the Informed Trader Given Manager’s Decision
In this section, we solve for the expected profits of the informed trader, given the
manager’s decision rule. We show above that the market maker increases the price
impact when the manager is active, which in turn reduces the trading intensity of
the informed trader such that it is unaffected by the manager’s use of information.
In this section, we show that, when the manager is active, despite the fact that the
informed trader trades at the same intensity as when the manager is passive, he gets
higher expected profits (as compared to equation (3.10)).
The expected profits E[pi(st)] = E[(V − P )x(st)] can be easily shown to be equal
to:
E[pi(st)] = (1 + β1)
σyσ
2
θ
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
. (3.18)
Note the expected profits are higher if β1 is higher but they do not depend on β2,
manager’s feedback from the price. This gives us the following proposition.
Proposition III.6. The expected profits of the informed trader are increasing in the
manager’s use of her private information, and are unaffected by the feedback from the
prices.
In order to gain intuition for this result we breakdown the expected profits to the
market maker in the following way. We know that the market maker, in order to
achieve 0 expected profits, sets the price such that V − P is orthogonal to q. i.e.
Cov(V − P, q) = 0. We expand the total order flow and re-write the expected losses
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to the market maker as:
Cov(V − P, q) = γ1Cov(V − P, st) + Cov(V − P, y) . (3.19)
Note the first term in equation (3.19) is equal to the expected profits of the informed
trader, and the second term is equal to the expected profits to the liquidity traders. In
equilibrium, the market maker would set price impact such that the expected profits
of the informed trader are equal to the expected losses to the liquidity traders. Thus,
we can write the equilibrium expected profits of the informed trader as:
E[pi(st)] = Cov(P − V, y) . (3.20)
When the manager is passive, the firm value is uncorrelated with liquidity trading y,
thus the expected losses to liquidity traders, or equivalently the expected profits to
the informed trader, are Cov(P, y) = αP1 σ
2
y.
However, the manager’s learning from price gives an advantage to the liquidity
traders. The feedback from the price induces a positive correlation between firm value
and the liquidity trading, which reduces the expected losses to the liquidity traders.
The expected losses to the liquidity traders are:
Cov(P − V, y) = α1(1− β2)σ2y . (3.21)
Note the key difference between the effect of manager’s learning from her own private
information and from the market price on the expected losses to liquidity traders.
If the manager uses more of her private information, it does not induce a positive
correlation between firm value and liquidity trading, thus the expected losses to the
liquidity traders are only affected by β2.
We show in Lemma III.5 that the equilibrium price impact is higher by a factor
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of 1+β1
1−β2 . Note the greater price impact exactly cancels out the benefit to liquidity
traders due to manager’s learning from price resulting in greater expected losses to
the liquidity traders, or equivalently greater expected profits to the informed trader
only due to manager’s learning from her private information.
The results of Lemma III.5 and Proposition III.6 can be summarised as follows.
If the manager uses more of her own information or feedback from the prices to
make decisions, the information asymmetry between the informed traders and the
liquidity traders increases. This increases the expected profits to the informed trader.
However, the manager’s learning from price has an additional offsetting effect on the
expected profits by inducing a positive correlation between the liquidity trades and
firm value, which benefits liquidity traders and lowers the wealth transfer from the
liquidity traders to the informed trader. Overall, the increase in expected profits to
the informed trader is only due to manager’s use of her private information, which
increases the expected profits by a factor of 1 + β1.
3.5.3 Manager’s Optimal Decision
In this section, we solve for manager’s optimal action given the trading intensity
and market liquidity. The manager is taking action a based on her information set
(sa, P ). We show in Proposition III.3 above, the active manager would prefer to
gather precise information about θ, because it increases her ex-ante expected payoff.
This motivates the idea that learning from prices will increase the precision of her
information set which increases her expected payoff. Her private information sa is a
noisy signal about θ, while price P contains the information of the informed trader
st concealed by the order of the liquidity traders y.
In other words, having additional information about θ coming from the informed
trader’s signal helps the manager in predicting θ accurately. Consider the case when
θ is the returns to technology. Higher prices indicate that the technology, in which
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the firm is about to invest, is good. Conditional on her own private information the
manager learns from price and invests more. The manager would be under investing
if there is lack of feedback from the prices. The same logic applies when prices are
low. If the manager does not learn from low prices and update her beliefs about the
technology, then she would overinvest.
First, we solve for manager’s optimal decision rule when the informed trader’s
strategy is given and the market maker’s pricing rule is best response to manager’s
decision and informed trader’s strategy. The market maker’s best response is given
by equation (3.13). We show that the manager’s use of private information β1 is
decreasing with trading intensity γ1, while feedback from price β2 is increasing with
trading intensity. The reason is that higher trading intensity increases price informa-
tiveness about θ, thus the manager uses more feedback from prices to take optimal
action.
Next, we solve for manager’s optimal decision rule when the market maker’s pric-
ing rule is given and the informed trader’s order strategy is a best response to market
maker’s pricing rule and manager’s decision rule. The informed trader’s order strat-
egy follows equation (3.12). We show that the manager increases her use of feedback
from price when the price impact is low. The reason is that with low price impact, the
informed trader trades aggressively, which increases the price informativeness about
θ and thus the manager uses more feedback.
Lemma III.7. The manager uses greater feedback from the prices and lowers use of
private information if the trading intensity is high (γ1 high) or if the market liquidity
is high (α1 low).
In other words, the manager increases her use of feedback from the price when
it is more informative about θ relative to her own private information. The price is
more informative when the informed trader is trading at a greater intensity or when
the market liquidity is high (α1 low). Thus, price informativeness in the secondary
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market affects the manager’s action through manager’s information set.
The results of Lemma III.7 are further illustrated in figure 3.3. The solid line in
the figure shows that β1 is decreasing and β2 is increasing with the trading intensity
of the informed trader when the market maker’s pricing rule follows equation (3.13).
The dotted line shows that β1 is decreasing and β2 is increasing with market liquidity
1/α1 when the informed trader’s strategy follows equation (3.12).
3.5.3.1 Manager’s Action in Equilibrium
Now, we use the results of Lemma III.5 and Lemma III.7 and show the existence
of a unique linear equilibrium.
Lemma III.5 shows that manager’s use of information increases the informational
advantage to the informed trader and the market maker increases the price im-
pact such that the trading intensity is independent of manager’s use of information.
Lemma III.7 shows that the manager uses more information from price if the price
informativeness is high, which happens when price impact is low. Thus, manager’s
greater use of information increases the price impact, which reduces the manager’s
incentives to use information from price. Thus, equilibrium is obtained at a fixed
point, where the manager’s use of information corresponds to price impact, which in
turn corresponds to a trading intensity and price informativeness in order for such
use of information to be optimal.
The equilibrium use of information can also be seen in figure 3.3. Note the solid
line is plotted to show the effect of varying trading intensity on β1 and β2, while
incorporating the market maker’s response to varying trading intensity. The dotted
line is plotted to show the effect of varying price impact, while incorporating the
informed trader’s response to varying price impact. The intersection of solid line and
dotted line shows the equilibrium β1 and β2 at which the trading intensity chosen on
the solid line and the price impact chosen on the dotted line are best responses to
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This figure shows the equilibrium use of information and the equilibrium
trading intensity and market liquidity
each other.
We show the existence of a unique equilibrium and report the equilibrium strate-
gies in Proposition III.8 below.
Proposition III.8. There exists a unique linear equilibrium when the manager is
active. In the equilibrium, the manager’s use of her private information and feedback
from the price corresponding to action a(sa, P ) = β0 + β1sa + β2P is:
β1 =
k1
1 + ρ
,
β2 =
k1
1 + k1
ρ
1 + ρ
,
where ρ =
2σ2a(σ
2
t+σ
2
θ)
σ2θ(2σ
2
t+σ
2
θ)
.
The market maker sets the price impact α1 as:
α1 = (1 + k1)
σ2θ
2σy(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
1/2
.
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The informed trader’s trading intensity γ1 is:
γ1 =
[
σ2y
σ2θ + σ
2
t
]1/2
.
See the appendix to this chapter for the expressions for β0, γ0 and α0. Recall
that k1 =
w′′
C′′−w′′ (see equation 3.2). ρ is a measure of precision of price as a signal of
θ, relative to the manager’s private information. In the limiting case when σ2a goes
to infinity, β1 goes to 0 and β2 goes to
k1
1+k1
. In that case, the model reduces to a
standard model with feedback effects.3 Further, the expected profits of the informed
trader (see Proposition III.6) reduce to the profits of the informed trader with a
passive manager. It implies that the manager’s use of information in price does not
affect the profits of the informed trader.
On the other hand, if σ2t is low, then the price is more precise (ρ is high), and
the manager’s use of the stock price (β2) is high. Moreover, as price becomes more
informative, ceteris paribus, manager decreases her use of private information (β1 is
low). In other words, if the manager does not know much about future investment
returns, while the market has more precise information about the fundamental, she
will use more information from the price. Therefore, in equilibrium, the manager’s
use of feedback from price is increasing with quality of information from price and
decreasing with her own quality of information.
3.5.4 Equilibrium Price Volatility and Price Informativeness
Proposition III.8 shows that the equilibrium price impact is increasing with k1.
k1 is determined by the compensation contract provided to the manager. k1 is high
if the compensation has high powered pay-for-performance incentives. Lemma III.2
shows that the manager’s compensation contract provides her with incentives to take
higher action when her prediction about θ is high. Thus, if k1 is high, the manager’s
3See Bond et al. (2011) for a survey paper on the real effects of financial markets.
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decision is more sensitive to her prediction about θ. This increases the uncertainty
in the firm value and the market maker responds by increasing the price impact.
Note, the equilibrium trading intensity of the informed trader does not depend
on k1. This is because the market maker chooses the price impact (shown earlier in
Lemma III.5) so that the trading intensity of the informed trader does not depend on
the manager’s action. Next, we calculate the equilibrium price informativeness and
equilibrium price volatility. The equilibrium price informativeness and price volatility
are:
PI =
σ2θ
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
, (3.22)
V (P ) = (1 + k1)
2 (σ
2
θ)
2
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
. (3.23)
The equilibrium price informativeness does not depend on k1. The reason is, as
before, the equilibrium price informativeness only depends on trading intensity, which
is unaffected by the manager’s actions and thus her compensation contract. However,
the equilibrium price volatility is greater if k1 is high. Again, the reason is if k1 is
high, manager’s action is more sensitive to µ, which increases the uncertainty in the
firm value, and the market maker raises the price impact, which increases the price
volatility.
We use the standard definition of price informativeness about the firm value from
the literature.
PIFirm =
V ar[V ]− V ar[V |P ]
V ar[V ]
.
Using simple algebra, it follows that, in equilibrium, the price informativeness about
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the firm value is:
PIFirm =
σ2θ
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
(1 + k1)
2σ2θ
σ2θ + (k
2
1 + 2k1)V ar(µ)
,
where V ar(µ) = V ar[E[θ|I]]. Using the fact that V ar(µ) is smaller than V ar(θ), it
follows that the price informativeness about the firm value with an active manager is
greater than with a passive manager (see equation 3.8).
The reason is that the active manager’s action increases the uncertainty in the firm
value which decreases the price informativeness but the increase in uncertainty in-
creases the covariance between V and P , which increases the price informativeness. To
see this, note that Cov(V, P ) = Cov(θ, P ) + k1Cov(µ, P ) and Cov(µ, P ) = Cov(θ, P )
since the information set of the market maker is a subset of the information set
I = {sa, P} of the manager. Thus, the greater uncertainty increases the covariance
by a factor of 1 + k1, while the total uncertainty in firm value does not increase as
much (since V ar(µ) < σ2θ). Overall, the price informativeness about the firm value is
greater when the manager is active. We summarize the results of this section in the
following proposition.
Proposition III.9. Manager’s learning in the active manager equilibrium does not
affect the price informativeness about the fundamental. However, it leads to greater
price informativeness about the firm value. Also, the equilibrium market price is more
volatile in active manager equilibrium.
We use this result to study the effect of an increase in the precision of manager’s
private information sa on price informativeness of the fundamental and price informa-
tiveness of the firm value. As we show in Lemma III.5, due to an increase in the price
impact, the informed trader lowers his trading intensity such that it is unaffected by
manager’s learning. Thus, when the manager’s information is more precise and she
learns more from her private information, it does not affect the trading intensity of
128
the informed trader, and consequently does not affect the price informativeness about
the fundamental.
Interestingly, ceteris paribus, the price informativeness about the firm value de-
creases as the precision of manager’s private information increases. The reason is
that an increase in the precision of manager’s private information increases the to-
tal uncertainty in firm value, while keeping Cov(V, P ) unchanged. Thus, the price
informativeness about the firm value decreases.
3.5.5 Equilibrium Expected Profits of the Informed Trader
In this section, we calculate the expected profits of the informed trader in equilib-
rium. Then, we use the manager’s equilibrium use of information to study its effects
on the incentives of the informed trader to gather information about fundamentals.
Recall from proposition III.6, that the expected profits of the informed trader are
high if his information is precise and if manager uses more of her private information.
More importantly, the expected profits are unaffected by the manager’s use of market
price. We use the equilibrium use of private information from proposition III.8 and
show that the unconditional expected profits of the informed trader, in equilibrium,
are:
E[pi(st)] =
(
1 +
k1
1 + ρ
)
σyσ
2
θ
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
.
This result shows that the expected profits of the informed trader are decreasing
with ρ where ρ is a measure of informed trader’s information precision relative to
manager’s private information. It implies that the information precision of the in-
formed trader σ2t affects his profits in two ways, a direct effect and through ρ. The
direct effect is obvious. The indirect effect of increasing precision of informed trader’s
information increases price informativeness, which, in equilibrium, makes the man-
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ager use more of price and less of her private information. This benefits the liquidity
traders and lowers the wealth transfer from the liquidity traders to the informed
traders (Proposition III.6). Overall, the expected profits of the informed trader are
greater with greater precision of information. This implies that manager’s learning
increases the incentives of the informed trader to gather precise information.
Conversely, if the informed trader has poor quality of information, then the extent
of losses can be compensated if the manager’s private information is of better quality.
Ceteris paribus, if the manager’s precision of information increases, she learns less
from the price, which lowers the benefit to liquidity traders and increases the wealth
transfer from the liquidity traders to the informed trader.
Thus, our model sheds light on the incentives of outsiders to gather precise infor-
mation when the manager is active. In equilibrium, the informed trader’s information
affects the price informativeness, which affects the amount of learning by the manager,
which in turn affects the profit of liquidity traders and net informational advantage
to the informed trader. Overall, ex-ante the informed trader has greater expected
profits which increases the incentives to gather precise information.
3.6 Competition Between Informed Traders
In this section, we solve the model if there are N informed traders competing in
quantities in a Cournot competition. We assume that all traders obtain the same
private information st. The trading strategy xi for trader i is obtained by solving :
max
xi
E[(V − P )xi|st, xi] . (3.24)
The total order flow received by the market maker is q =
∑
xi + y, where ,as before,
y is order of the liquidity traders. The price set by the market maker to obtain zero
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expected profits is:
P (q) = E[V |q] = α0 + α1q . (3.25)
In equilibrium since all traders have the same private information, their order are
the same. We assume the order to be equal to γ0 + γ1st. As before, we first solve
for the optimal trading strategy and market maker’s optimal pricing rule given the
manager’s decision rule to be exogenous. The equilibrium values of γ1, α1 are:
γ1 =
[
σ2y
N(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
]1/2
, (3.26)
α1 =
√
N
N + 1
1 + β1
1− β2
σ2θ
σy(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
1/2
. (3.27)
See Appendix for γ0 and α0. Similar to the earlier section with monopolistic informed
trader, the market maker increases the price impact to account for the increase in
uncertainty in the firm value. However, the increase in price impact is lower than
would be in the case of a monopolistic informed trader. Note as N (> 1) increases,
the price impact is lower and the trading intensity of each trader is lower. But the
aggregate trading intensity increases with N, which reduces the adverse selection risk
to the market maker. Thus, he sets lower price impact.
Before solving for the manager’s optimal action, we solve for the aggregate ex-
pected profits of the informed trader. The aggregate expected profit of informed
traders E[pi(st)] =
∑
E[pii(st)] is:
E[pi(st)] = (1 + β1)
σyσ
2
θ
N1/2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
N
N + 1
. (3.28)
As a direct consequence of Cournot competition the aggregate profits decrease as the
number of informed traders increase. However, the aggregate profits are increasing
with β1. The results of Proposition III.6 hold when there is competition between
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informed traders. i.e the informational advantage to the informed trader comes only
from the manager’s use of private information.
Next, we solve for the manager’s optimal action given the trading intensity and
market liquidity. The manager’s optimal decision rule is given by a(sa, P ) = β0 +
β1sa + β2P where β0(α, γ), β1(α, γ) and β2(α, γ) can be seen in the appendix. As
with one monopolistic informed trader case analyzed earlier, the manager use of
feedback from the prices is greater if price impact is low. Also, the price impact
chosen by the market maker is greater when manager’s use of information is greater.
The equilibrium is obtained as a fixed point, where the manager’s use of information
corresponds to a price impact, which in turn corresponds to a trading intensity and
price informativeness so that such use of information is optimal.
We show the existence of a unique equilibrium in Proposition III.10 below.
Proposition III.10. There exists a unique equilibrium. In the equilibrium the man-
ager’s action is β0 + β1sa + β2P where:
β1 =
k1
1 + ρN
,
β2 =
k1
1 + k1
ρN
[1 + ρN ]
,
where ρN =
(N+1)σ2a(σ
2
t+σ
2
θ)
σ2θ((N+1)σ
2
t+σ
2
θ)
.
The market maker pricing rule is α0 + α1q where:
α1 =
√
N
N + 1
(1 + k1)
σ2θ
σy(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
1/2
.
The informed trader’s trading strategy is γ0 + γ1st where:
γ1 =
[
σ2y
N(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
]1/2
.
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The expected profits of the informed trader before receiving private information st are:
E[pi(st)] =
(
1 +
k1
1 + ρN
)
σyσ
2
θ
N1/2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
N
N + 1
.
See Appendix for the expressions for β0, α0 and γ0. In this equilibrium, with mul-
tiple traders, the informed traders collectively trade with a greater intensity, which
impounds greater information into prices. Thus, the price precision relative to man-
ager’s private information ρN is greater than ρ. Thus, the manager uses greater
feedback from the price, and lowers her use of private information. This increases the
correlation between liquidity trading and firm value which benefits liquidity traders
and lowers the wealth transfer from liquidity traders to the informed traders. Thus,
we provide another channel through which the profits of the informed trader decrease
beyond the forces of market competition.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we model the effect of market prices on the real decisions of the
manager. We show that the incentives of the manager induce her to learn about the
fundamentals from the price, in addition to her private information. The feedback
from price improves the information set of the manager, and therefore improves the
efficiency of manager’s decisions. That is, as the manager’s knowledge of the state
improves, her actions are more appropriate for the state of the world. Thus, the feed-
back from the market price affects the manager’s learning, and consequently affects
her actions and firm value.
However, manager’s decision, in particular, manager’s learning from prices to
improve her information set, affects the price formation process which aggregates
the information of the speculators into the prices in the first place. We show that
manager’s learning, both from her private information and from the prices, increases
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the price impact and price volatility. On the contrary, manager’s learning from her
private information and from prices do not affect the trading intensity of the informed
trader, and hence price informativeness about the fundamentals. That is, manager’s
learning does not reduce the discovery aspect of the information content in the prices.
We also show that manager’s learning from her private information and from the
feedback from market price has opposite effects on the expected profits of the in-
formed trader. Only the manager’s learning from her private information increases
the expected profits of the informed trader. The reason is that the manager’s learning
increases uncertainty about her actions which increases the uncertainty in firm value,
thereby increasing the informational advantage to the informed trader. On the con-
trary, the feedback from price affects the manager’s learning and her action, but does
not affect the expected profits of the informed trader. Because the market maker, by
setting a higher price impact, “undoes” the informational advantage created by the
feedback from price.
Our model also generates implications for underpricing in the IPOs and incentives
of the informed trader in information acquisition. We show that the manager’s in-
centives induce her to gather information before taking actions. When the manager’s
private information is of greater precision, it increases the expected profits of the in-
formed trader. This increases the incentives of the informed trader to gather precise
information. Moreover, it increases the losses to the uninformed liquidity traders and
thereby aggravates the underpricing in the IPOs.
3.8 Proofs
Proof of Proposition III.3. The expected payoff to the manager can be written as:
pi(µ, σ2) = E[w(θ + a∗(µ))− C(a∗(µ))|I] ,
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where I = {sa, P}, and σ2 = V [θ|I]. In Lemma III.2, we assume that w′ is linear and
show a∗(µ) = k0 + k1µ. Using that assumption here, we can re-write the expected
payoff as:
pi(µ, σ2) = w(µ+ a∗(µ)) + w′E[(θ − µ)|I] + 1
2
w′′E[(θ − µ)2|I]− C(a∗(µ))
= w(µ+ a∗(µ)) +
1
2
w′′σ2 − C(a∗(µ)) ,
where σ2 = V [θ|I]. Next, we show that expected payoff E[pi] is increasing in the pre-
cision of information set. We write the ex-ante expected payoff by taking expectation
and substituting a∗(µ) = k0 + k1µ as:
E[pi] = E[w(µ+ a∗(µ)) +
1
2
w′′σ2 − C(a∗(µ))]
= w(θ0 + a
∗(θ0)) +
1
2
w′′(1 + k1)2V (µ) +
1
2
w′′σ2 − C(a∗(θ0))− 1
2
C ′′k21V (µ) .
We use the fact that σ2 + V (µ) = σ2θ and re-write the equation as:
E[pi] = w(θ0 + a
∗(θ0)) +
1
2
w′′σ2θ − C(a∗(θ0)) +
1
2
(w′′(k21 + 2k1)− C ′′k21)V (µ) .
We substitute k1 =
w′′
C′′−w′′ and get:
E[pi] = w(θ0 + a
∗(θ0)) +
1
2
w′′σ2θ − C(a∗(θ0)) +
1
2
(w′′)2
C ′′ − w′′V (µ) .
As the information set I is more precise, V (E[θ|I]) is greater, which increases E[pi]
only if w′′ > 0. If w′′ = 0, then E[pi] is not affected by the precision of information
I.  
Proof of Lemma III.5. We first solve for informed trader’s strategy given the pricing
rule P (q) = α0 +α1q and the manager’s decision rule a(sa, P ) = β0 +β1sa+β2P . The
noise in the manager’s private information is assumed to be independent of the in-
135
formed trader’s private information. Thus, the optimal order x(st) = arg maxxE[(V −
P )x|st, x] for the informed trader is then
x(st) = γ0 + γ1st =
(1 + β1)E[θ|st] + β0 − (1− β2)α0
2α1(1− β2) , (3.1)
where
γ0 =
(1 + β1)
σ2t θ0
σ2θ+σ
2
t
+ β0
2α1(1− β2) −
α0
2α1
, (3.2)
γ1 =
(1 + β1)
2α1(1− β2)
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
t
. (3.3)
Next, we solve for the market maker’s pricing rule P (q) = α0+α1q given the informed
trader’s trading strategy x(st) = γ0 +γ1st and the manager’s decision rule a(sa, P ) =
β0 + β1sa + β2P . The pricing rule P (q) = E[V |q = (x+ y)] = α0 + α1q is then
P (q) = α0 + α1q =
1 + β1
1− β2E[θ|q] +
β0
1− β2 , (3.4)
where
α0 =
1 + β1
1− β2
θ0(σ
2
t +
σ2y
γ21
)− γ0
γ1
σ2θ
σ2t +
σ2y
γ21
+ σ2θ
+
β0
1− β2 , (3.5)
α1 =
1 + β1
1− β2
σ2θ
γ1
σ2t +
σ2y
γ21
+ σ2θ
. (3.6)
Next, we solve for γ0, γ1, α0, α1 as a function of β0, β1, β2 and the primitives of
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the model. After simple algebra, it follows that:
γ0 = −θ0 σy
(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
(3.7)
γ1 =
[
σ2y
σ2θ + σ
2
t
]1/2
(3.8)
α0 =
1 + β1
1− β2 θ0 +
β0
1− β2 (3.9)
α1 =
1 + β1
1− β2
σ2θ
2σy(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
1/2
(3.10)
Thus equations (3.7,3.10) show the effect of manager’s decision rule on trading inten-
sity and price impact.  
Proof of Proposition III.6. Expected Profits of the Informed Trader given manager’s
decision
Using the equilibrium values of γ, α in (3.7)-(3.10), it can be easily shown that the
profits of the informed trader (pi(st)) after receiving their private information st are:
pi(st) = E[(V − P )x|st]
= E[(θ + β0 + β1sa + β2P − P )(γ0 + γ1st)|st]
= (1 + β1)
σy
(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
σ2θ(st − θ0)2
2(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
where the third equality is obtained by substituting the equilibrium values of γ(β) and
α(β). The expected profits of the informed trader before receiving private information
st are:
E[pi(st)] = (1 + β1)
σy
(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
σ2θE(st − θ0)2
2(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
E[pi(st)] = (1 + β1)
σyσ
2
θ
2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
This gives us the unconditional expected profits of the informed trader, which are
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increasing with manager’s use of her private information and are unaffected from the
manager’s learning from prices.  
Proof of Lemma III.7. We solve for optimal manager’s action given the trading inten-
sity and market liquidity. The manager’s optimal action a(sa, P ) = β0 + β1sa + β2P
is:
a(sa, P ) = k0 + k1E[θ|sa, P ] (3.11)
= k0 + k1
θ0
σ2θ
+ sa
σ2a
+ P−α0−α1γ0
α1γ1
1
σ2t+σ
2
y/γ
2
1
1
σ2θ
+ 1
σ2a
+ 1
σ2t+σ
2
y/γ
2
1
(3.12)
where
β0 = k0 + k1
θ0
σ2θ
+ −α0−α1γ0
α1γ1
1
σ2t+σ
2
y/γ
2
1
1
σ2θ
+ 1
σ2a
+ 1
σ2t+σ
2
y/γ
2
1
(3.13)
β1 = k1
1
σ2a
1
σ2θ
+ 1
σ2a
+ 1
σ2t+σ
2
y/γ
2
1
(3.14)
β2 = k1
1
α1γ1
1
σ2t+σ
2
y/γ
2
1
1
σ2θ
+ 1
σ2a
+ 1
σ2t+σ
2
y/γ
2
1
(3.15)
First, we solve for β1 and β2 given γ1, while α1 is endogenous. We can directly observe
from equation (3.14) that β1 is decreasing with γ1. In order to see the effect of γ1 on
β2, we substitute for α1 from equation (3.6). We get β2 as:
β2 =
k1(1− β2)
(1 + β1)
σ2a
σ2θ+σ
2
a
(σ2t +
σ2y
γ21
+ σ2θ)
σ2t + σ
2
y/γ
2
1 + σ
2
θ
σ2a
σ2θ+σ
2
a
(3.16)
From the above equation, it directly follows that the manager’s learning from price
is increasing with trading intensity γ1. Next, we solve for β1 and β2 as a function of
α1 by replacing γ1 from equation (3.3). We get two nonlinear equations in β1 and
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β2 which we solve using matlab and show that β1 is increasing with α1 while β2 is
decreasing with α1.  
Proof of Proposition III.8. We solve for the equilibrium by substituting γ0, γ1, α0, α1
into the expressions for β0, β1, β2. First, by direct substitution of γ1, the equilibrium
value of β1 is:
β1 = k1
σ2θ(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
σ2a(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
θ(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
θσ
2
a
(3.17)
= k1
σ2θ(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
2σ2a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
θ(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
(3.18)
By substituting α1 and γ1, the equilibrium value of β2 is:
β2 =
k1
α1γ1
σ2θσ
2
a
σ2a(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
θ(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
θσ
2
a
(3.19)
β2 =
k1(1− β2)2(σ2t + σ2θ)
(1 + β1)
σ2a
σ2a(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
θ(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
θσ
2
a
(3.20)
β2 =
k1
(1+β1)
2(σ2t+σ
2
θ)σ
2
a
σ2a(2σ
2
t+σ
2
θ)+σ
2
θ(2σ
2
t+σ
2
θ)+σ
2
θσ
2
a
1 + k1
(1+β1)
2(σ2t+σ
2
θ)σ
2
a
σ2a(2σ
2
t+σ
2
θ)+σ
2
θ(2σ
2
t+σ
2
θ)+σ
2
θσ
2
a
(3.21)
β2 =
k1
1 + k1
2σ2a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
[2σ2a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
θ(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)]
(3.22)
Next we solve for equilibrium value of β0 as follows:
β0 = k0 + k1
θ0
σ2θ
+ −α0−α1γ0
α1γ1
1
σ2t+σ
2
y/γ
2
1
1
σ2θ
+ 1
σ2a
+ 1
σ2t+σ
2
y/γ
2
1
(3.23)
= k0 + k1
θ0(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)(σ
2
a) +
−α0−α1γ0
α1γ1
(σ2aσ
2
θ)
(2σ2t + σ
2
θ)σ
2
a + (2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)σ
2
θ + σ
2
aσ
2
θ
(3.24)
= k0 − k1 β02σ
2
a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
2σ2a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + (2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)σ
2
θ(1 + k1)
(3.25)
=
k0
1 + k1
[
1 +
k1(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)σ
2
θ
2σ2a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + (2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)σ
2
θ
]
(3.26)
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For simplicity, lets define ρ as:
ρ =
2σ2a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
σ2θ(2σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
(3.27)
Now, β0, β1 and β2 can be written as:
β0 =
k0
1 + k1
[
1 +
k1
1 + ρ
]
(3.28)
β1 =
k1
1 + ρ
(3.29)
β2 =
k1
1 + k1
ρ
[1 + ρ]
(3.30)
We use the above values of β0, β1, β2 to obtain the equilibrium informed trader’s
order and the equilibrium market price set by the market maker. We have shown
above that the informed trader’s order does not depend on the manager’s action.
The equilibrium market price set by the market maker is:
α0 = θ0 + k0 + k1θ0 (3.31)
α1 = (1 + k1)
σ2θ
2σy(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
1/2
(3.32)
The equilibrium order strategy of the informed trader is the same as (3.7,3.8) since
it does not depend on β.  
Proof of Proposition III.10. To solve the model, we first solve for informed trader’s
strategy given the pricing rule P (q) = α0 + α1q and the manager’s decision rule
a(sa, P ) = β0 + β1sa + β2P . Thus, the optimal order xi(st) = arg maxxi E[(V −
P )xi|st, xi] for the informed trader i is then
xi(st) = γ0 + γ1st =
(1 + β1)E[θ|st] + β0 − (1− β2)(α0 + α1
∑
j 6=i xj)
2α1(1− β2) (3.33)
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where γ0 and γ1 can be easily shown as:
γ0 =
2
N + 1
(1 + β1) σ2t θ0σ2θ+σ2t + β0
2α1(1− β2) −
α0
2α1
 (3.34)
γ1 =
2
N + 1
(1 + β1)
2α1(1− β2)
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
t
(3.35)
Next, we solve for the market maker’s pricing rule P (q) = α0+α1q given the informed
traders trading strategy
∑
xi(st) = N(γ0 + γ1st) and the manager’s decision rule
a(sa, P ) = β0 + β1sa + β2P . The pricing rule P (q) = E[V |q = (
∑
xi + y)] = α0 +α1q
is then
P (q) = α0 + α1q =
1 + β1
1− β2E[θ|q] +
β0
1− β2 (3.36)
where
α0 =
1 + β1
1− β2
θ0(σ
2
t +
σ2y
N2γ21
)− γ0
γ1
σ2θ
σ2t +
σ2y
N2γ21
+ σ2θ
+
β0
1− β2 (3.37)
α1 =
1 + β1
1− β2
σ2θ
Nγ1
σ2t +
σ2y
N2γ21
+ σ2θ
(3.38)
Next, we solve for γ0, γ1, α0, α1 as a function of β0, β1, β2 and the primitives of
the model. After simple algebra, it follows that:
γ0 = −θ0 σy
N1/2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
(3.39)
γ1 =
[
σ2y
N(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
]1/2
(3.40)
α0 =
1 + β1
1− β2 θ0 +
β0
1− β2 (3.41)
α1 =
√
N
N + 1
1 + β1
1− β2
σ2θ
σy(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
1/2
(3.42)
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Expected Profits of the Informed Trader given Manager’s decision rule
Using the equilibrium values of γ, α given manager’s decision rule, it can be easily
shown that the profits of the informed trader i (pii(st)) after receiving their private
information st are:
pii(st) = E[(V − P )xi|st] (3.43)
= E[(θ + β0 + β1sa + β2P − P )(γ0 + γ1st)|st] (3.44)
= (1 + β1)
σy
N1/2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
1
N + 1
σ2θ(st − θ0)2
(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
(3.45)
where the third equality is obtained by substituting the equilibrium values of γ(β)
and α(β). The expected profits of the informed trader i before receiving private
information st are:
E[pii(st)] = (1 + β1)
σyσ
2
θ
N1/2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
1
N + 1
(3.46)
The total profit of all informed traders E[pi(st)] =
∑
E[pii(st)]is:
E[pi(st)] = (1 + β1)
σyσ
2
θ
N1/2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
N
N + 1
(3.47)
Next, we solve for optimal manager’s action given the trading intensity and market
liquidity. The manager’s optimal action a(sa, P ) = E[k0+k1θ|sa, P ] = β0+β1sa+β2P
where
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β0 = k0 + k1
θ0
σ2θ
+ −α0−α1Nγ0
α1Nγ1
1
σ2t+σ
2
y/(N
2γ21)
1
σ2θ
+ 1
σ2a
+ 1
σ2t+σ
2
y/(N
2γ21)
(3.48)
β1 = k1
1
σ2a
1
σ2θ
+ 1
σ2a
+ 1
σ2t+σ
2
y/(N
2γ21)
(3.49)
β2 = k1
1
α1Nγ1
1
σ2t+σ
2
y/(N
2γ21)
1
σ2θ
+ 1
σ2a
+ 1
σ2t+σ
2
y/(N
2γ21)
(3.50)
Next, we solve for the equilibrium by substituting γ0, γ1, α0, α1 into the expres-
sions for β0,β1, β2. First, by direct substitution of γ1, the equilibrium value of β1
is:
β1 = k1
σ2θ((N + 1)σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
(N + 1)σ2a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
θ((N + 1)σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
(3.51)
By substituting α1 and γ1, the equilibrium value of β2 is:
β2 =
k1
1 + k1
(N + 1)σ2a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
[(N + 1)σ2a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + σ
2
θ((N + 1)σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)]
(3.52)
Note that it gives an interesting relationship between β1 and β2 as follows:
β1 + β2(1 + k1) = k1 (3.53)
Next we solve for equilibrium value of β0 as follows:
β0 =
k0
1 + k1
[
1 +
k1((N + 1)σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)σ
2
θ
(N + 1)σ2a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ) + ((N + 1)σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)σ
2
θ
]
(3.54)
For simplicity, lets define ρN as:
ρN =
(N + 1)σ2a(σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
σ2θ((N + 1)σ
2
t + σ
2
θ)
(3.55)
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Now, β0, β1 and β2 can be written as:
β0 =
k0
1 + k1
[
1 +
k1
1 + ρN
]
(3.56)
β1 =
k1
1 + ρN
(3.57)
β2 =
k1
1 + k1
ρN
[1 + ρN ]
(3.58)
We use the above values of β0, β1, β2 to obtain the equilibrium informed trader’s
order and the equilibrium market price set by the market maker. We have shown
above that the informed trader’s order does not depend on the manager’s action.
The equilibrium market price set by the market maker is:
α0 = θ0 + k0 + k1θ0 (3.59)
α1 =
√
N
N + 1
(1 + k1)
σ2θ
σy(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
1/2
(3.60)
Expected Profits of the Informed Trader in Equilibrium
We find the profits of the informed trader i (pii(st)) by substituting the equilibrium
β1 to be:
pii(st) = (1 + β1)
σy
N1/2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
1
N + 1
σ2θ(st − θ0)2
(σ2t + σ
2
θ)
(3.61)
The expected profits of the informed trader i before receiving private information st
are:
E[pii(st)] =
(
1 +
k1
1 + ρN
)
σyσ
2
θ
N1/2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
1
N + 1
(3.62)
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The total profit of all informed traders E[pi(st)] =
∑
E[pii(st)]is:
E[pi(st)] =
(
1 +
k1
1 + ρN
)
σyσ
2
θ
N1/2(σ2θ + σ
2
t )
1/2
N
N + 1
(3.63)
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